Monument 2A Extensions

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**Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially reform its foreign military presence and/or foreign military commitments.**

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INHERENCY

Not all coming home in 2014. They’re building long-term bases

Nick Turse 2012. (journalist) 13 Feb 2012 "Our non-withdrawal from Afghanistan" (ellipses in original) <http://www.salon.com/2012/02/13/our_non_withdrawal_from_afghanistan/>

The hush-hush, high-tech, super-secure facility at the massive air base in Kandahar is just one of many building projects the U.S. military currently has planned or underway in Afghanistan. While some U.S. bases are indeed closing up shop or being transferred to the Afghan government, and there’s talk of combat operations slowing or ending next year, as well as a withdrawal of American combat forces from Afghanistan by 2014, the U.S. military is still preparing for a much longer haul at mega-bases like Kandahar and Bagram airfields. The same is true even of some smaller camps, forward operating bases (FOBs) and combat outposts (COPs) scattered through the country’s backlands. “Bagram is going through a significant transition during the next year to two years,” Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Gerdes of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Bagram Office recently told Freedom Builder, a Corps of Engineers publication. “We’re transitioning… into a long-term, five-year, 10-year vision for the base.”

HARMS

Afghan government is awful

Doug Bandow 2012. ( J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 6 Mar 2012 Why Are We Still in Afghanistan? <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-we-still-afghanistan>

Afghans are cynical about "their" government. However, they fear "their" security forces, particularly the Afghan National Police. When I visited Afghanistan people described being robbed by the latter, which is supposed to protect them. The latest State Department assessment on human rights reported that the "security forces committed arbitrary or unlawful killings." State cited "reports of serious abuses by government officials, security forces, detention center authorities, and police," including arbitrary arrests, unlawful trials, and illegal imprisonments filled with beatings, torture, and rape. Children are mistreated as well. Such is the government presided over by President Karzai.

Afghan central government is not effective and support is declining

Michael Hart 2012. (Royal Air Force (RAF) officer who served in Afghanistan from 2008–09 and former director of defense studies for the RAF) 28 Feb 2012 NATIONAL INTEREST “West's Afghan Hopes Collide with Reality” (nepotism means hiring your relatives for jobs rather than seeking out qualified candidates) <http://nationalinterest.org/article/wests-afghan-hopes-collide-reality-6510>

Afghanistan’s central government also poses a big question mark for the country. The government almost surely will be weak—a consequence in large measure of President Karzai’s two terms in office. His government has been undermined by corruption, familial and Pashtun nepotism, and a failure to engage consistently with the wider Kabul polity. At the provincial level and below, Karzai’s political situation is not much better. Lack of effective government and the Taliban challenge have undermined his standing, and his support among Pashtuns in the South has declined precipitately.

Local models of governance are more effective than those imposed by the West, and they can resist the Taliban

Michael Hart 2012. (Royal Air Force (RAF) officer who served in Afghanistan from 2008–09 and former director of defense studies for the RAF) 28 Feb 2012 NATIONAL INTEREST “West's Afghan Hopes Collide with Reality” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/wests-afghan-hopes-collide-reality-6510>

Away from the Pashtun South and East, individuals such as Atta Muhammad Noor, governor of Balkh, have established security, provided the basis for local stability and economic growth, and denied the Taliban a foothold. This model of governance, rooted in local conditions and society, is inherently more sustainable than models imposed by the West. Governors such as Noor command respect and raise effective militias, and warlords such as Ismail Khan in Herat have sufficient authority and capacity to provide the basis for coherent resistance to Taliban encroachment. Crucially, they also have overriding personal and ethnic incentives to do so.

Innocent lives ruined. Far too many innocent Afghans have been killed or displaced

Doug Bandow 2012. ( J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 6 Mar 2012 Why Are We Still in Afghanistan? <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-we-still-afghanistan>

In fact, there are reasons why Afghans might hate Americans. Even then U.S. commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal admitted that at checkpoints "We've shot an amazing number of people and killed a number and, to my knowledge, none has proven to have been a real threat to the force." Tens of thousands of Afghans have fled to Pakistan and more than 300,000 have been displaced within their own nation. While the Taliban is primarily responsible for the human carnage, Americans and Europeans are outsiders, who rarely have been welcomed fondly by people determined to govern themselves.

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY

We should immediately stop spending lives and money on the Afghan war that is not in our national interest

Malou Innocent 2012. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 27 Feb 2012 It’s Time to Cut Our Losses in Afghanistan <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/its-time-to-cut-our-losses-in-afghanistan/>

According to a poll from last summer by the Pew Research Center, 59 percent of Americans want a withdrawal from Afghanistan immediately—not two years from now, not six months from now. Immediately. Americans may finally be realizing what George Mason University’s Christopher Coyne has argued, which is that the historical record indicates “that attempts to spread liberal democracy via military occupation will fail more often than they will work.” More money, more time, and more resources will not change these underlying realities. To continue to train and assist the Afghan national army and police when distrust remains this high risks more violent incidents like this, and this, and this. Rather than become Afghanistan’s perpetual crutch, Washington must cut its losses. The war is fiscally irresponsible and wasteful of U.S. taxpayer dollars. Most importantly, no more American or Afghan lives should be lost in pursuit of a strategy that is not in America’s national interest.

Afghanistan isn’t worth 1 more American life

Doug Bandow 2012. ( J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 6 Mar 2012 Why Are We Still in Afghanistan? <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-we-still-afghanistan> (ellipses in original)

THE LATEST ROUND of violence should cause Americans to reflect on what Afghanistan is and is likely to become. U.S. foreign policy cannot be based solely on the perceived worthiness of those being defended, but presidential contender Newt Gingrich made an important point when he declared that Washington shouldn't risk "the life of a single American... in a country whose religious fanatics are trying to kill us and whose government seems to be on the side of the fanatics."

Obama should accelerate withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan

Malou Innocent and Robert Naiman 2012. (Innocent - Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Naiman - has worked as a policy analyst and researcher at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch; masters degrees in economics and mathematics from the Univ of Illinois and has studied and worked in the Middle East) “Stop Treading Water in Afghanistan” 13 Mar 2012 <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/stop-treading-water-afghanistan>

Rather than continue to tread water in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama should announce an accelerated drawdown of U.S. troops. Sharing intelligence with allies and partners, scrutinizing people trying to enter the United States who may be linked to terrorist groups and relying on targeted raids against Al Qaeda leaders — as opposed to local insurgents who aren't trying to attack the U.S. — are the most efficient means of reducing the threat from terrorism. Compared to drawn-out nation-building campaigns, targeted operations are the lesser of two evils. They don't require tens of thousands of U.S. troops to occupy Afghanistan or any foreign country. These operations are far less costly in terms of lives, money, time and effort than attempts to cultivate a foreign people's allegiance to a rapacious and unpopular central government backed by foreign forces. Without a drastic change in strategy, the war in Afghanistan will continue to be a slow bleed.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai wants faster exit of US troops

Associated Press 2012. (journalists Deb Riechmann and Amir Shah) 15 March 2012 Karzai Tells NATO to Pull Back <http://www.military.com/news/article/karzai-tells-nato-to-pull-back.html>

The American campaign in Afghanistan suffered a double blow Thursday: The Taliban broke off talks with the U.S., and President Hamid Karzai said NATO should pull out of rural areas and speed up the transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan forces nationwide in the wake of the killing of 16 civilians. The moves represent new challenges to America's strategy for ending the 10-year-old war at a time when support for the conflict is plummeting. Part of the U.S. exit strategy is to transfer authority gradually to Afghan forces. Another tack is to pull the Taliban into political discussions with the Afghan government, though it's unclear that there has been any progress since January. Although Karzai has previously said that he wanted international troops to transition out of rural areas, the apparent call for an immediate exit is new. Karzai also said he now wants Afghan forces take the lead for countrywide security in 2013, in what appeared to be a move to push the U.S. toward an earlier drawdown.

Each US service member in Afghanistan costs between ½ to 1.2 million dollars / year

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Estimates indicate that each U.S. service member in Afghanistan costs between $500,000 and $1,200,000 annually. With just under 100,000 troops in Afghanistan the bill will range between $50 billion and over $100 billion per year. The United States is pursuing a costly strategy in Afghanistan that is unnecessary for securing vital U.S. interests in that country.

Afghans will follow their own path - outsiders cannot change it

Michael Hart 2012. (Royal Air Force (RAF) officer who served in Afghanistan from 2008–09 and former director of defense studies for the RAF) 28 Feb 2012 NATIONAL INTEREST “West's Afghan Hopes Collide with Reality” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/wests-afghan-hopes-collide-reality-6510>

HISTORY SUGGESTS that Afghanistan ultimately always follows its own path, guided in arcane and often obscure ways by powerful competing forces of ethnicity, tribalism, religion, geography, regional feuds, a fervor of national protectiveness and unbending obstinacy. For centuries these forces have militated against a strong central government in Kabul and all manner of foreign incursion.

DISAD RESPONSES

“Al Qaeda resurgence” - Response: Victory won’t matter and leaving won’t make it more dangerous

Prof. Stephen Walt 2012. (professor of international affairs at Harvard University) 3 Apr 2012 “Don’ t Prolong the Inevitable” NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/there-is-no-need-to-prolong-the-inevitable>

Fortunately, Afghanistan is not a vital United States interest. President Obama had said that we must prevent Al Qaeda from establishing safe havens there, but Osama bin Laden is dead and Al Qaeda already has better safe havens elsewhere. Victory in Afghanistan will not eliminate Al Qaeda, and leaving won’t make it more dangerous. If it makes no difference whether we win or lose, why fight on?

“Civil war without US troops” - Response: Non-unique. Civil war is inevitable, we should stop sacrificing American lives trying to prevent it

Chris Mason 2012. (Navy veteran and retired foreign service officer who served in combat in 2005 in Paktika Province, Afghanistan; currently an analyst, counterinsurgency instructor and senior fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington) 3 Apr 2012 The Lesson of Vietnam: Out Now , NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/learn-the-lessons-of-vietnam-out-now>

Civil war is inevitable in Afghanistan, and by 2016 there will again be helicopters on the embassy roof. No amount of temporary local tactical victories can possibly change this strategic calculus. We should be focused now on how to manage the coming civil war, not telling more lies about the emperor’s new clothes and his imaginary progress. Every American life lost now is sacrificed for political theater with no chance whatever of changing the eventual outcome, and that is obscene.

Remaking Afghan society is a hopeless task

Doug Bandow 2012. ( J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 6 Mar 2012 Why Are We Still in Afghanistan? <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-we-still-afghanistan>

Remaking Afghan society is a hopeless task. Social engineering is hard enough at home. Doing so abroad is far more difficult, especially when many Afghans are ready to kill when offended by those who believe differently than them. The problem runs far deeper than the loss of mutual trust between Afghans and allies, as some observers suggest. Afghan society may — and hopefully will — eventually evolve in a more humane direction, but it will do so on Afghanistan's, not America's, schedule.

Decline of Afghan central state will not be a problem: Al Qaeda will not recreate safe havens and Pak militants won’t find sanctuary there

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

The upshot of this analysis is that state building is not necessary to succeed in Afghanistan. The decline of the central state will not lead to a domino effect in the region. Al Qaeda will not be able to recreate its old safe haven there even if the government collapses. Pakistani militants will not find reliable sanctuary either, regardless of what happens in Kabul.

“Al Qaeda will take over” - Response: Al Qaeda will have to remain in hiding

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

A state-building failure would not mean victory for al Qaeda or the Taliban. Even if the United States substantially reduces its ground forces in Afghanistan and the Kabul government remains weak and ineffectual, al Qaeda would not be able to recreate anything like the safe haven it once enjoyed. The original circumstances that made sanctuary possible no longer exist today. In the 1990s there was little domestic support for aggressive U.S. counterterrorism operations abroad, and the Clinton administration debated at length whether to strike large al Qaeda training camps. Today there would be little debate; indeed, the Obama administration would surely welcome the opportunity to conduct strikes against well-defined terrorist strongholds without having to cross over into Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban, which by now is very familiar with U.S. air power, has much to lose by inviting al Qaeda back. As the Afghanistan Study Group aptly concludes, senior al Qaeda leaders “will likely have to remain in hiding for the rest of their lives, which means Al Qaeda will have to rely on clandestine cells instead of large encampments.”

We don’t need a policy to block safe havens for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

We don’t need to worry about securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, policymakers have emphasized two basic national security interests at stake in Afghanistan. The first is preventing al Qaeda and its Taliban allies from reestablishing a safe haven. The second is preventing the violence in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan, thus putting its nuclear forces at risk and increasing the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Coalition strategy is based on the assumptions that the only way to deny al Qaeda safe haven is by building a strong central Afghan state and that Pakistan’s nuclear complex will become increasingly vulnerable to militant attacks if the Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan. Both assumptions are wrong. The United States does not need to build a state in Afghanistan because the conditions that allowed al Qaeda safe haven in the 1990s have permanently changed. Moreover, the steps needed to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal have nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we continue to operate on the bases of these mistaken beliefs, and the result is that American strategy has become incoherent.

We can still strike Al Qaeda effectively with air power

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

The U.S. military has recently demonstrated the vulnerability of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In the Korengal Valley of eastern Afghanistan, an area where the United States has withdrawn conventional forces, al Qaeda attempted to reestablish a training camp in 2010. It was subsequently struck by U.S. aircraft, resulting in the deaths of dozens of al Qaeda affiliates, including two senior leaders. Some observers interpret this as demonstrating that al Qaeda will find sanctuary where U.S. conventional forces are absent, yet it actually demonstrates that U.S. intelligence collection and ability to strike are substantial, even in areas without conventional forces on the ground.

Taliban will not promote al Qaeda in Afghanistan

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. ( Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Moreover, al Qaeda operatives still residing in Pakistan may believe that they can wait out the United States before it leaves the region. Pakistani militants, on the other hand, are enemies of the Pakistani state, which is not going anywhere. If the Afghan Taliban succeeded in retaking part or all of Afghanistan, it would risk losing ISI support if it offered a substantial sanctuary to Pakistan’s enemies. It is possible that some members of the Pakistani groups might find shelter there, but the Afghan militants would have a strong incentive to ensure that their numbers remained low enough to be plausibly deniable to the ISI.

“Pakistan nukes at risk” - Response: Taliban success/failure will not affect Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. ( Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

In reality, success or failure against the Afghanistan Taliban will not affect the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The issues are unrelated. The logic behind the administration’s concern is that militants will have a better chance of acquiring nuclear weapons if they operate from a secure foothold. The stronger the Taliban become in Afghanistan, the more dangerous they will become to Pakistan. And because political instability in Afghanistan is likely to spill across the border, the government in Islamabad will be less capable of stopping them. This logic is wrong. For the reasons discussed above, fear of a safe haven in Afghanistan is wildly exaggerated. Afghan militants may find some protection from U.S. forces by hiding in Pakistan, but Pakistani militants will find no similar refuge in an Afghanistan dominated by Islamic militants.

“Pakistan destabilizes” - Response: Pakistan instability is caused by forces within Pakistan, not Afghanistan

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. ( Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

This modern version of the domino theory ignores the fact that the root causes of Pakistani instability are found in Pakistan, not across the border. Nonetheless, recent attacks against Pakistan’s military and nuclear complex have led to fresh concerns about the security of its technology and fissile material. In addition to the bombing of a bus full of workers from the Kahuta Research Laboratories in 2008, militants also launched rockets at suspected nuclear facilities. In the aftermath of the attacks, one observer concluded that a nuclear-armed Taliban “may not be as far-fetched as it might first appear.” Yet closer examination of these attacks shows that the complex itself, much less the weapons, was never in any great danger. Two suicide bombings led to fears that facility defenses were vulnerable, but in both cases the outer perimeter held. In at least one case, the rest of the sprawling facility was immediately locked down when the attack happened.

“Pak nukes at risk” - Response: 1) Militants don’t have the capability to pull it off. 2) Afghan safe haven wouldn’t be of any help to attacks on Pak nukes

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. ( Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Rather than attacking facilities directly, militants could conceivably try to intercept weapons or fissile material in transit. So far, none of the Pakistani groups have shown anything close to the sophistication and resources needed to pull off such an audacious attack. In any case, a safe haven far away in Afghanistan would not help militants seeking to mass forces inside Pakistan to intercept nuclear weapons.

Negotiation with Taliban won’t work

Associated Press 2011. Afghan president says talks with Taliban useless, 1 Oct 2011 <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/afghan-president-says-talks-with-taliban-useless>

Karzai has been pushing for years to reconcile with the Taliban. He says that effort is no longer viable since a suicide bomber claiming to be a peace emissary from the Taliban killed former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani at his home on Sept. 20. Rabbani was leading Karzai's effort to broker peace with the Taliban. Karzai says the only way forward is for Afghanistan to negotiate with Pakistan.

What doesn’t matter: Western involvement , Taliban insurgency, formal reconciliation process

What will matter: Afghan national character and influence of neighboring powers

Michael Hart 2012. (Royal Air Force (RAF) officer who served in Afghanistan from 2008–09 and former director of defense studies for the RAF) 28 Feb 2012 NATIONAL INTEREST “West's Afghan Hopes Collide with Reality” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/wests-afghan-hopes-collide-reality-6510>

However effective Western military organizations are in transitioning to Afghan control, the country’s future will not be decided primarily by the residual structures and legacies of Western involvement, the current Taliban insurgency or even any formal process of reconciliation. Rather, it will be decided more by the country’s ethnic character, the particular nature of local and national governance, and the influence of neighboring powers with enduring geopolitical and strategic imperatives in the region far stronger than those of the West.

“Need US presence to fight corruption in Afghanistan” - Response: International actors in Afghanistan are what fuel corruption

Dr. Luis Peral and Ashley J. Tellis 2011. (Dr. Luis Peral has a PhD in law; was a lecturer in international law at the Carlos III University in Madrid; former Senior Researcher at the Center for Political and Constitutional Studies of the Spanish Government. Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; was assigned to the US Department of State as senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State; served as senior adviser to the ambassador at the US Embassy in New Delhi; served on the National Security Council staff as special assistant to the President)June 2011, Afghanistan 2011-2014 and beyond: from support operations to sustainable peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Afghanistan_2011-2014_Joint_Report.pdf>

Systemic corruption has weakened Afghanistan’s institutions to the point where the political realm has been largely captured by warlords and criminals, making it easy for officials to be corrupted by criminals. Unfortunately, international actors have exacerbated corruption and institutional weakness in Afghanistan. The reluctance of donors to channel aid through state agencies has contributed to weakening the state, instead of strengthening its capacity to deliver aid. Leaving aside petty corruption, which is endemic in many countries, large-scale corruption is in most cases connected one way or another with international private companies. This is particularly true of the security companies operating or acting as intermediaries of operations in Afghanistan.

“Need US presence to stabilize Afghan governance” - Response: Western governance reforms are not sufficiently rooted to endure

Michael Hart 2012. (Royal Air Force (RAF) officer who served in Afghanistan from 2008–09 and former director of defense studies for the RAF) 28 Feb 2012 NATIONAL INTEREST “West's Afghan Hopes Collide with Reality” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/wests-afghan-hopes-collide-reality-6510>

Away from the areas of direct Western military control, Taliban “shadow governance” is far stronger than the writ of Kabul. It is true that the surge of American forces in southern Afghanistan has produced significant tactical gains, and Afghan forces, mentored by Western soldiers, have begun to perform more effectively. But once Western military forces are removed, Taliban influence and control will likely expand once again. The models of provincial governance imposed or attempted by the West are not sufficiently deep or rooted to endure in Pashtun-majority areas.

“Narcotics trade” - Response: US troop presence doesn’t stop drug trade in Afghanistan

Maj. Keith Alfeiri 2011. (Major, Army national guard) thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE, Homeland Security, June 2011 “TO DETERMINE IF A COMBINED US AND AFGHANISTAN MILITARY-CIVILIAN COUNTER-NARCOTICS JOINT TASK FORCE SHOULD BE CREATED TO SUPPORT THE FIGHT AGAINST COUNTERINSURGENCIES IN THE AFGHAN THEATER OF WAR”<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA547238>

Regardless of the presence of U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, insurgents continue to traffic narcotics in and out of the country. Despite the highest troop presence of anywhere in Afghanistan, the drug trade originating in Helmand Province is still a leading source of revenue for the insurgency.

“Narcotics trade” - Response: Opium production is soaring in Afghanistan in status quo

David Williams 2012. (journalist) with British newspaper DAILY MAIL, “Afghan drug war debacle: Blair said smashing opium trade was a major reason to invade but 10 years on heroin production is up from 185 tons a year to 5,800” 17 Feb 2012 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2102158/Heroin-production-Afghanistan-RISEN-61.html>

A report by the UN Office of Drugs and Crime said revenue from opium production in Afghanistan soared by 133 per cent last year to about £900 million after the crop recovered from a 2010 blight and approached previous levels. Ban Ki-moon, in his opening comments, cited a 2011 UN survey saying that poppy cultivation has increased by 7 per cent and opium production by 61 per cent in the past year.

“Need to ensure orderly succession after Karzai” - Response: There will be no orderly political succession

Michael Hart 2012. (Royal Air Force (RAF) officer who served in Afghanistan from 2008–09 and former director of defense studies for the RAF) 28 Feb 2012 NATIONAL INTEREST “West's Afghan Hopes Collide with Reality” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/wests-afghan-hopes-collide-reality-6510>

Karzai raised concerns among American policy makers in 2010 when he sacked two top governmental officials—Interior Minister Mohammad Hanif Atmar and intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh—after they failed to prevent an attack on a Kabul peace council. Such actions belie any idea of an orderly political succession. Thus, the collective behavior of the Kabul polity is likely to revert to that of the early 1990s—jockeying for individual and ethnic advantage as well as the formation of unstable, shifting alliances susceptible to external exploitation and military pressure.

“NATO collapse” - Response: NATO would not dissolve if Afghan mission fails.

Col. Tarn Warren 2009. (US Army, instructor in the Department of Military Strategy, Plans, and Operations at the U.S. Army War College) ISAF and Afghanistan: The Impact of Failure on NATO's Future <http://www.ndu.edu/press/ISAF-and-Afghanistan.html>

The question remains: If ISAF fails, would NATO go with it? Despite all the credible warnings by many respectable leaders, scholars, and observers, the answer is probably no. Not one NATO head of state or foreign minister, despite other grumblings, has suggested dissolving the Alliance. NATO was, is, and will remain critical for transatlantic security and for other reasons. NATO is the only institution in the world with the experience, structure, and capacity not only to handle large-scale security crises, but also to act as the hub of a global web of cooperative security initiatives. Despite occasional rhetoric to the contrary, Europeans will continue to support NATO not only because Russia is in their peripheral vision, but also because continuing to play the "burden-shifting" game gets them the best security at the cheapest price, far less than they would be forced to pay on their own. They would rather tolerate an alliance with a hard-to-heel America than go it alone.

“Afghan civilians will suffer / Human rights will be lost” - Response: Nothing we can do about it in Status Quo either

Prof. Stephen Walt 2012. (professor of international affairs at Harvard University) 3 Apr 2012 “Don’ t Prolong the Inevitable” NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now/there-is-no-need-to-prolong-the-inevitable>

Staying longer will not lead to victory, because the Taliban have sanctuaries and allies in Pakistan and will simply wait us out. Their ideology may be deeply objectionable, but they are an integral part of Afghan society while we are intruders from afar. It would be nice if we could protect Afghan civilians from further strife or future repression, but trying to do so will cost additional hundreds of billions of dollars, take a decade or more, and could still fail. The sad truth is: we do not know how to create stable governance in that unhappy country.

US forces cannot prevent religious persecution in Afghanistan

Doug Bandow 2012. ( J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 6 Mar 2012 Why Are We Still in Afghanistan? <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-we-still-afghanistan>

The group Open Doors ranked Afghanistan number 2 on its latest "World Watch List," up a spot from last year. Afghanistan outranked even Saudi Arabia and Iran in persecution. Explained Open Doors: "the situation remains desolate, especially for minority groups, including the small Christian community. Despite having signed all international agreements designed to protect the freedom of religion, the government in the current setting is not even able to guarantee the most basic tenants of this right. On the contrary, being recognized as a Christian immediately places any believer in a very difficult position." In its most recent report the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom concluded simply: "Conditions for religious freedom remain exceedingly poor for minority religious communities and dissenting members of the majority faith, despite the presence of U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan for almost 10 years and the substantial investment of lives, resources, and expertise by the United States and the international community." Recently "the small and vulnerable Christian community experienced a spike in government arrests, with Christians being detained and some jailed for the 'crime' of apostasy." Last year's State Department assessment of international religious liberty offered a similarly negative assessment.

2A EVIDENCE: CARTER DOCTRINE

TOPICALITY

US has a substantial military commitment in the Persian Gulf

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

Since the conclusion of the Cold War brought an end to Soviet threats to Western Europe, no region of the world has a security architecture more reliant on U.S. power than the Persian Gulf. The U.S. military commitment to the Gulf is substantial for such a small piece of geography. Although hard to quantify now in the face of two ongoing wars, there has been the equivalent of a carrier battle group and air wing in the vicinity of the Gulf for most of the last two decades.

MINOR REPAIR RESPONSE

“Let’s just negotiate more with Iran” - Response: Iran considers negotiation a sign of weakness , they won’t keep deals they negotiate, and they have rejected U.S. efforts at dialog

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf> (“Modus Vivendi” = “means of living with”)

At the public level, the Iranian government’s actions do not seem oriented toward finding a modus vivendi with the United States. There have been a number of reports that private U.S. government gestures to the Iranian government have been rebuffed,and Tehran walked away from what seemed to be an agreement in October 2009 to supply enriched uranium from abroad for the Tehran Research Reactor in exchange for Iran shipping its low-enriched uranium overseas and suspending further high-level enrichment. Further, Iranian behavior in a whole range of negotiations, including for energy rights, suggests an Iranian preoccupation with the country’s own weakness. Negotiators report a lingering Iranian fear that any party’s willingness to strike a deal with the Islamic Republic is in and of itself proof that the deal is more advantageous to that party than to the Iranians, and there is a notable Iranian predilection to seek to renegotiate deals after they have been concluded in order to find terms even more favorable to Iranian interests.

INHERENCY

Carter doctrine established in 1980 but outlasted Carter

Shmuel Rosner 2008. (Journalist) 25 June 2008 “Protecting the Oil Supply,” SLATE, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2008/06/protecting_the_oil_supply.html>

"Let our position be absolutely clear," Jimmy Carter declared. It was January 1980, and a year later he would no longer be president. But the doctrine he espoused in his final State of the Union address was, arguably, one of the few policies that outlasted his tenure. The Carter Doctrine: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America."

Carter Doctrine established in 1980: US will use military force in the Persian Gulf to secure oil

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2011. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College) 13 Nov 2011 “Carter Doctrine” THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WAR, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/9781444338232.wbeow096/abstract>?

“The Carter Doctrine is the term widely given to the US policy of ensuring western dominance of the greater Persian Gulf area and using military means if deemed necessary to ensure the unhindered export of Persian Gulf oil to international markets. This policy was first given formal expression in President Jimmy Carter's State of the Union address of January 23, 1980. In his speech, Carter indicated that the Gulf region represented an area of “great strategic importance” as the source of “two-thirds of the world's exportable oil,” and so the United States was compelled “to preserve the security of this crucial region.” In the operative passage of his speech, Carter declared: “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”

Carter Doctrine was followed by Carter, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2004. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College) “The Carter Doctrine Goes Global” <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Oil_watch/Carter_Doctrine_Global_Oil.html>

George W. Bush's Iraq War, while duplicitous in many respects, is actually the culmination of twenty-five years of U.S. policy to ensure continued domination of the Persian Gulf and its prolific oil fields. In fact, it was a natural expression of the Carter Doctrine. Enunciated by then-President Jimmy Carter in his State of the Union speech in January 1980, the doctrine defines Persian Gulf oil as a "vital interest" of the United States that must be defended "by any means necessary, including military force." Seen in this light, Bush Jr. was merely applying the doctrine when he invaded Iraq in 2003. He's not the first. President Reagan cited it to justify U.S. intervention in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 to help ensure the defeat of Iran. President Bush Sr. invoked it to authorize military action against Iraq in 1991, during the first Gulf War. And Bill Clinton, though not explicitly citing the doctrine, adhered to its tenets. So the use of force to ensure U.S. access to Persian Gulf oil is not a Bush II policy or a Republican policy, but a bipartisan, American policy.

Carter Doctrine has been followed by each of Carter’s successors and broadened

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2010. (PhD; Prof of international relations and history at Boston Univ; graduated from the US Military Academy in 1969, later serving in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, and the Persian Gulf; Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton Univ) WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL 1 Apr 2010 “The Carter Doctrine at 30” <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/andrew-j-bacevich/carter-doctrine-30>

Carter’s immediate aim in January 1980 was also limited. When he declared that "an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States,” to be “repelled by any means necessary,” his primary purpose was to warn the Kremlin against entertaining any thoughts about asserting Soviet dominion over the world’s energy heartland. Yet each of Carter’s successors has reinterpreted his eponymous doctrine, broadening its scope and using it to justify ever larger ambitions. The ultimate effect has been to militarize U.S. policy across various quarters of the Islamic world.

Obama has not repudiated Carter Doctrine

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2009. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College) 23 Jan 2009 “Repudiate the Carter Doctrine” Foreign Policy In Focus, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/repudiate_the_carter_doctrine>

True, Obama has spoken repeatedly of his desire to withdraw U.S. combat troops from Iraq and to hasten the development of petroleum alternatives so as to reduce U.S. reliance on Middle Eastern oil. But he has not specifically repudiated the Carter Doctrine or its underlying premises. Rather, he has emphasized the need to preserve a robust U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf area and to use force when necessary to protect vital American interests there — though exactly what these interests may be, he has yet to spell out in detail.

Obama building up US military presence in Persian Gulf

Thom Shanker & Steven Lee Myers 2011. (Journalists) 29 Oct 2011 U.S. Planning Troop Buildup in Gulf After Exit From Iraq, NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/middleeast/united-states-plans-post-iraq-troop-increase-in-persian-gulf.html?pagewanted=all>

The Obama administration plans to bolster the American military presence in the Persian Gulf after it withdraws the remaining troops from Iraq this year, according to officials and diplomats. That repositioning could include new combat forces in Kuwait able to respond to a collapse of security in Iraq or a military confrontation with Iran.

Libya intervention was about oil

Analysis: Proves Obama continues Carter Doctrine

United Press International 2011. (UPI - leading news agency) 22 Mar 2011 “Libyan war about oil, U.S. lawmaker says” (parentheses in original) <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/03/22/Libyan-war-about-oil-US-lawmaker-says/UPI-48361300801026/>

The U.N. Security Council last week passed a resolution that allowed for military intervention in Libya to protect the civilian population. U.S. Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., the former chairman of the Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming, told MSNBC, however, that a primary reason for intervention was oil. "We're in Libya because of oil," he said. "And I think both Japan and the nuclear technology and Libya and this dependence that we have upon imported oil have both once again highlighted the need for the United States to have a renewable energy agenda going forward." Markey earlier said U.S. President Barack Obama was right to back the Security Council resolution permitting the use of force in Libya. This, he said, was consistent with U.S. commitments to helping the people meet their political aspirations. "But it all goes back to the 5 million barrels of oil that we import from (the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) on a daily basis," he told MSNBC.

“Obama announces reduction in military footprint in the Gulf” - Response: Not going to happen. Forces are rearranging and new facilities are being built

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “ Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/

Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, remarked last week that the U.S. will seek to reduce the American military footprint there. This would allow "us in many respects to demilitarize elements of our foreign policy and establish more normal relationships," he said, to bring the U.S. security posture in the region more "in line with where we were before 1990." Rhodes apparently did not comment on either energy security or Iran. While his comments strike the right tone, there may be less to them than meets the eye. Last week's statement directly contradicted an October New York Times report that administration officials plan to reallocate military resources and combat troops from Iraq to elsewhere in the Gulf, Kuwait in particular. There are compelling reasons to believe that the Obama administration will not demilitarize the Gulf to pre-1990 levels, as Rhodes said. The majority of U.S. military facilities, including the al-Udeid airbase in Qatar and the headquarters of the Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, were built after 1990. New military spending and new construction are planned for 2012.

SIGNIFICANCE / HARMS / FAILURES

US military presence in Strait of Hormuz could trigger war with Iran

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2012 (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College) “Hormuz-Mania“ <http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/175496/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_no_exit_in_the_persian_gulf/>

So oil, the prestige of global dominance, Iran's urge to be a regional power, and domestic political factors are all converging in a combustible mix to make the Strait of Hormuz the most dangerous place on the planet. For both Tehran and Washington, events seem to be moving inexorably toward a situation in which mistakes and miscalculations could become inevitable. Neither side can appear to give ground without losing prestige and possibly even their jobs. In other words, an existential test of wills is now under way over geopolitical dominance in a critical part of the globe, and on both sides there seem to be ever fewer doors marked “EXIT.” As a result, the Strait of Hormuz will undoubtedly remain the ground zero of potential global conflict in the months ahead.

Carter Doctrine risks one war after another in the Persian Gulf region

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2009. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College) 23 Jan 2009 “Repudiate the Carter Doctrine” Foreign Policy In Focus, <http://www.fpif.org/articles/repudiate_the_carter_doctrine>

So long as the United States adheres to a policy that legitimates the use of military force to protect the flow of oil, we run the risk of involvement in one war after another in the ever-volatile Persian Gulf region. True, other issues and objectives have been associated with these wars, but the underlying strategic premise for every U.S. intervention in the Gulf since 1980 has been the core concept of the Carter Doctrine: to disallow a hostile power from gaining control of the region and blocking our access to its oil.

Gulf War + Iraq War cost $1 Trillion for Persian Gulf oil

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

Thus, the total cost of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War is expected to be on the order of a trillion dollars, including rough estimates of the costs of reconstruction in Iraq, but excluding the cost of the war in Afghanistan on the grounds that it is not related to the Persian Gulf or oil. If such a sequence of wars is assumed to occur every 50 years, then the annual expected cost is approximately $20 billion per year. Based on this, we assume a range of $15–$25 billion per year, in current dollars for any year.

“We’re in the Persian Gulf for other reasons besides oil” - Response: Cost of defending other interests is only a minor fraction

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

We argue here that the major ongoing US interest in the Persian Gulf is to protect oil supplies, and hence that the cost of defending interests other than oil is a minor fraction of the total cost of defending the Persian Gulf. The reason for this is straightforward: oil is the major source of energy for every industrialized economy in the world, and as a result, the price and quantity of oil in the world market directly affect economic output.

“Persian Gulf intervention was about containing the Soviet Union, not oil” - Response: The military’s own planning documents said it was about oil

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

In an analysis of the external costs of oil use in transportation, the Congressional Research Service (CRS, 1992) argues that concern about oil has been but one of many reasons that the US military has cared about the Persian Gulf, and even implies that oil security is a minor concern. In this section we review and rebut the CRS’ arguments, which in some form have been made by others. First, the CRS (1992) claims that throughout the Cold War, the US military was concerned more with the Soviet threat (per se) in the Persian Gulf than with US oil interests. However, the CRS does not offer any evidence in support of this claim, which as noted above is directly refuted by statements in every Military Posture document by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1979 to 1989.

“It’s about Israel, not oil” - Response: It still goes back to oil

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

Next, the CRS (1992) claims that the US military also is concerned with the security of Israel. However, we see no evidence of a major military policy concern for Israel per se, independent of general concerns about oil supply security for the region, and apart from the economic and military grants that the US makes directly to Israel (and which we discuss more later). The Joint Chiefs of Staff were clear on this when they stated that: The United States is determined to preclude disruption or hostile control of the vital resources and to limit the spread of Soviet influence in the area. Other US interests, important in their own right but bearing heavily on the security of energy resources, include peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict and increased stability throughout the region (Joint Chiefs of Staff, FY1983, p. 6, emphasis added).

“It’s about Israel”- Response: If it weren’t for oil in the region we would not care about Israel

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

On account of its oil interests in the Gulf, the US certainly does want the region to be stable, and to forestall and resolve Arab–Israeli conflicts. Thus, US military policy is not concerned significantly with the security of Israel per se, but rather with regional stability because of the region’s oil. We contend that if the Middle East had neither oil nor strategic importance, the US would not make a significant military commitment in the region solely to help protect Israel. Fuller and Lesser (1997) agree, stating that ‘‘at this point, Israel’s security, however important, does not represent an extra dimension of US Gulf Policy’’ (p. 45).

“Protecting US citizens abroad” - Response: There aren’t very many, and most of them are there for oil

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

Finally, the CRS suggests that another ‘‘major’’ interest is the protection of US citizens, but given the small number of tourists in the Middle East—maybe 10,000 in the oil-rich nations, out of a total of nearly 7 million US tourists abroad in the early 1990s (Bureau of the Census, 1992), this seems highly unlikely. (In addition, about 50 thousand US citizens were residents in the oil-rich countries of the Middle East, but it is likely that most of them worked for oil companies or related ventures, and hence would not be there if the region were not oil-rich.)

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY

Protecting Persian Gulf oil is far less necessary today than it ever was

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

The world today is awash in oil and natural gas. Protecting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to global markets is far less necessary than it once was. Over the past generation, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the other oil producers in the region have grown accustomed to bloated national budgets and expensive state-run, cradle-to-grave welfare services, which means that there is greater pressure on them to sell oil than to horde it.

None of the reasons used to justify intervention for oil are valid

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

Indeed, much of the war-fighting of the last two decades has been rationalized as necessary to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and their oil, from neighborhood threats. The economic logic that has underpinned all this is based mostly on an assumption that oil is a scarce resource, that there is a tight gap between supply and demand, that ensuring supply is essential to stabilize prices and to protect the global economy from potentially devastating disruptions. None of that is really true. For most of the 20th century, oil companies and oil producing states regularly collaborated to regulate supply in order to limit competition and control prices. There never has been a global oil market. Instead, oil's production and delivery has been managed by a small network of corporate and national energy elites, whose primary concern has been serving their own interests and maintaining their bottom line.

Carter Doctrine led to 3 major wars - we need to repudiate it

Dr. Michael T. Klare 2009. (PhD, professor of Peace and World Security Studies at Hampshire College) 23 Jan 2009 “Repudiate the Carter Doctrine” Foreign Policy In Focus,<http://www.fpif.org/articles/repudiate_the_carter_doctrine>

“This principle — known ever since as the Carter Doctrine — led to U.S. involvement in three major wars and now risks further military entanglement in the greater Gulf area. It's time to repudiate this doctrine and satisfy U.S. energy needs without reliance on military intervention.”

Need to repeal Carter Doctrine to avoid foreign policy mistakes

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2009. (PhD; Prof of international relations and history at Boston Univ; graduated from the US Military Academy in 1969, later serving in Vietnam, Germany, El Salvador, and the Persian Gulf; Ph.D. in American diplomatic history from Princeton Univ) “These Colors Run Red “ THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE, <http://www.theamericanconservative.com/article/2009/oct/01/00018/>

To persist in Afghanistan will more likely compound the miscalculation that lies at the heart of our foreign policy: the conviction that the United States has no alternative but to use any means necessary to ensure its ostensibly vital interests throughout the Greater Middle East. The debate that we need is not about Afghanistan as such but about the original sin that eventually mired us there: the misinterpretation of Soviet behavior back in 1979 that has disfigured U.S. policy ever since. If you want a strategy worthy of the name, start by repealing the Carter Doctrine.

Dept. of Defense estimates of cost of US military oil protection are too low: Eliminating Persian Gulf oil intervention would result in major military cost savings

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw> (brackets added)

The detailed estimates of Ravenal (1991) and Kaufmann and Steinbruner (1991) are likely to be more accurate than the DoDs (GAO, 1991), although we do accept that a small fraction of DoD [Department of Defense] overhead costs would not be significantly affected if the Persian Gulf mission were eliminated. We believe that in the long run, nearly all defense costs are variable and that Congress would recognize this through base closures, reductions in personnel, scaling back operations, and reduced expenditures on material, equipment, and major weapons systems. This sort of restructuring happens frequently, and hence it is not unreasonable to expect that there would be major cost savings were a major military objective, such as protecting the Persian Gulf, eliminated.

Congress would eliminate defense spending related to the Persian Gulf if oil were not a factor

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

If, as we have argued, the main concern of the US military in the Persian Gulf is to protect oil supplies, and if, as we also have argued, most military resources vary as a function of the number and extent of threats, then it follows that if there were no oil in the Persian Gulf, Congress eventually would eliminate most of the defense spending related to the Persian Gulf. (It would not eliminate all Persian Gulf defense spending because of non-oil interests in the Gulf and because of the fixed costs that are incurred if there is any regional defense at all, regardless of its size, scope, and purpose.)

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

“Iran threatens Saudis / Gulf States” - Response: Iran is no threat to them

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

Led by Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf states claim that their fears of Iranian ambition are existential. It is certainly true that Tehran is locked in a regional balance of power struggle with Saudi Arabia and that Iran seeks greater influence. But Iran does not seek the destruction of Saudi Arabia or the overthrow of Arab world's political order. In spite of claims to the contrary by the Saudi and Bahraini governments, Iran's revolutionary imperative is a relic of the past.

“Iran will do bad things” - Response: Status Quo policies are strengthening Iran’s hardliners and fueling confrontation

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

The presence of the American military in the Gulf has not only done little to deter Iran's ambitions, it has emboldened them. Surrounding Iran militarily and putting it under the constant threat of American or Israeli military action has failed to deter the country. Instead this approach has strengthened hardliners within Tehran and convinced them that the best path to self-preservation is through defiance, militarism, and the pursuit of dangerous ties across the Middle East. The rivalry between Iran, the U.S., and its regional partners has turned into a political and military arms race, one that could easily spin out of control.

No Impact: Oil prices have very small effect on the economy

Dr. Lutz Kilian 2009. (Ph.D. in Economics; prof. of economics at University of Michigan) Oil Price Volatility: Origins and Effects, December 1, 2009 <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201002_e.pdf>

The second problem is that, to the extent that oil prices affect domestic output, under standard assumptions their impact should be bounded by the cost share of oil in domestic production, which is known to be very small. For example, for the United States, the ratio of imported and domestically produced crude oil in GDP has been fluctuating between 1 and 5 percent (see Edelstein and Kilian 2007). Thus, if oil price shocks are viewed as cost shocks for the oil-importing economy, their effect by construction cannot be very large. Indeed, Backus and Crucini (2000) have demonstrated that standard production-based general equilibrium models of the transmission of oil price shocks are not capable of explaining large fluctuations in real GDP. This type of result came as a surprise to many researchers who expected oil price shocks to be a major determinant of the business cycle.

“Higher oil prices from lack of military security in the Persian Gulf” - Response: Oil producing nations would make other security arrangements. US protection has little effect on oil prices

Jerry Taylor 2007. ( served on several congressional advisory bodies and has testified frequently on Capitol Hill regarding various energy and environmental policy matters; adjunct scholar at the Institute for Energy Research) “Ask the Expert: Does Interventionism Cause Cheap Oil?” <http://www.catooncampus.org/article/show/63.html>

I suspect that a cessation of U.S. security assistance would be replaced by security expenditures from other parties. First, oil producers will provide for their own security needs as long as the cost of doing so results in greater profits than equivalent investments could yield. Because Middle Eastern governments typically have nothing of value to trade except oil, they must secure and sell oil to remain viable. Second, given that their economies are so heavily dependent on oil revenues, Middle Eastern governments have even more incentive than we do to worry about the security of production facilities, ports, and sea lanes. Third, even if producing countries were to provide inadequate security in the eyes of consuming countries, consuming countries could pay producers to augment it. In short, whatever security our presence provides (and many analysts think that our presence actually reduces security) could be provided by other parties were the United States to withdraw. The fact that the Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid for 55 percent of the cost of Operation Desert Storm suggests that keeping the Straits of Hormuz free of trouble is certainly within their means. The same argument applies to al Qaeda threats to oil production facilities. Thus, U.S. Persian Gulf expenditures should not be viewed as a subsidy that lowers oil prices below what they otherwise would be. Instead, the expenditures are a taxpayer financed gift to oil regimes that have little, if any, effect on oil prices.

US is not the principal export market for Persian Gulf oil, nor is any Mid-East country the principal source for US oil imports. Dr John Alterman, who advocates US intervention in the Middle East, nevertheless admits in 2011:

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power” <http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

In this regard, what many in the Gulf are watching closely are signs of diminished U.S. commitment to provide free passage of energy resources out of the region. U.S. economic ties to the Gulf have always been secondary to security concerns. The United States is not the principal oil export market for any country in the region, nor is any Middle Eastern country the principal source for U.S. imported oil. In fact, Saudi exports to the United States have flattened, and China is now the principal destination for Saudi oil.

“US protects oil for other consuming nations” - Response: Other nations’ oil consumption is irrelevant to US Persian Gulf policy

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

Should some of the US military cost be allocated to oil consumption and production by other nations, on the grounds that these other nations benefit from US military expenditures? The answer is an unambiguous ‘‘no’’. These other nations are free riders, and whenever there are free riders the incidence of benefits does not correspond to the incidence of costs. In an economic cost or cost-benefit analysis, the relevant question always focuses on opportunity cost, on the counterfactual: if the US did not have oil interests in the Persian Gulf, and in fact was completely insulated from any worldwide recessions traceable to any country’s use of Persian Gulf oil, it certainly would not spend money (without reimbursement or reciprocation) to protect oil in the Persian Gulf. US expenditures are motivated entirely by US interests, broadly defined, and the presence of free riders does not change this.

“Abandoning Israel” - Response: US can still support Israel without military presence and operations in Middle East. Costs of supporting Israel are not included in cost of oil protection

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

Note that we are not arguing that the US does not have any interest in the security Israel; rather, we are arguing that the US military policy towards the Middle East is not predicated ultimately on the security of Israel. Indeed, as we discuss later, the US does give Israel military and economic grant aid (the cost of which is separate from the US DoD costs estimated here). Thus, whatever interest the US has in the security of Israel it expresses mainly by giving Israel military and economic aid rather than by devoting more resources to the US military presence and operation in the Middle East.

“Cutting defense spending hurts the economy” - Response: No link between defense spending and economy

Dr. Mark A. Delucchi & Dr. James J. Murphy 2008. (Delucchi - PhD, research scientist at the Institute of Transportation Studies at Univ of Californa-Davis; Murphy - PhD, prof. of economics, Univ. of Alaska ) “US military expenditures to protect the use of Persian Gulf oil for motor vehicles” ENERGY POLICY Apr 2008 <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=8&cts=1331330882950&ved=0CGEQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fpubs.its.ucdavis.edu%2Fdownload_pdf.php%3Fid%3D1165&ei=oXpaT4S2EdC1hAflu4ipBA&usg=AFQjCNF28qcISuuixWz_7p5LbiTzMlSLsA&sig2=nXjSMvkLcbl1oMjMSe7qkw>

One might ask whether military spending affects economic growth, and hence has social benefits or costs in addition to the direct expenditures. One could argue, for example, that technological spin-offs of military research and development become a positive externality in the private sector and contribute to economic growth. On the other hand, one could argue that defense spending takes money from more productive uses. As it turns out, most studies have found either no link between defense spending and economic growth, or else weak and ambiguous links.

“Iran will block the Strait of Hormuz” - Response: No, they would be wrecking their own economy by doing that.

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Jan 2012 “Con: U.S. bombing unnecessary because Iran lacks the resources to block the strait” GAZETTE XTRA <http://gazettextra.com/news/2012/jan/26/con-us-bombing-unnecessary-because-iran-lacks-reso/>

Besides, closing the Strait would be economic suicide for the Iranian regime, which has been teetering politically since its fraudulent 2009 election. Such an action would indeed fulfill the West’s goal of stanching Iran’s oil exports, but it would also cut off vital imports, including refined petroleum products. Even during Iran’s radical revolution in the late 1970s and its bitter war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988—which involved the belligerents attacking oil tankers and facilities and a large battle between the Iranian and U.S. navies—Iran did not try to totally block this chokepoint. Thus, Iran’s threat is likely just an attempt to increase the world oil price to nullify any effects of sanctions.

“Strait of Hormuz would get closed” - Response: Unlikely, and even if it did, alternative routes exist and US military intervention would not be needed

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Jan 2012 “Con: U.S. bombing unnecessary because Iran lacks the resources to block the strait” GAZETTE XTRA <http://gazettextra.com/news/2012/jan/26/con-us-bombing-unnecessary-because-iran-lacks-reso/>

U.S. Navy war games have shown that closing the Strait for any length of time would be highly unlikely. Even if oil flow through the Strait was reduced, more oil could be transferred from the Persian Gulf using the underutilized land pipeline across Saudi Arabia to its port of Yanbu on the Red Sea. History shows that developed economies, such as that of the United States, are fairly resilient to petroleum price increases that reduced oil flow might bring. Thus, there is no reason for the United States to use military force to keep the Strait open.

“Iran closes Strait of Hormuz” - Response: Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict

Lt. Gen. Ron Burgess 2012. (US Army general, director of the Defense Intelligene Agency) 16 Feb 2012 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, http://www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-02-16b.html

Iran can close the Straits of Hormuz, at least temporarily and may launch missiles against United States forces and our allies in the region if it is attacked. Iran could also attempt to employ terrorists surrogates worldwide. However, the agency assesses Iran is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict.

“Iran mines the Strait of Hormuz” - Response: Not easy to do, and Saudi Arabia could stop them

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 26 Jan 2012 “Con: U.S. bombing unnecessary because Iran lacks the resources to block the strait” GAZETTE XTRA <http://gazettextra.com/news/2012/jan/26/con-us-bombing-unnecessary-because-iran-lacks-reso/>

Mining the Strait would be difficult as well, requiring a large number of Iran’s primitive mines to completely close the waterway. Capable regional air forces, such as Saudi Arabia’s, could prevent that by sinking Iranian tankers and mine-layers without any need for direct U.S. involvement.

“Oil Price Shocks if a war breaks out in the Middle East” - Response: Doesn’t justify US military protection. Developed economies are resistant to oil shocks.

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 29 Feb 2012 “Energy Protectionism Is Not Good Policy,” <http://original.antiwar.com/eland/2012/02/28/energy-protectionism-is-not-good-policy/>

Protectionism and neo-mercantilism, the government subsidization of certain private businesses at the expense of consumers, are as inefficient in energy as they are in other products and commodities. One hidden subsidy for American oil companies and overseas oil-producing countries that my book exposes are the hundreds of billions of dollars spent “defending” U.S. oil interests abroad. Even if wars in the Middle East occur, oil is a valuable commodity, and exporting it generates handsome profits. Thus, oil is often exported around and sometimes, as in the example of the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, through wars. Guarding against the rare oil-supply disruption by stationing vast American military forces, whose expenses are not contingent, in the Middle East and other places is unnecessary to prevent oil price shocks to developed economies that have proven resistant to them.

“Oil Price Shocks if a war breaks out in the Middle East” - Turn: US intervention drives up oil prices

Dr. Ivan Eland 2012. (PhD public policy,Georgetown U.; Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute; spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office) 29 Feb 2012 “Energy Protectionism Is Not Good Policy,” <http://original.antiwar.com/eland/2012/02/28/energy-protectionism-is-not-good-policy/>

Even oil protectionists and neo-mercantilists, such as Friedman, apparently don’t put much credence in the theory that high oil prices damage developed economies. In fact, they usually support wars in the Middle East and economic sanctions on oil-producing nations — for example, against Saddam’s Iraq and currently against Iran — that artificially drive oil prices up.

“Lost US influence in the Gulf” - Response: We would have better influence without military protection

Dr. Toby C. Jones 2011. (PhD history; assistant professor of history at Rutgers University) Dec 2011 “Don't Stop at Iraq: Why the U.S. Should Withdraw From the Entire Persian Gulf” THE ATLANTIC, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/12/dont-stop-at-iraq-why-the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-entire-persian-gulf/250389/>

The Gulf states are wealthy and resource rich, but they are beholden to the free movement of labor, capital, and oil. Once oil has to flow in a free market, rather than in one controlled by producers who operate under Western military protection, they will be subject to a range of "normal" kinds of political and economic leverage. Using these sources of leverage would prove less problematic for an America that is struggling with the gap between its interests and values in the less-than-democratic Gulf.

“SAUDIS GET NUKES DISAD RESPONSES” - Affirmative has to decide whether they want to go with a non-uniqueness response (“Saudis will get them anyway in Status Quo”) or a no-link response (“Saudis can’t build a nuke, so the impact never happens”). But you can’t really run both at the same time.

“Nuclear arms race - Saudis get nukes if we don’t protect them” - Response: They are deciding not to rely on outside protection and will get nukes anyway if Iran does

ASSOCIATED PRESS 2011. “Prince Hints Saudi Arabia May Join Nuclear Arms Race” 6 Dec 2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-may-seek-nuclear-weapons-prince-says.html>

A Saudi prince, in a remark designed to send chills through the Obama administration and its allies, suggested that the kingdom might consider producing nuclear weapons if it found itself between atomic arsenals in Iran and Israel. The prince, Turki al-Faisal, who has served as the Saudi intelligence chief and as ambassador to the United States, made the comment on Monday at a Persian Gulf security forum in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The remark confirmed Western fears about the potential for an arms race in the Middle East if Iran moves to produce a nuclear weapon. But it also reflected the hardening views among the Persian Gulf’s Arab states that they must rely on themselves — and not just on Western protection — as tensions with Iran grow worse.

“Saudis get nuclear weapons” - Response: They don’t have the capacity to build nukes

Steven A. Cook 2012. (Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations) Apr 2012 Don't Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East , FOREIGN POLICY<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/don_t_fear_a_nuclear_arms_race>

What about Saudi Arabia, then, the Sunni power that is on the tip of most analysts' tongues when it comes to Shiite Iran getting the bomb? Saudi Arabia has the cash to make large-scale investments in nuclear technology. Indeed, the only factor that makes warnings about Saudi proliferation -- such as that delivered by former Ambassador the United States Prince Turki al-Faisal last year -- even remotely credible is the resources the Saudis can muster to buy a nuclear program. Yet, while Riyadh can outfit itself with nuclear facilities with ease, it does not have the capacity to manage them. Mohamed Khilewi, a former Saudi diplomat, claims that the kingdom has been developing a nuclear arsenal to counter Israel since the mid-1970s -- but he offers no substantiated evidence to support these claims. In fact, the country has no nuclear facilities and no scientific infrastructure to support them**.**It's possible that Saudi Arabia could import Pakistanis to do the work for them. But while Saudis feel comfortable with Pakistanis piloting some of their warplanes and joining their ground forces, setting up a nuclear program subcontracted with Pakistani know-how -- or even acquiring a nuclear device directly from Islamabad -- poses a range of political risks for the House of Saud.

Saudi claims about nuclear weapons are just empty posturing - they shouldn’t be taken seriously

Steven A. Cook 2012. (Hasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations) Apr 2012 Don't Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East , FOREIGN POLICY<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/02/don_t_fear_a_nuclear_arms_race>

The concern about Saudi proliferation stems from fears that the kingdom would be forced to act if both Iran and Israel possessed a nuclear arsenal. "We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don't," an unnamed Saudi official declared to the Guardian on the sidelines of a meeting between Prince Turki al Faisal and NATO officials in June 2011. "It's as simple as that. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit." Yet given the fact that the Saudis have very little nuclear infrastructure to speak of, this kind of statement is little more than posturing designed to force the U.S. hand on Iran. Unlike similar warnings by Israel, which has the capacity to follow through on its threat to attack Iran's nuclear sites, Riyadh's rhetoric about acquiring nuclear weapons is empty. What is amazing is how many people take the Saudis seriously.

2A EVIDENCE: DRONES

BACKGROUND INFO

Military and CIA drone programs and how they operate

Andrew Callam 2010. (candidate for a masters degree in international affairs, George Washington Univ.) Winter 2010 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW Vol XVIII No. 3 “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144>

The operational use of weaponized UAVs can be divided into two broad categories; direct support of military operation and hunter-killer missions. As mentioned above, the military first utilized UAVs in the early operations of OEF and OIF as both a weapon and surveillance tool and they proved particularly useful in identifying, locating and eliminating targets. In describing the utility of UAVs in OEF, CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks said: “The Predator is my most capable sensor in hunting down and killing al Qaeda and Taliban leadership and is proving critical to our fight.” By 2007, the military began utilizing drones in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and demand for drones skyrocketed. Drones continue to serve in supporting operations to American forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. In contrast, the CIA’s drone program in the tribal areas of Pakistan utilizes weaponized UAVs primarily in hunter-killer missions. This program, begun under the George W. Bush Administration as part of the GWOT, uses drones primarily in “search and destroy” missions aimed at terrorism suspects and Taliban leadership in Pakistan. One important difference between the two programs is that while the military program operates exclusively in recognized combat zones, the CIA program flies drones over civilian areas as well. The CIA conducts these strikes with the reluctant and implicit support of the Pakistani government, which has publicly condemned the attacks, but continues to allow the CIA to base the drones in its territory. According to a former White House counterterrorism official, the CIA has multiple drones constantly scouting the tribal areas of Pakistan for targets.

TOPICALITY

CIA drone attacks are essentially a military mission

Scott Horton 2011. (New York attorney known for his work in emerging markets and international law, especially human rights law and the law of armed conflict; lectures at Columbia Law School; chair of NY City Bar Association’s Committee on International Law) 1 Dec 2011 “Blair Addresses the CIA, Drones and Pakistan,” HARPER’S MAGAZINE, <http://www.harpers.org/archive/2011/12/hbc-90008329> (brackets added)

The current crisis in U.S.–Pakistan relations — which is to some extent the consequence of avoidable missteps by the CIA, such as the Raymond Davis affair — further validates [former National Intelligence Director for President Obama, Navy Admiral Denis] Blair’s critique. As the United States and Pakistan seek to mend their relationship, the White House should carefully reassess some of the decisions that have led to the breakdown, one of which is clearly the unprecedented, essentially military mission being conducted by the CIA. Blair’s resistance may have earned him Langley’s enmity, and may have hastened his departure from the White House, but he was right about every element of it. Indeed, the CIA’s drone war goes to the heart of America’s challenge in forging a stable relationship with Pakistan and the nations emerging from the Arab Spring. The campaign cannot be reconciled with the Obama Administration’s talk of dedication to democracy, nor of respect for the rule of law.

Drone attacks in Pakistan are a use of military force

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell 2010. (prof. of law, Univ. of Notre Dame law school) “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009” Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144>

The drone attacks in Pakistan involve significant firepower—this is not the force of the police, but of the military. In law enforcement lethal force is restricted to situations of absolute necessity; not so on the battlefield, making the use of bombs and missiles lawful. The drones used in Pakistan are lawful for use only on the battlefield. The right to resort to them must be found in the jus ad bellum; the way they are used must be based on the jus in bello and human rights.

Drone attacks are uses of military force

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell 2010. (prof. of law, Univ. of Notre Dame law school) “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009” Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144>

Drone attacks are uses of military force. Pakistan is not responsible for an armed attack on the United States and so there is no right to resort to military force under the law of self-defense. Pakistan has not expressly invited the United States to assist it in using force. At best there have been mixed signals from Pakistan about the U.S. strikes. Further, even with express consent, the attacks would have to be part of Pakistan‘s own military operations. Even then, drone attacks may well be counter-productive to the military objective of eliminating the challenge from Pakistani militants, and they have been responsible for the deaths of many unintended victims, leading to serious questions about whether they may be used consistently under the principle of proportionality.

CIA may be considered part of the “armed forces” under international rules even if not under domestic law

Prof. Afsheen J. Radsan & Prof. Richard Murphy 2011. (Radsan - Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; former assistant general counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency; Murphy - Prof. of Law, Texas Tech Univ. School of Law ) MEASURE TWICE, SHOOT ONCE: HIGHER CARE FOR CIA-TARGETED KILLING, ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW, <http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2011/4/Murphy.pdf> (brackets added)

Note, however, that the CIA operates under the Commander-in-Chief, nothing stops drone operators from wearing uniforms, and nothing stops the CIA from training its officers in the laws of war. Cf. MELZER, supra note 14, at 317 (observing that in either international or noninternational armed conflicts, police forces, intelligence agents, and border guards may be regarded as “armed forces” of a state for the purpose of IHL [international humanitarian law] even if they are not recognized as such under domestic law).

INHERENCY

Obama approves at least 239 drone strikes and more targeted killings than any modern president

David Rohde 2012. (journalist, two-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize) 1 Mar 2012 “How Obama’s drone war is backfiring,” REUTERS news service, <http://blogs.reuters.com/david-rohde/2012/03/01/how-obamas-drone-war-is-backfiring/>

Oddly, technology has enabled Obama to become something few expected: a president who has dramatically expanded the executive branch’s ability to wage high-tech clandestine war. With a determination that has surprised many, Obama has embraced the CIA, expanded its powers and approved more targeted killings than any modern president. Over the last three years, the Obama administration has carried out at least 239 covert drone strikes, more than five times the 44 approved under George W. Bush.

The US has an active drone program that has launched hundreds of strikes in Pakistan

CNN 2012. (Dan Lothian & Reza Sayah, journalists) 31 Jan 2012 “Obama’s drone comment was no slip-up, official says,” <http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-31/politics/politics_obama-pakistan_1_drone-strikes-drone-missions-target-al?_s=PM:POLITICS>

In a forum on YouTube and Google+, the president said a "pinpoint strike" is "less intrusive" of other countries' sovereignty than other military ways to target al Qaeda. While it marked the first time the president publicly acknowledged drone strikes on Pakistan, it was not the first time his administration did. Last year, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta acknowledged the use of CIA Predator drones. With hundreds of strikes over the past few years, the program has been one of the biggest open secrets in Pakistan. For years, the Pakistani government has given tacit approval of the strikes while publicly condemning them. The president's remarks came in response to a question about drone strikes.

“Drone attacks in Pakistan were suspended” - Response: Drone attacks resumed in Pakistan on 10 January 2012

Sarvat Hanif 2012. (Journalist) 30 Mar 2012 “PCNS snubbed, drone strikes to continue” ISLAMABAD PULSE, <http://www.weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=2101&storylist=1>

Mounting protests and public backlash against drone attacks as well as tension between the US and Pakistan since last November led to a decline in drone attacks. The US suspended drone attacks after an attack by NATO helicopters on a Pakistani military check post on November 26, 2011. However, after a hiatus of about 55 days drones returned to Pakistan, with the first strike of 2012 taking place on January 10. In all, the Unites States has carried out nine drone attacks inside Pakistan since the beginning of this year, killing 68 people and injuring four.

“Consulting” or “Notifying” Congress isn’t enough: We need specific legislation authorizing use of force

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>

Neither consulting nor notifying Congress is a substitute for its collective judgment expressed in authorizing legislation. In any case, all members of the War Powers Initiative agree that it is in the President’s institutional interests and in the national interest for the use of force abroad to be supported by the collective judgment of Congress and the President, because such a judgment reflects a political consensus that makes them jointly responsible for the resulting costs. To persuade a majority of both houses of Congress to make the collective judgment that the use of force is in the national interest, a President must, in effect, persuade the people. If he cannot persuade the people’s representatives, he is unlikely to persuade the people who elected them.

Constitution requires shared responsibility for war powers

Robert McMahon, last updated 2011. (master's degree in international relations from Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) last updated 20 June 2011 “Balance of War Powers: The U.S. President and Congress,” <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/balance-war-powers-us-president-congress/p13092>

Susan Low Bloch, a constitutional law expert at the Georgetown University Law Center, says the framers of the Constitution deliberately divided the war powers between the two branches to induce them to work together on such a vital issue. "I don't know if they expected conflict, but they wanted coordination and cooperation and shared responsibility," Bloch says.

Modern threats have not changed the need for the checks and balances of war powers enacted in 1789

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>

Changes in international threats to the national security from 1789 to the present have not dislodged war powers from this carefully wrought system of checks and balances. The evolution of the world order and the emergence of serious threats from terrorists have supplied new labels for the ways in which force is used (i.e., “peace operations,” “police actions,” “counter-terrorist operations”), and, in some cases, new justifications for preauthorization of its use. But they have not changed the constitutional necessity for some form of congressional authorization for initiating uses of force abroad except when force is used for a limited range of defensive purposes.

Modern threats do not change the need for respecting constitutional war powers

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>

The changing threats to our national security, however, have not changed the allocation of constitutional war powers. While new threats may change the kind of force that is authorized, the identity of the enemy, or the optimal form of authorization, they require no change in the principles by which our government should decide whether to initiate the use of force abroad. The system of checks and balances is no less necessary today for the constitutional exercise of war powers than it was in 1789, as we discuss next.

“Congress can always stop the President by cutting off funding” - Response: President has the constitutional burden to obtain authorization from Congress before conducting war

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>

The President may constitutionally use force abroad for a range of defensive purposes, including some counter-terrorist operations, depending on their scope and duration and other factors listed above. But the President otherwise cannot constitutionally conduct war, or preventive war, without obtaining prior congressional authorization. Beyond this range of defensive war powers, the burden lies on the President to obtain the authorization. The constitutional rule is that the President can lawfully fight wars for other than a range of defensive purposes only if Congress has authorized it, not that the President may fight it until Congress has stopped it.

Drones remove Congress from decision-making about war

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD in government, Harvard; Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution; served as coordinator of the Obama 2008 campaign’s defense policy task force) 22 Jan 2012 “Do Drones Undermine Democracy?” <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0122_drones_singer.aspx>

Congress has not disappeared from all decisions about war, just the ones that matter. The same week that American drones were carrying out their 145th unauthorized airstrike in Libya, the president notified Congress that he had deployed 100 Special Operations troops to a different part of Africa. This small unit was sent to train and advise Ugandan forces battling the cultish Lord’s Resistance Army and was explicitly ordered not to engage in combat. Congress applauded the president for notifying it about this small noncombat mission but did nothing about having its laws ignored in the much larger combat operation in Libya. We must now accept that technologies that remove humans from the battlefield, from unmanned systems like the Predator to cyberweapons like the Stuxnet computer worm, are becoming the new normal in war. And like it or not, the new standard we’ve established for them is that presidents need to seek approval only for operations that send people into harm’s way — not for those that involve waging war by other means.

HARMS

Better to arrest terrorists than kill them - you get more intelligence information that way

Andrew Callam 2010. (candidate for a masters degree in international affairs, George Washington Univ.) Winter 2010 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW Vol XVIII No. 3 “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144>

The lack of military presence on the ground also limits the capability of drones to assist in acquiring critical intelligence. In the urban counterinsurgency operations of Iraq, UAVs would use their persistent surveillance capabilities to observe combatants, then either eliminate or send in ground troops to arrest the combatant. The combatant might then go on to provide U.S. forces with valuable intelligence. In contrast, the use of UAVs in hunter-killer operations in the remote regions of Pakistan, where there are no ground forces, only eliminates the target. As Daniel Byman of Georgetown University argues, “it’s almost always better to arrest terrorists than to kill them. You get intelligence then. Dead men tell no tales.” Hunter-killer operations can only eliminate the target and thus forfeit potential intelligence that could be gained through capture.

Bad example. Lack of clear legal guidelines for drone strikes will justify others doing the same thing to us

Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School 2011. “Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications” 25 Mar 2011 <http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf>

While they disagree on important legal issues, critics and proponents alike share at least one significant concern: drones may be the future of warfare, and the U.S. may soon find itself “on the other end of the drone,” as other governments and armed non-state groups develop drone technology. Yet discussions of the legal constraints lag behind the rapid advances in technological capability and deployment. Even those who believe that the U.S. government’s use of drone technology is carefully calibrated to adhere to applicable law worry that other governments or non-state groups will cite the U.S. government’s silence on key legal questions as justification to shirk from transparency about their practice or even openly flout the law.

Drones aren’t accurate enough to correctly identify individuals targeted

Andrew Callam 2010. (candidate for a masters degree in international affairs, George Washington Univ.) Winter 2010 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW Vol XVIII No. 3 “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144>

The lack of multiple intelligence sources also inhibits the ability of drones to accurately identify targets. Local informants are notoriously unreliable and can exploit the attacks for personal gain by pointing drone attacks towards personal rivals. Additionally, while the Predator’s camera can provide remarkably clear images, it can be difficult for drone pilots to accurately identify individuals when staring at them directly from above. For example, just months after the September 11th attacks, a Predator pilot spotted a tall man in flowing white robes walking near the eastern border of Afghanistan. Intelligence officials incorrectly believed the man to be Osama bin Laden and fired the Predator’s missile, killing the innocent villager and his two companions. Without a persistent ground presence, drones must act with incomplete intelligence and may cause civilian casualties.

Between 207 to 321 additional people were killed in drone missions intended to take out 1 Taliban leader

Andrew Callam 2010. (candidate for a masters degree in international affairs, George Washington Univ.) Winter 2010 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW Vol XVIII No. 3 “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144>

On August 5, 2009, two Hellfire missiles fired from an American Predator drone crashed through the roof of a house in northwest Pakistan. Lying on the roof of his father-in-law’s house was Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban. Along with Mehsud, the explosion killed his father-in-law, his mother-in-law, his wife, his uncle, a lieutenant and seven bodyguards. It took three days for mainstream news sources to confirm rumors of the Taliban leader’s death as the Taliban moved to prevent the news from leaking out. While the Pakistani newspaper Dawn ran the headline “Good Riddance, Killer Baitullah” in celebration of the death of the man believed responsible for the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Pakistanis typically condemn similar drone strikes due to the civilian casualties they cause. In Mehsud’s case, it took sixteen strikes, fourteen months and between 207 and 321 additional deaths to finally kill him. In contrast, the American government views the drone program as one of its most effective weapons against al Qaeda and the Taliban, described by CIA director Leon Panetta as “the only game in town.”

Drone strikes on terrorists often kill innocent bystanders

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell 2010. (prof. of law, Univ. of Notre Dame law school) “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009” Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144>

The intended targets of these attacks are in villages, in homes, in vehicles, and, in general, surrounded by many persons not involved in hostilities, not suspected militants, and not intended targets. In August 2009, the U.S. attacked a home where an infamous Taliban leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was staying with one of his wives and her parents. He was on the roof of the house, at night, apparently receiving an intravenous transfusion. He is known to have suffered from diabetes and a kidney ailment. His uncle, a medic, was believed to be administering the treatment. His wife was with him. Missiles from a drone tore him to pieces. His wife, parents-in-law, seven men described as ―bodyguards‖ and one man described as a ―lieutenant‖ also, reportedly, died in the strike. Presumably only Mehsud was an intended target. The strike killed twelve for one intended target. Jane Mayer reports that the U.S. carried out as many as 16 attempts to kill Mehsud with drone strikes. In the conditions of the Pakistan border region, using drones to selectively target individuals has not been possible with current technology.

Increased drone attacks would only push Pakistanis into the Taliban camp

Malou Innocent 2009. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 23 Jan 2009 What Obama Should Do in Pakistan (brackets added) <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/what-obama-should-do-pakistan>

U.S. forces in Afghanistan, working in coordination with Pakistani security forces more familiar with the region's inhospitable terrain and the cultural and linguistic aspects of tribal society, can offer the U.S.-NATO mission a higher likelihood of succeeding. Obama's national security team must understand that the struggle for FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan] would best be waged by bolstering Islamabad's ability to compete with militants for political authority in FATA. If his administration simply increases attacks from pilotless drones, it will only push more wavering tribes further into the Taliban camp.

Drones killing American citizens is a human rights violation: “Extra-judicial killing”

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell 2010. (prof. of law, Univ. of Notre Dame law school) “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009” Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144>

On November 3, 2002, the U.S. used a drone outside a combat area to fire laser-guided Hellfire missiles at a passenger vehicle traveling in a thinly populated region of Yemen. The drone was operated by CIA agents based in Djibouti. The U.S. Air Force, at that time, operated the U.S.‘s drones, but the Air Force was concerned about legal issues raised by the Yemen operation, so the CIA carried out the strike. All six passengers in the vehicle were killed. U.S. officials said one of six men was a suspected “lieutenant” in al-Qaida; another was an American citizen in his early twenties. In January 2003, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights received a report on the Yemen strike from its special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary killing. The rapporteur concluded that the strike constituted “a clear case of extrajudicial killing.”

Drone strikes kill civilians, alienate Pakistani people, and contribute to Pakistan’s instability

David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum 2009. (Kilculler was a counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus from ‘06 to ‘08; Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was an Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan from ‘02 to ‘04) 16 May 2009 “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?_r=1>

Second, public outrage at the strikes is hardly limited to the region in which they take place — areas of northwestern Pakistan where ethnic Pashtuns predominate. Rather, the strikes are now exciting visceral opposition across a broad spectrum of Pakistani opinion in Punjab and Sindh, the nation’s two most populous provinces. Covered extensively by the news media, drone attacks are popularly believed to have caused even more civilian casualties than is actually the case. The persistence of these attacks on Pakistani territory offends people’s deepest sensibilities, alienates them from their government, and contributes to Pakistan’s instability.

Drone strikes can’t kill as many terrorists as they are recruiting - could cause more resentment and make it worse

David Cortright 2012. (Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame) The Wrong Option 27 Jan 2012 [www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/27/david-cortright/the-wrong-option/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/27/david-cortright/the-wrong-option/)

Killing the mafia dons who control these violent networks may cause some temporary disruption, but it will not end the threats of violence and could make matters worse. U.S. military attacks—of all kinds, including ground operations, conventional bombing and drone strikes—may arouse popular resentment and hatred toward American policy and increase the terrorist recruitment rate. Donald Rumsfeld asked the right question years ago, “Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrasas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?” In Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia the answer is clearly no. After years of war in Afghanistan and hundreds of drone strikes into Pakistan, the Taliban insurgency is stronger than ever. Why do we think more of the same will produce a different result?

Drones kill 1 civilian for every 3 militants

Andrew Callam 2010. (candidate for a masters degree in international affairs, George Washington Univ.) Winter 2010 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW Vol XVIII No. 3 “Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” <http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144>

Civilian deaths caused by the CIA’s drone program are one of the main criticisms of using drones exclusively in hunter-killer missions. Since 2006, 82 drone attacks in Pakistan have killed between 750 and 1,000 people, including between 250 and 320 civilians, equivalent to roughly 1 civilian death for every 3 militants killed. Some experts claim that the collateral damage of these attacks creates more militants than they eliminate.

CIA operatives have no legal right to participate in armed conflict killing

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell 2010. (prof. of law, Univ. of Notre Dame law school) “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009” Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144>

In the well-documented case of the attack on Baitullah Mehsud‘s in-laws house in August 2009, we see the serious legal problems with the U.S. approach. Reports on the attack say that the CIA carried out the killing. CIA operatives have no legal right to participate in armed conflict killing.

CIA involvement in military hostilities violates the Geneva Convention

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell 2010. (prof. of law, Univ. of Notre Dame law school) “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009” Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144>

One of the most important rules respecting the conduct of armed conflict may well be the rule of distinction. Under international law, civilians may not be intentionally targeted. Only members of a state‘s armed forces during armed conflict or persons taking a direct part in hostilities may be targeted. In the ICRC study of customary international humanitarian law, distinction is the first rule:

Rule 1. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed against civilians.

This rule is supported by a number of legal authorities, including, perhaps most importantly, Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions:

Article 43(2) Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.

Article 51(3) Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

Persons with a right to take direct part in hostilities are lawful combatants; those without a right to do so are unlawful combatants. Having a right to participate in hostilities means that the person may not be charged with a crime for using force. CIA operatives, like the militants challenging authority in Pakistan, have no right to participate in hostilities and are unlawful combatants.They may be charged with a crime.

Drones make war easier to enter

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD in government, Harvard; Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution; served as coordinator of the Obama 2008 campaign’s defense policy task force) “When RoboCop Replaces Private Jackson” CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL 8 Jan 2012 <http://www.opencanada.org/features/drones/>

At the pointy end of the spear, the technology allows you to lower the potential number of civilian casualties by increasing precision. However, at the same time, it changes the way that policymakers look at, or think about, when and where to use force. And it creates the almost erroneous impression that these operations are costless, which makes them easier to authorize, because politicians look at them differently. A good example would be to compare discussions surrounding the bin Laden raid, which involved boots on the ground, with discussions of the drone strikes. President Obama’s top adviser described the decision to put boots on the ground in the bin Laden raid as “the ultimate gutsy call.” By contrast, we don’t even think about the more than 300 drone strikes we carried out in Pakistan.

Even if you support current war efforts, we set the precedent of bypassing Congress for drone warfare for future wars you might not support

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD in government, Harvard; Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution; served as coordinator of the Obama 2008 campaign’s defense policy task force) 22 Jan 2012 “Do Drones Undermine Democracy?” <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0122_drones_singer.aspx>

We must now accept that technologies that remove humans from the battlefield, from unmanned systems like the Predator to cyberweapons like the Stuxnet computer worm, are becoming the new normal in war. And like it or not, the new standard we’ve established for them is that presidents need to seek approval only for operations that send people into harm’s way — not for those that involve waging war by other means. Without any actual political debate, we have set an enormous precedent, blurring the civilian and military roles in war and circumventing the Constitution’s mandate for authorizing it. Freeing the executive branch to act as it chooses may be appealing to some now, but many future scenarios will be less clear-cut. And each political party will very likely have a different view, depending on who is in the White House.

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY

Drones should be under military control, not intelligence agencies

Admiral Denis Blair (former National Intelligence Director for Pres. Obama) quoted by Scott Horton 2011. (Horton - New York attorney known for his work in emerging markets and international law, especially human rights law and the law of armed conflict; lectures at Columbia Law School; chair of NY City Bar Association’s Committee on International Law) 1 Dec 2011 “Blair Addresses the CIA, Drones and Pakistan,” HARPER’S MAGAZINE, <http://www.harpers.org/archive/2011/12/hbc-90008329>

Covert action that goes on for years doesn’t generally stay covert. And you need a way to make it something that is part of your overt policy. I think that the way that we know about to do that is to make it a military operation and to — therefore, when you are going to be using drones over a long period of time, I would say you ought to give strong consideration to running those as military operations. Within the armed forces we have a set of procedures that are open, known for how you make decisions about when to use deadly force or not, levels of approval degrees of proof and so on and they are things that can be and should be openly put out. So yet another of the problems of trying to conduct long-term sustained covert operations is this secrecy, which you do for other purposes but then puts you in this position which we said. So, I argue strongly that covert action should be retained for relatively short duration operations which — no kidding — should not be talked about and should not be publicized. That if something has been going for a long period of time, somebody else ought to do it, not intelligence agencies.

Military control of drones means investigations and transparency, while CIA control avoids public scrutiny

Ken Dilanian 2011. (journalist) LOS ANGELES TIMES, “U.S. counter-terrorism strategy to rely on surgical strikes, unmanned drones” 29 June 2011 (brackets added) <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/29/news/la-pn-al-qaeda-strategy-20110629>

[President Obama’s counter-terrorism advisor, John] Brennan's willingness to boast about the precision of the drone strikes without actually acknowledging them underscores one of the implications of the Obama counter-terrorism strategy: It will be conducted largely in secret, without public accountability. When the military makes a mistake in a drone strike, as it has done in Afghanistan, there is an investigation and some transparency. But when it comes to targeted killing by the CIA or clandestine special operations units, government officials are able to avoid public scrutiny, citing the need for secrecy. They are willing to make claims about limited civilian casualties, but are not willing to document those claims by, for example, releasing the video taken of each strike.

Clear standards and transparency limit abuse, increase effectiveness, and promote democracy

Dr Stephanie Carvin 2011. (Lecturer at the Royal Halloway, University of London, Department of Politics and International Relations; PhD at the London School of Economics) 14 Dec 2011 “A View to Kill” CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL, <http://www.opencanada.org/features/view-to-a-kil/>

Although the United States’ drone campaigns in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have been kept secret out of necessity, as a democratic country, the U.S. should be more open about the criteria it uses to justify targeting individuals, and about the precautions it takes to ensure that such campaigns are conducted as legitimately as possible. This would serve to demonstrate that the campaign is governed by rules, and that it is not at the whim of counter-terrorism officials. Finally, as there is no evidence either for or against the effectiveness of assassination as a counter-terrorism strategy, states should identify the indicators of success that they (and their populations) are looking for. The seriousness and significance of engaging in targeted killing suggest that, while determining what constitutes success in counter-terrorism, governments should at least be able to say what benefits they expect to see as a result of their engagement in this kind of activity. Ultimately, accountability and responsibility are two key features of the western tradition of warfare. This is not only for legal and moral reasons, but also because the past 100 years have seen a clear link between legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Democratic accountability is important to ensure that programs do not run amok, and that governments, policy-makers, and citizens can expect results at the end of the day. Unfortunately, the assassination programs currently in existence fall short of meeting these standards. While the United States may remain engaged in a War on Terror, relying on a declaration of self-defence and decisions that were made over a decade ago – at a time when that war looked very different – is problematic. While counter-terrorism activities must realistically stay secretive, this does not mean that any and all democratic accountability is out of the question.

Military has policies to reduce civilian casualties

[Note: Drones are not mentioned in the underlined part of the quote, but we included the paragraph before to show that they are under consideration in context.]

Prof. Afsheen J. Radsan & Prof. Richard Murphy 2011. (Radsan - Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law; former assistant general counsel at the Central Intelligence Agency; Murphy - Prof. of Law, Texas Tech Univ. School of Law ) MEASURE TWICE, SHOOT ONCE: HIGHER CARE FOR CIA-TARGETED KILLING, ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW, <http://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2011/4/Murphy.pdf> (brackets in original)

Critics of the CIA’s targeted killing, contrary to Panetta, say the program does more harm than good to U.S. interests. Kilcullen and Exum, for instance, concede that killing terrorists, viewed in a vacuum, creates positive military effects. But they also contend that the overall costs outweigh their benefits because: (1) drone strikes create a counterproductive “siege mentality” among the local populace of Northwest Pakistan, solidifying extremists in that area; (2) they cause public outrage across Pakistan; and (3) the drones, deployed without a sound understanding of their effects, substitute a “piece of technology” for strategy. Assessing the Kilcullen and Exum critique is not a mathematical exercise—rather, it requires nuanced political and military judgments based on incomplete, uncertain facts. Still, the U.S. military’s own policies demonstrate that it agrees with critics that controlling collateral damage and maintaining local support are crucial. In this regard, the objectives of law and policy overlap. The U.S. Army’s Counterinsurgency Manual advises that “[p]olitical power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate.” It adds, “[a]n operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to recruitment of fifty more insurgents.” For this reason, the U.S. military has applied extremely restrictive rules of engagement in Afghanistan to bring down civilian casualties.

CIA should not be engaging in military drone missions

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell 2010. (prof. of law, Univ. of Notre Dame law school) “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009” Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43(brackets added) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=1501144

Even if the U.S. had a right to resort to combat drones in Pakistan, their use to date has conflicted with the principles governing the conduct of armed conflict. The CIA operatives involved are not lawful combatants with the combatant‘s privilege to kill during an armed conflict. CIA operatives are not trained in the IHL [International Humanitarian Law] rules governing the use of force and there is evidence the rules are being violated in the context of Western Pakistan: Drones kill many unintended victims for each intended one, raising questions of proportionality. Counter-terrorism experts doubt the efficacy of military force to end terrorist group, raising doubts about the necessity of drone strikes. Nor has the U.S. apparently taken the necessary precautions to protect civilian lives. The ease of killing with drones seems to be encouraging the narrow U.S. view that military force is the only ―game in town‖ in response to the serious problem of terrorism.

We have no legal right to kill without warning in a country we are not at war with

Prof. Mary Ellen O’Connell 2010. (prof. of law, Univ. of Notre Dame law school) “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009” Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1501144> (brackets added)

Under current law, if terrorist suspects are located in a state other than the United States, the U.S. may offer assistance to that other state. The *jus in bello* [rules of conduct during war] will apply if there is an armed conflict in the state. Peacetime criminal law applies if not. Indeed, as [advocate for US drone missions, Colonel Peter] Cullen accepts, the United States is resorting only to peacetime criminal law on the territory of the U.S. He does not believe there is any right to kill without warning persons in the U.S. How can there be any such right on the territory of others states that are, like the U.S., not experiencing hostilities on their territory?

Even for action against terrorism and WMDs, Congress should be asked for authorization

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf> (brackets added)

The Declare War Clause gives Congress the choice between authorizing the use of force abroad by declaration of war or by legislation. Public accountability for the decision to use force requires that Congress speak as clearly in legislation as it does in a declaration. Under this constitutionally-derived clear statement rule, which is restated in the WPR [the War Powers Resolution of 1973], authorization for the use of force abroad should not usually be inferred from a general defense appropriation, let alone from other legislation regarding military procurement, conscription or other collateral subjects. However, the nature and source of terrorist attacks and threats posed by WMD [weapons of mass destruction], and the need for secrecy and speed in clandestine operations against them, may justify more general authorization of some counter-terrorist operations that are not already authorized by the President’s defensive war power. Even in such cases, Congress must always state the purposes and scope of its authorization as clearly as the circumstances permit in order to satisfy the constitutional objectives of legislative deliberation and political accountability.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

“Don’t have to send someone into harm’s way” - Response: That’s bad because drones remove political barriers to war by removing political consequences

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD in government, Harvard; Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution; served as coordinator of the Obama 2008 campaign’s defense policy task force) 22 Jan 2012 “Do Drones Undermine Democracy?” <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0122_drones_singer.aspx>

And now we possess a technology that removes the last political barriers to war. The strongest appeal of unmanned systems is that we don’t have to send someone’s son or daughter into harm’s way. But when politicians can avoid the political consequences of the condolence letter — and the impact that military casualties have on voters and on the news media — they no longer treat the previously weighty matters of war and peace the same way. For the first 200 years of American democracy, engaging in combat and bearing risk — both personal and political — went hand in hand. In the age of drones, that is no longer the case.

“We’re assassinating terrorist leaders” - Response: No evidence that assassinations are effective counter-terrorism strategy

Dr Stephanie Carvin 2011. (Lecturer at the Royal Halloway, University of London, Department of Politics and International Relations; PhD at the London School of Economics) 14 Dec 2011 “A View to Kill” CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL, <http://www.opencanada.org/features/view-to-a-kil/>

Finally, and most importantly, the largest problem with arguments put forward by assassination advocates is the underlying assumption that assassination is an effective counter-terrorism strategy. Unfortunately, research and scholarship on assassination have not been able to demonstrate that this is actually the case. This is partly due to the secretive nature of assassination programs: We simply do not know what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and other areas of the world where assassination strikes against terrorists have been carried out. The lack of access to much of this information also means that measuring the impact of such exercises is extremely difficult. Furthermore, there has been little thought given to how we measure the “success” of assassination. Is it simply deemed successful if it eliminates individuals seen as threats? If there is a measurable decrease in the number of attempted, or successful, terrorist attacks carried out by the target’s organization? Or is it necessary to look at second- and third-order effects such as the target organization’s morale, recruitment, support from the population, etc.?

“Need drones to kill terrorists” - Response: Drones kill civilians along with terrorists, creating a powerful recruiting opportunity among the angry survivors.

David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum 2009. (Kilculler was a counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus from ‘06 to ‘08; Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was an Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan from ‘02 to ‘04) 16 May 2009 “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?_r=1>

While violent extremists may be unpopular, for a frightened population they seem less ominous than a faceless enemy that wages war from afar and often kills more civilians than militants. Press reports suggest that over the last three years drone strikes have killed about 14 terrorist leaders. But, according to Pakistani sources, they have also killed some 700 civilians. This is 50 civilians for every militant killed, a hit rate of 2 percent — hardly “precision.” American officials vehemently dispute these figures, and it is likely that more militants and fewer civilians have been killed than is reported by the press in Pakistan. Nevertheless, every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.

“Need drones to fight terrorists” - Response: Drone strikes increase anti-American extremism

David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum 2009. (Kilculler was a counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus from ‘06 to ‘08; Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was an Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan from ‘02 to ‘04) 16 May 2009 “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?_r=1>

The appeal of drone attacks for policy makers is clear. For one thing, their effects are measurable. Military commanders and intelligence officials point out that drone attacks have disrupted terrorist networks in Pakistan, killing key leaders and hampering operations. Drone attacks create a sense of insecurity among militants and constrain their interactions with suspected informers. And, because they kill remotely, drone strikes avoid American casualties. But on balance, the costs outweigh these benefits for three reasons. First, the drone war has created a siege mentality among Pakistani civilians. This is similar to what happened in Somalia in 2005 and 2006, when similar strikes were employed against the forces of the Union of Islamic Courts. While the strikes did kill individual militants who were the targets, public anger over the American show of force solidified the power of extremists. The Islamists’ popularity rose and the group became more extreme, leading eventually to a messy Ethiopian military intervention, the rise of a new regional insurgency and an increase in offshore piracy.

“Need drones to fight terrorists” - Response: Terrorists regroup quickly after a leader is killed, and the resources devoted to drones distract us from larger problems we should be working on

David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum 2009. (Kilculler was a counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus from ‘06 to ‘08; Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was an Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan from ‘02 to ‘04) 16 May 2009 “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?_r=1>

The drone campaign is in fact part of a larger strategic error — our insistence on personalizing this conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Devoting time and resources toward killing or capturing “high-value” targets — not to mention the bounties placed on their heads — distracts us from larger problems, while turning figures like Baitullah Mehsud, leader of the Pakistani Taliban umbrella group, into Robin Hoods. Our experience in Iraq suggests that the capture or killing of high-value targets — Saddam Hussein or Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — has only a slight and fleeting effect on levels of violence. Killing Mr. Zarqawi bought only 18 days of quiet before Al Qaeda returned to operations under new leadership.

Drone attacks are a counterproductive strategy against extremists

David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum 2009. (Kilculler was a counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus from ‘06 to ‘08; Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was an Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan from ‘02 to ‘04) 16 May 2009 “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?_r=1>

People don’t tolerate extremists in their midst because they like them, but rather because the extremists intimidate them. Breaking the power of extremists means removing their power to intimidate — something that strikes cannot do. Imagine, for example, that burglars move into a neighborhood. If the police were to start blowing up people’s houses from the air, would this convince homeowners to rise up against the burglars? Wouldn’t it be more likely to turn the whole population against the police? And if their neighbors wanted to turn the burglars in, how would they do that, exactly? Yet this is the same basic logic underlying the drone war.

Drone strikes make it harder to win in Pakistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban

David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum 2009. (Kilculler was a counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus from ‘06 to ‘08; Exum, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, was an Army officer in Iraq and Afghanistan from ‘02 to ‘04) 16 May 2009 “Death From Above, Outrage Down Below,” NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/opinion/17exum.html?_r=1>

The goal should be to isolate extremists from the communities in which they live. The best way to do this is to adopt policies that build local partnerships. Al Qaeda and its Taliban allies must be defeated by indigenous forces — not from the United States, and not even from Punjab, but from the parts of Pakistan in which they now hide. Drone strikes make this harder, not easier.

2A EVIDENCE: EGYPT

OPENING QUOTE / AFFIRMATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Tolerating oppression in the name of stability is wrong

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf> (ellipses in original)

President George W. Bush embraced this principle himself in a 2004 address in front of the United Nations General Assembly:

For too long, many nations, including my own, tolerated and even excused oppression in the Middle East in the name of stability… We must take a different approach. We must help the reformers of the Middle East as they work for freedom and strive to build a community of peaceful, democratic nations.

TOPICALITY

Military aid creates a commitment to a long term relationship

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships” <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

When we provide security assistance through our Foreign Military Financing program to buy U.S. defense systems, we are not just providing a country with weapons systems. We are committing ourselves to a long term relationship. The complex and technical nature of advanced defense systems often require continuous collaboration between countries. This includes training and support in the use of the equipment, assistance in maintenance, and help to update and modernize the equipment throughout its life-cycle.

HARMS / FAILURES

Egyptian military is anti-American, arrests US election monitors

Shadi Hamid 2012. (Director of Research at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former Director of Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford Univ Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law; master’s degree from Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service) Apr 2012 “BEYOND GUNS AND BUTTER: A U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP FOR A DEMOCRATIC ERA” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/04_egypt_hamid/04_guns_butter_hamid1.pdf>

A year after President Hosni Mubarak’s fall, U.S.-Egypt relations are at an all-time low. Not, as many expected, because of the rise of Islamist parties, but because America’s longtime allies in the Egyptian military have whipped up anti-American sentiment at a feverish pace. It may have started as a political ploy, a way to build support on the street and highlight the army’s nationalist credentials, but the generals soon lost control. In January, the Egyptian government announced that sixteen Americans—including the son of a top U.S. official— would be put on trial, facing up to five years in prison. Their apparent crime was working for American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—the National Democratic Institute, the International Republican Institute, and Freedom House—that offered support, funding, and election monitoring for Egypt’s uneven transition.

Anti-Americanism in Egypt justifies rethinking US policy

Shadi Hamid 2012. (Director of Research at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former Director of Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford Univ Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law; master’s degree from Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service) Apr 2012 “BEYOND GUNS AND BUTTER: A U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP FOR A DEMOCRATIC ERA” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/04_egypt_hamid/04_guns_butter_hamid1.pdf>

The growing anti-Americanism makes a rethinking of U.S. policy toward Egypt both more challenging and

more urgent. Today, the United States and the international community have a strong interest in ensuring freedom of association for Egypt’s embattled civil society and helping Egypt rebuild its battered economy. Making strides in these areas will help stabilize Egypt and allow it, in time, to return to playing a strong, constructive regional role. A stable, democratic Egypt could serve as model for the new kind of mutually beneficial relationship the United States can develop with the region’s emerging democracies.

Helping Egypt’s military is the wrong path to stability

David J. Kramer 2012. (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) “Waiver on Egypt Aid Undercuts Support for Democracy” FREEDOM HOUSE, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/waiver-egypt-aid-undercuts-support-democracy>

“The U.S. government risks repeating the mistakes of the past, indulging the Egyptian military in the name of regional stability while ignoring what the Egyptian people want,” Kramer said. “Stability in Egypt is best achieved by supporting a full transition to a democratic government, which will uphold human rights and a free society.”

Stability in Egypt depends on democracy, and reverting to authoritarianism would be bad

David J. Kramer 2012. (president of Freedom House, an international human rights non-profit advocacy group; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) testimony before the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs: “Egypt at a Crossroads” 16 Feb 2012 <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-DKramer-20120216.pdf>

Egypt has been a strategic partner of the United States for over thirty years. Stability in this important country depends on moving forward in the transition to democracy. The alternative — reversion to authoritarianism and resurgent radicalism — poses a serious threat of deepening political turmoil and increased economic stress, with potential regional repercussions. This is in no one’s interest.

US military aid betrays human rights advocates in Egypt

Nancy Okail quoted by Thomas Friedman 2012. (Okail is an Egyptian, director of the US-based Freedom House human rights advocacy non-profit group in Cairo. Friedman is an American Pulitzer prize-winning journalist) 24 Apr 2012 “Defendant No. 34 Has Her Say” NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/opinion/defendant-no-23-has-her-say.html?_r=1>

“When the U.S. decides to just give away the military aid to Egypt without considering the consequences on us,” Okail told me, “it sends a message that the West and the U.S. don’t care about democracy and human rights. They just care about strategic stability. We, the defendants, felt betrayed. The battle we fight standing in that cage, hearing calls for our execution, is not a battle for our freedom but a battle for liberating Egyptian civil society.”

Freedom House (non-profit human rights advocacy group) was raided by Egyptian government

David J. Kramer 2012. (president of Freedom House, an international human rights non-profit advocacy group; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) testimony before the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs: “Egypt at a Crossroads” 16 Feb 2012 <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-DKramer-20120216.pdf>

For Freedom House, the problems did not suddenly appear with the raids of December 29. Members of our staff, all of whom are Egyptian (we have no expats working for us in Egypt) were interrogated several times before, and Freedom House was the object of unwanted and negative state-media attention in the weeks leading up to the raids. This, despite the fact that we were fully transparent with various government ministries about our activities, cooperated fully with officials as we submitted our application for registration, and met with the authorities as the investigation unfolded. We never did anything illegal or improper. As part of the registration process, we were told by authorities that to seek registration, we were required to have an office and a staff, and we complied with those requirements. We have made every effort to conduct our activities in Egypt in a transparent manner and to comply with the terms of Egyptian law. We were repaid with an armed raid, legal threats, and closure of our facilities, which are funded, I might add, by U.S. taxpayers.

Hundreds of human rights groups are threatened in Egypt

David J. Kramer 2012. (president of Freedom House, an international human rights non-profit advocacy group; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) testimony before the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs: “Egypt at a Crossroads” 16 Feb 2012 <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-DKramer-20120216.pdf>

Our organizations and staff are the ones in the headlines, but we must not forget about the hundreds of Egyptian organizations that are facing similar pressure and charges but have no Americans on their payroll. Of the 10 organizations raided on December 29 by armed Egyptian forces, five were foreign (our four organizations plus the Konrad Adenauer Foundation) and five were Egyptian; 17 offices in total were raided. Some 400 additional Egyptian non-governmental organizations have been under investigation and face relentless pressure from the government.

Egypt’s military perpetuates instability and interferes with democracy

David J. Kramer 2012. (president of Freedom House, an international human rights non-profit advocacy group; former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs; former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) testimony before the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs: “Egypt at a Crossroads” 16 Feb 2012 <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-DKramer-20120216.pdf> (brackets added)

At the same time that NGOs are being blamed for Egypt’s problems, Egypt’s military rulers are blocking the accountability and transparency that Egyptian society fought for and that was integral to ending Mubarak’s rule. Meanwhile, amid the current unstable environment, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) did well in elections for the lower house of parliament, and the Salafist Nour Party far exceeded expectations, winning close to a quarter of the parliament’s seats. While the more moderate, liberal parties deserve some criticism for not preparing adequately for the elections, they also were handicapped by the interim government’s efforts to neuter and neutralize them in the hope that voters would be faced with a false choice between the SCAF [Supreme Council of the Armed Forces] and the extremists. Indeed, the SCAF’s repression over the past year was directed almost entirely at liberal political forces and civil society, as the SCAF has attempted to continue the Mubarak line that they are the only viable alternative to Islamist extremism. This approach perpetuates the instability produced under the Mubarak regime and will lead to an inability to meet the needs of the Egyptian people. The results of the election have raised concerns that extremist forces will take over Egypt. While somewhat overblown, these fears would best be allayed by allowing civil society to play an active role in shaping the country’s future. The crackdown on civil society represents a clear effort to block a democratic transition in Egypt.

INHERENCY

US gives $1.3 billion in military aid and $250 million in economic aid to Egypt

[Notes: Economic aid is not changed by AFF plan, it’s extra-topical. This proves that of the total aid we give Egypt, 84% is military and 16% is economic.]

Jeffrey Fleishman 2012. (journalist) LOS ANGELES TIMES, “Muslim Brotherhood: US aid cuts may alter Egypt-Israel treaty,” <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/02/senior-muslim-brotherhood-say-cuts-in-us-aid-could-affect-egypts-peace-treaty-with-israel-.html>

President Obama's budget to Congress included $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt and $250 million in economic aid. Egypt’s military rulers appear to be playing two strategies: Assuring Washington that Egypt remains a close ally while allowing Cabinet member Faiza Abu El-Naga to blame the Washington for fomenting chaos in Egypt as part of a plan to strengthen U.S. and Israeli interests.

The US gives military aid to Egypt and overrides Congressional rules about progress towards democracy.

David Elkins 2012. (journalist) 23 Mar 2012 “Rights Groups Slam Renewed U.S. Military Aid to Egypt” INTERPRESS SERVICE, <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=107178> (“recent” was misspelled in the original, brackets added)

The U.S. State Department announced on Friday that military aid to Egypt will resume, citing a national security waiver that was included in the most resent [recent] appropriations legislation on foreign assistance. "These decisions reflect America's over-arching goal: to maintain our strategic partnership with an Egypt made stronger and more stable by a successful transition to democracy," Victoria Nuland, a spokeswoman for the State Department said in a statement. "The secretary's decision to waive is also designed to demonstrate our strong support for Egypt's enduring role as a security partner and leader in promoting regional stability and peace," Nuland added. The announcement comes after U.S. lawmakers conditioned aid on Egypt's progress in transitioning to a verifiably democratic system of governance – an unprecedented move since the U.S. began supplying Egypt with roughly 1.3 billion dollars in aid after it signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

Resumption of military aid to Egypt violated US commitment to “Arab Spring” democracy

Shadi Hamid 2012. (Director of Research at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former Director of Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford Univ Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law; master’s degree from Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service) Apr 2012 “BEYOND GUNS AND BUTTER: A U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP FOR A DEMOCRATIC ERA” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/04_egypt_hamid/04_guns_butter_hamid1.pdf>

Not only did the administration’s decision to resume military aid circumvent congressional conditions, it directly contradicted stated U.S. policy after the Arab Spring, which pledged a newfound commitment to supporting Arab democracy (exemplified by President Obama’s May 19, 2011 and Secretary Clinton’s November 7, 2011 speeches). According to the 2012 Appropriations Act, in order for Egypt to receive military aid, the secretary of state had to certify that that the Egyptian government was “implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and religious, and due process of law.” By any reasonable measure, Egypt failed to meet this standard. As a result, the administration used a national security waiver to override the conditions.

Lifting aid restrictions undermines US leverage and enables Egypt’s leaders to promote anti-American sentiments and persecute civil society

James Phillips 2012. (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; former Research Fellow at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; Master's Degree and a M.A.L.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University ) 27 Mar 2012 Greater U.S. Pressure Needed to Ensure Successful Egyptian Transition <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/us-egypt-relations-greater-pressure-needed-to-ensure-successful-egyptian-transition>

However, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton notified Congress on Friday that she will waive those restrictions on national security grounds. This decision undermines U.S. leverage and raises questions about the resolve of the Administration to confront capricious Egyptian bureaucrats, hostile Islamist politicians, and authoritarian generals, all of whom seek to muzzle Egypt’s civil society. Clinton’s decision to bypass congressional concerns sends the wrong signal to Egypt’s leaders: that they can continue to exploit anti-American sentiments whipped up by the state-controlled media with little fear of the consequences.

Aid to Egypt will not promote democracy

Doug Bandow 2011. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) 30 May 2011 A Foreign Policy Fit for a Republic <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/foreign-policy-fit-republic>

It is especially hard to find instances where aid caused a transition from autocracy to democracy. Aid often becomes a permanent policy, irrespective of changing circumstances. After the heavily subsidized Mubarak government fell, the Obama administration immediately offered assistance to the new Egyptian government, even before the latter held an election. Should the current authorities be overthrown, Washington undoubtedly would promise a new aid package to the next regime.

**“Military is losing control, democracy is taking hold” – Response: Muslim Brotherhood is gaining power**

[see below for impact to Muslim Brotherhood]

Shadi Hamid 2012. (Director of Research at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former Director of Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford Univ Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law; master’s degree from Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service) Apr 2012 “BEYOND GUNS AND BUTTER: A U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP FOR A DEMOCRATIC ERA” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/04_egypt_hamid/04_guns_butter_hamid1.pdf>

As Egypt’s military has begun to lose power and control, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to secure its

position as the country’s dominant political actor. Over the course of much of the transition, the movement— which claims as many as 600,000 members—has retained its trademark mix of caution and pragmatism, tempered in recent months by a growing assertiveness and ambition.

The Muslim Brotherhood is taking control of the Egyptian government

Shadi Hamid 2012. (Director of Research at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former Director of Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford Univ Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law; master’s degree from Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service) Apr 2012 “BEYOND GUNS AND BUTTER: A U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP FOR A DEMOCRATIC ERA” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/04_egypt_hamid/04_guns_butter_hamid1.pdf>

In Egypt’s parliamentary elections, held in three rounds between November 2011 and January 2012, the Brotherhood’s political arm, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), exceeded expectations, winning 46 percent of the seats. Since its victory, the Brotherhood has displayed greater confidence and has begun adopting the tone of a governing party rather than a beleaguered opposition group. It has also made a strategic decision to solidify its influence and—where possible—control over Egypt’s major political institutions, including the presidency.

Muslim Brotherhood will promote terrorism

Ken Timmerman 2011. (journalist) 3 Feb 2011 “Muslim Brotherhood Dangerous for Egypt” NEWSMAX <http://www.newsmax.com/KenTimmerman/egypt-hosni-mubarak-iran/2011/02/03/id/384852>

Former federal prosecutor Andrew C. McCarthy, who led the U.S. government case against Sheik Ahmed Abdul Rahman, the blind Egyptian who plotted to blow up the Lincoln Tunnel in New York in the early 1990s, said, “The Brotherhood would neither keep the peace nor support our efforts against terrorism. Its doctrine is a pro-terrorist doctrine." He added ominously: “If you fall for its claims to be against 'terrorism,' you are falling for a word game — they do not consider attacks against Israel or against Western forces in Muslim countries to be terrorism. They consider that to be 'resistance.'”

Muslim Brotherhood has contempt for America

James Phillips 2012. (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; former Research Fellow at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; Master's Degree and a M.A.L.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University ) 27 Mar 2012 Greater U.S. Pressure Needed to Ensure Successful Egyptian Transition (brackets added) <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/us-egypt-relations-greater-pressure-needed-to-ensure-successful-egyptian-transition>

Although the Muslim Brotherhood reportedly helped lift the travel ban on the American NGO personnel after Washington threatened to cut all U.S. aid, it quickly reverted to its public contempt for the United States and blamed the SCAF [Supreme Council of the Armed Forces] for bowing under humiliating American pressure when it allowed the Americans to leave the country.

ADVOCACY

Aid to Egypt should be conditional on human rights

James Phillips 2012. (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; former Research Fellow at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; Master's Degree and a M.A.L.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University ) 27 Mar 2012 Greater U.S. Pressure Needed to Ensure Successful Egyptian Transition <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/us-egypt-relations-greater-pressure-needed-to-ensure-successful-egyptian-transition>

The United States has provided almost $70 billion in bilateral aid to Egypt since 1979. Now that Cairo has new rulers, it is important to signal that American aid should not be taken for granted. Washington should serve notice that if Egyptian leaders continue to stoke anti-American populism to reap domestic political benefits, they will lose U.S. financial support—and with it, possibly, their hold on power. The Obama Administration should clearly warn Cairo that it must act responsibly to keep American aid flowing. At a minimum, these red lines should include Egyptian compliance with international obligations to fight terrorism and abide by its peace treaty with Israel, as well as respect for the human rights and freedom of its own people, particularly women and Egypt’s Christian minority.

Wrong and shameful to send weapons to Egypt when they violate human rights

Suzanne Nossel quoted by Amnesty International 2012. ( Nossel - chief of operations for Human Rights Watch; served as deputy to the Ambassador for U.N. Management and Reform at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations from 1999 to 2001. Amnesty International is a Nobel-Prize-winning non-profit human rights advocacy group) “Ship of Shame” Carrying Weapons and Explosives To Egypt from United States Should Not be Allowed to Deliver Cargo, Amnesty International Press Release, 15 Mar 2012 <http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/ship-of-shame-carrying-weapons-and-explosives-to-egypt-from-united-states-should-not-be-allowed-to-d>

"The United States should not place more weapons in the hands of the Egyptian security forces that have shown ongoing disregard for the rights of the Egyptian people," said Suzanne Nossel, executive director, Amnesty International USA. "It would be flat-out wrong and shameful for the United States to falsely certify that the Egyptian government is protecting human rights – and would send a dangerous signal to waive that certification requirement.”

Attaching conditions to US aid is the best way to pressure Egypt to comply with human rights

James Phillips 2012. (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; former Research Fellow at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; Master's Degree and a M.A.L.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University ) 27 Mar 2012 Greater U.S. Pressure Needed to Ensure Successful Egyptian Transition <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/us-egypt-relations-greater-pressure-needed-to-ensure-successful-egyptian-transition>

The Obama Administration needs to apply constant pressure at the highest official levels to motivate Egyptian leaders to find an acceptable resolution of the crisis. Washington should point out that the crackdown contravenes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, an agreement Egypt signed that provides for freedom of association. The Administration should insist that Cairo comply with its international obligations, including the terms of its peace treaty with Israel and commitments to combat terrorism. To attain these ends, Washington should use its strongest source of leverage: U.S. aid, which includes $1.3 billion in military aid and about $250 million to promote civil society and democracy. Congress attached conditions to Egyptian aid in the fiscal year 2012 foreign operations bill. Before transferring any funds to Egypt, the State Department should certify that “the Government of Egypt is supporting the transition to civilian government including holding free and fair elections; implementing policies to protect freedom of expression, association, and religion, and due process of law.” As things stand now, Egypt’s transitional government does not qualify for such certification and should be warned that it must change its policies to merit the aid.

Sen. Patrick Leahy: Not appropriate to waive conditions on military aid to Egypt

Andrew Quinn 2012. (journalist) REUTERS news service, 23 Mar 2012, “U.S. approves Egypt military aid despite rights fears” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/23/us-egypt-usa-aid-idUSBRE82M0UG20120323>

Some U.S. lawmakers have criticized the move, saying it was inappropriate to waive conditions on military aid while the Egyptian government's transition was so uncertain. Senator Patrick Leahy, the Democratic chairman of the Senate subcommittee on foreign aid who wrote the law imposing conditions on aid, said the United States should release no more money than is "demonstrably necessary." "The Egyptian military should be defending fundamental freedoms and rule of law, not harassing and arresting those who are working for democracy," Leahy said on Thursday.

Sen. Patrick Leahy: Mistake to release military aid to Egypt

Roxana Tiron and Tony Capaccio 2012. (journalists) BLOOMBERG news agency, 23 March 2012, “Egypt Military Aid to Be Paid by U.S. for Strategic Goals” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-23/egypt-military-aid-to-be-paid-by-u-s-for-strategic-goals.html>

“I’ve made a statement every single day for five days that it would be a mistake” to release aid for Egypt, Leahy said in an interview yesterday at the Capitol. “I know Secretary Hillary Clinton wants the democratic transition in Egypt to succeed, but by waiving the conditions we send a contradictory message,” he said in a statement. “The Egyptian military should be defending fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, not harassing and arresting those who are working for democracy,” Leahy said. “They should end trials of civilians in military courts and fully repeal the Emergency Law, and our policy should not equivocate on these key reforms.

We should apply pressure to Egypt - they are headed in the wrong direction on democracy and human rights

James Phillips 2012. (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; former Research Fellow at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; Master's Degree and a M.A.L.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University ) 27 Mar 2012 Greater U.S. Pressure Needed to Ensure Successful Egyptian Transition <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/us-egypt-relations-greater-pressure-needed-to-ensure-successful-egyptian-transition>

In recent months, Egyptian–American relations have severely deteriorated due to Cairo’s politically motivated prosecution of several U.S.-funded nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in democracy building. The fact that these civil society efforts, which were tolerated in Egypt before the fall of President Hosni Mubarak last year, now are considered criminal activities reveals the dangerous trajectory taken by Egypt’s revolution. Egypt’s transition to democracy is threatened by an unholy alliance of holdover bureaucrats, army officers, and newly empowered Islamist political parties. The Obama Administration should apply pressure on Egypt’s leaders at the highest levels to head off show trials that would poison bilateral relations and prospects for genuine democracy in the largest Arab country.

Threat to cut off aid forced release of arrested American human rights workers, but prosecution of Egyptians continues

James Phillips 2012. (Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation; former Research Fellow at the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress; Master's Degree and a M.A.L.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University ) 27 Mar 2012 Greater U.S. Pressure Needed to Ensure Successful Egyptian Transition <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/us-egypt-relations-greater-pressure-needed-to-ensure-successful-egyptian-transition>

The worst crisis in Egyptian–American relations in more than 30 years was intentionally provoked by the transitional government’s prosecution of 43 civil society workers, including 16 Americans, for offering advice to Egyptians on how to organize political movements and prepare for democracy. The Americans worked for three respected American NGOs: Freedom House, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute. After Washington threatened to cut off aid, Cairo lifted a travel ban that had prompted seven of the Americans to seek refuge in the U.S. embassy and permitted them to leave, but Egypt has continued the prosecution, and the trial is set to resume on April 10.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

“We can influence Egypt through our contacts in their military” - Response: Already tried and failed. We have little leverage through the Egyptian army and they are not capable of reforming Egypt anyway

Shadi Hamid 2012. (Director of Research at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former Director of Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford Univ Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law; master’s degree from Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service) Apr 2012 “BEYOND GUNS AND BUTTER: A U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP FOR A DEMOCRATIC ERA” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/04_egypt_hamid/04_guns_butter_hamid1.pdf>

In the early days of the revolution, the Obama administration had high hopes for the Egyptian military. Democratization, the thinking went, would empower forces with uncertain commitments both to political pluralism and to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The military, meanwhile, was a known quantity, the linchpin of the thirty-year U.S.-Egypt relationship and a force for regional stability. U.S. assistance, as well as the personal relationships built over three decades of close cooperation, suggested that United States could exercise leverage through the army. In contrast, the United States could boast no real relationships with, or even first-hand knowledge of, either the Muslim Brotherhood or the more conservative Salafi groups. The Obama administration therefore found itself looking at a new Egypt and realizing that it had little leverage with the forces that would be shaping it. Any hope that the military might prove a competent steward of reform was quickly dashed.

“US influence” turn: Resuming military aid reduces US influence

Shadi Hamid 2012. (Director of Research at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former Director of Research at the Project on Middle East Democracy and a Hewlett Fellow at Stanford Univ Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law; master’s degree from Georgetown Univ. School of Foreign Service) Apr 2012 “BEYOND GUNS AND BUTTER: A U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP FOR A DEMOCRATIC ERA” <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/04_egypt_hamid/04_guns_butter_hamid1.pdf>

The goal of any aid freeze should not be to damage ties with Egypt’s military, which will remain a powerful player well after the transition to civilian rule. The goal, rather, should be to restore America’s waning leverage in Egypt. Unfortunately, given the Obama administration’s recent decision to resume aid after the NGO crisis, this may be prove more challenging than ever.

“Egypt-Israel peace treaty threatened” - Response: No threat to the treaty, it will be honored

Dr. Guy Bechor interviewed by Adi Ben-Israel 2012. (PhD. ; heads the Middle East Division at the Lauder School of Government at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel) “Dr. Guy Bechor: Egypt has not breached the peace treaty” 23 Apr 2012 GLOBES (Israeli business journal) (brackets added) <http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000743599&fid=1725>

[Ben-Israel] Will the Egyptians continue to honor the peace treaty?

[Bechor] "Certainly, and they say as much. Even the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood don't say otherwise. What we have here is typical Israeli hysteria, stemming from lack of understanding of the reality of the situation. And that is very bad. We are getting raucous responses when relations between the two countries are very delicate."

“Egypt-Israel peace treaty at risk” - Response: Egypt won’t go to war with Israel

Dr. Guy Bechor interviewed by Adi Ben-Israel 2012. (Bechor heads the Middle East Division at the Lauder School of Government at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel) “Dr. Guy Bechor: Egypt has not breached the peace treaty” 23 Apr 2012 GLOBES (Israeli business journal) (brackets added) <http://www.globes.co.il/serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=1000743599&fid=1725>

[Ben-Israel] So the fears of war with Egypt are groundless

[Bechor] "The Egyptians have no interest in going to war against Israel. They don't have money to buy wheat for the masses. What are we talking about here? Not everything between Israel and Egypt has to be turned into a drama."

“Professionalism of the Egyptian military thanks to US aid” - Response: What professionalism? They killed 80 demonstrators

Dr. Martin S. Indyk 2012. (Ph.D. from the Australian National University; vice president and director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution; former U.S. ambassador to Israel; former assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs) Prospects for Democracy in Egypt , 23 Jan 2012, (brackets added) <http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2012/0123_egypt_indyk.aspx>

This tension will likely manifest itself in the massive demonstrations that are expected on January 25 in Tahrir Square to commemorate the first anniversary of the Revolution. The military and the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] have called for a celebration, complete with party balloons and patriotic songs. Youth activists and some liberal parties, particularly exercised by the eighty some demonstrators who were killed by the police and the army in crackdowns in November and December last year, are calling for a demonstration against military rule. Some of the far-left revolutionary youth are calling for a campaign of violence.

2A EVIDENCE: HONDURAS

BACKGROUND

Opening Quote: US support for Lobo is a foreign policy disaster

Prof. Dana Frank 2012. (professor of history at the Univ of California, Santa Cruz ) In Honduras, a Mess Made in the U.S., NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/opinion/in-honduras-a-mess-helped-by-the-us.html>

It’s time to acknowledge the foreign policy disaster that American support for the Porfirio Lobo administration in Honduras has become. Ever since the June 28, 2009, coup that deposed Honduras’s democratically elected president, José Manuel Zelaya, the country has been descending deeper into a human rights and security abyss. That abyss is in good part the State Department’s making. The headlines have been full of horror stories about Honduras. According to the United Nations, it now has the world’s highest murder rate, and San Pedro Sula, its second city, is more dangerous than Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, a center for drug cartel violence.

Honduras had democratic government for 27 years before the ‘09 coup

Peter J. Meyer 2011. (Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service) July 14, 2011 “Honduran-U.S. Relations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf>

A Central American nation of 8 million people, Honduras enjoyed 27 years of uninterrupted democratic, constitutional governance prior to the forced removal of President Manuel Zelaya from office in June 2009.

Removal of Pres. Zelaya in ‘09 was an illegal coup

Peter J. Meyer 2011. (Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service) July 14, 2011 “Honduran-U.S. Relations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf>

The legality of Zelaya’s removal has been heavily debated; however, most legal and political analysts—including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission appointed to investigate the ouster—have declared Zelaya’s removal a “coup d’état.” They assert that although Zelaya disobeyed judicial rulings by attempting to carry out the non-binding referendum, the Honduran military denied the president due process by expelling him from the country. Additionally, they maintain that the Honduran National Congress did not have any legal authority to remove Zelaya from office, and the interim government of Roberto Micheletti was therefore unconstitutional.

History and current status of Honduras: President Lobo took power in 2010 after the ‘09 coup; human rights abuses are on the rise

Peter J. Meyer 2011. (Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service) July 14, 2011 “Honduran-U.S. Relations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf>

On January 27, 2010, Porfirio “Pepe” Lobo Sosa was inaugurated president of Honduras, assuming power after seven months of domestic political crisis and international isolation that had resulted from the June 28, 2009, ouster of President Manuel Zelaya. While the strength of Lobo’s National Party in the legislature has enabled the administration to pass much of its policy agenda, Lobo has made only limited progress in addressing the challenges inherited as a result of the political crisis. Several efforts to foster political reconciliation have helped Honduras secure international recognition but have done little to lessen domestic polarization. Likewise, human rights abuses—which increased significantly in the aftermath of Zelaya’s ouster—have continued, and the citizen security situation has deteriorated.

HARMS

US military support promotes human rights violations in Honduras

Prof. Adrienne Pine 2012. (assistant professor of anthropology at American University) 29 Feb 2012 “U.S. foreign policy backs abusive Honduran state” SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/02/28/EDOV1NDFHK.DTL>

Last year, the U.S. Department of Defense spent more than $50 million in Honduras. Most of that went to the Soto Cano Air Base, the U.S. military base within spitting distance of the Comayagua prison. Additional hundreds of millions of dollars are being channeled through the Central American Regional Security Initiative to support initiatives like Lobo's "Operation Lightning," which deputizes soldiers to act as police officers. In the two months they have been on the streets, these military police have already been accused of numerous human rights violations.

US forces help forces of abuse - including drug dealers - in Honduras

Prof. Dana Frank 2011. (professor of history at the Univ of California, Santa Cruz ) WikiLeaks Honduras: US Linked to Brutal Businessman, 21 Oct 2011 <http://www.thenation.com/article/164120/wikileaks-honduras-us-linked-brutal-businessman>

In the past two years since the coup US funding for the Honduran military and police has escalated dramatically. The US has allocated $45 million in new funds for military construction, including expansion and improvement of the jointly operated Soto Cano Air Force Base at Palmerola (supplied now with US drones) and has opened three new military bases. Police and military funding, almost $10 million for 2011, rose dramatically in June with $40 million more under the new $200 million Central American Regional Security Initiative, supposedly to combat drug trafficking in Central America—which is, indeed, rampant, dangerous and growing in Honduras under Lobo’s post-coup government, especially in the Aguán. Honduran military operations in the lower Aguán valley, including joint operations with Facussé’s guards, benefit from these funds, as well as special training. This summer seventy members of Honduras’ Fifteenth Batallion received a special thirty-three-day training course from the US Rangers. According to the Honduras Solidarity Network, members of the Xatruch Special Forces group in the Aguán Valley, in a September meeting, “confirmed that they had received training from the United States military in special operations, which include sniper and anti-terrorism training.” Eyewitnesses informed Rights Action they saw US Rangers also training Facussé’s security guards.

US is training Honduran military even though there’s no combat scenario and they have an atrocious human rights record

Guy Taylor 2011. (journalist) 30 Nov 2011 “Honduras Base Shows U.S. Military Role in Drug War” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (brackets added) <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/10793/honduras-base-shows-u-s-military-role-in-drug-war>

What’s worrisome, [Master of Arts in International Relations with Concentration in development policy and Latin American studies, Adam] Isacson added, is that “the increasing collaboration with the Honduran army through joint exercises means they’re operating on land and learning skills applicable to combat in a region where there’s really no combat scenario.” “Your choices are to help Honduras get a better police force and justice system, or to teach combat to a military that continues to have an atrocious human rights record, as we’ve seen since the 2009 coup,” said Isacson. “They have a reputation for corruption on a large scale and a record of shaky support for democracy, as we saw two years ago.”

Human rights abuses continue; perpetrators are not brought to justice

Peter J. Meyer 2011. (Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service) July 14, 2011 “Honduran-U.S. Relations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf>

A year and a half after his inauguration to a four-year term, President Lobo continues to face daunting challenges stemming from Honduras’ seven-month political crisis. Efforts to foster political reconciliation, including the creation of a truth commission, the passage of a political reform measure, and an agreement to allow former President Zelaya to return to the country have produced mixed results. Although these reconciliation efforts have won support from the international community, they have done little to reduce domestic polarization. Moreover, there has been little improvement in the country’s poor human rights situation. Murders of journalists, political activists, and human rights defenders have continued and law enforcement officials have proven unwilling or unable to bring those responsible to justice.

US tax dollars support Honduran military repression

Prof. Dana Frank 2011. (professor of history at the Univ of California, Santa Cruz ) 11 Jan 2011 “In Honduras, the Holiday Season Brings Repression” (the word “aware” was in the original, probably supposed to be “away”) <http://www.commondreams.org/view/2011/01/11-3>

As we settle into our warm winter naps in the United States, a new wave of military repression is sweeping through Honduras, directed at the campesino movement. In December troops moved in and once again attacked the poorest of Honduras' rural poor, who have been standing up for their rights with astonishing bravery since the June 28, 2009 military coup. Up here in the North we can turn cozily aware from their plight. But as we sleep, our tax dollars are at work funding the Honduran army, police, and ongoing illegitimate government.

US military base was used to support the Honduran coup and trains the Honduran army, which violates human rights

Open letter to military contractors, signed by over 20 college professors and 15 religious leaders and institutions 2011. 26 May 2011 open letter to: “Contractors and bidders on contracts for U.S. construction on military bases in Honduras” <http://www.nlginternational.org/report/Ltr2HondurascontractorsMay2011-signers.pdf> (list of names is at the end of the brief)

In fact, the Soto Cano base was reportedly used as a way station for the plane that illegally and forcibly took President Manuel Zelaya out of Honduras, a fact implicitly recognized by the State Department. The foreign military presence your contract would support violates Honduran sovereignty and the principles of democracy. One of the missions of Joint Task Force – Bravo based in Soto Cano is training of Honduran armed forces. Yet the Honduran army is responsible not only for its participation in the 2009 coup, for which it has not been held accountable, but for ongoing violence against Honduran opponents of the current regime.

INHERENCY

US has troops stationed in Honduras and conducts training exercises

Peter J. Meyer 2011. (Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service) July 14, 2011 “Honduran-U.S. Relations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf>

The United States maintains a troop presence of about 600 military personnel known as Joint Task Force (JTF) Bravo at Soto Cano Air Base. JTF Bravo was first established in 1983 with about 1,200 troops who were involved in military training exercises and in supporting U.S. counterinsurgency and intelligence operations in the region. In the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in 1998, U.S. troops provided extensive assistance in the relief and reconstruction effort. Today, U.S. troops in Honduras support such activities as disaster relief, medical and humanitarian assistance, counternarcotics operations, and search and rescue operations that benefit Honduras and other Central American countries. Regional exercises and deployments involving active duty and reserve components also provide training opportunities for thousands of U.S. troops.

US suspended military cooperation after the coup, then restarted it.

The General who led the coup had received US military training

Peter J. Meyer 2011. (Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service) July 14, 2011 “Honduran-U.S. Relations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf>

The June 28, 2009, ouster of President Manuel Zelaya led some to reassess the state of U.S.-Honduran military cooperation. As a result of the Honduran military’s role in Zelaya’s removal, the United States suspended joint military activities as well as some military assistance to the country. The events in Honduras also led some analysts to question the effectiveness of U.S. foreign military training programs. They argued that such programs have not obtained their desired outcomes given that General Romeo Vasquez Velasquez, who had received U.S. training, led the effort to remove President Zelaya, and the Honduran military reportedly cut off contact with the United States prior to the ouster. Nevertheless, U.S.-Honduran military cooperation resumed following the election of President Lobo, with the United States restoring aid and training efforts. The United States also resumed funding the construction of a Honduran naval base on the island of Guanaja, which—together with a naval base constructed in Caratasca in 2009—is designed to enhance Honduras’ capacity to detect and interdict illicit drug shipments.

Increased US military aid and cooperation with Honduras, and a new naval base is being built

Guy Taylor 2011. (journalist) 30 Nov 2011 “Honduras Base Shows U.S. Military Role in Drug War” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/10793/honduras-base-shows-u-s-military-role-in-drug-war>

Increased U.S. funding to fight drugs and organized crime in Mexico and Central America has attracted a good deal of attention in recent years. But flying largely under the radar is the growing role being played in that effort by the U.S. military, most notably now in Honduras, where U.S. Marines are engaged in a joint training exercise with Honduran troops and the Pentagon is financing a new naval base. “There’s been a noticeable uptick in U.S. military aid and cooperation in Honduras during the past year,” says Adam Isacson, senior associate for regional security policy at the Washington Office on Latin America.

US military is expanding the drug war from its base in Honduras

Thelma Mejia 2011. (journalist) “With Increased US Aid, Honduras Militarizes Anti-Drug Fight” 19 Feb 2011 <http://original.antiwar.com/thelma-mejia/2011/02/18/with-increased-us-aid-honduras-militarizes-anti-drug-fight/>

Colonel Ruíz Pastor Lanza, head of the Honduran Air Force, said the U.S. support in the fight against drug trafficking will involve "more cooperation and coordination" at the level of equipment and operations. The cooperation includes special equipment for night-flying operations for the Honduran military, IPS was told. The assistance is being provided under the 1954 military treaty which provided for the U.S. military presence at the Palmerola Air Base in the 1980s. Palmerola, located in west-central Honduras, is the biggest U.S. base in Central America. In Mosquitia, which holds the largest remaining intact rainforest in Central America, the engines of the military helicopters and armored vehicles are revving up for a "surprise" strike against drug trafficking, in which U.S. forces from Palmerola are expected to take part.

US is expanding its military presence since the coup in Honduras

Prof. Dana Frank 2011. (professor of history at the Univ of California, Santa Cruz ) 13 Jan 2011 US: Wrong on Honduras, THE NATION <http://www.thenation.com/article/157725/us-wrong-honduras>

Llorens's leaked cable further calls into question the Obama administration's eager embrace of current President Porfirio "Pepe" Lobo in a bogus November 2009 election, which was managed by the coup perpetrators and boycotted by most of the opposition and international observers. Since the coup, the United States has constructed two new military bases in Honduras (in Gracias a Dios and on the island of Guanaja), ramped up police training and, most recently, on December 27, announced that drones will be operating out of the joint US/Honduras air force base at Palmerola.

US military cooperation with Honduras funded by Pentagon’s counternarcotics budget

Guy Taylor 2011. (journalist) 30 Nov 2011 “Honduras Base Shows U.S. Military Role in Drug War” WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (brackets added) <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/10793/honduras-base-shows-u-s-military-role-in-drug-war>

While the United States has a history of coordinating with the Honduran military, [Master of Arts in International Relations with Concentration in development policy and Latin American studies, Adam] Isacson reminded Trend Lines this week that the “spigot of aid” was, for a time, shut off after the June 2009 military coup that ousted former President Manuel Zelaya. The best illustration that those taps are once again flowing may be the $2 million base slated to open next month on the island of Guanaja, just off the northern Honduran coast east of Belize. The base, according to Isacson, is being paid for by the Pentagon’s Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account, which for the past two decades has financed similar base improvements and construction for the militaries of Colombia, Panama and Nicaragua, among others.

Obama’s own State Department admits the Honduran coup was illegal

Prof. Dana Frank 2011. (professor of history at the Univ of California, Santa Cruz ) 13 Jan 2011 US: Wrong on Honduras, THE NATION <http://www.thenation.com/article/157725/us-wrong-honduras>

As we brace ourselves for the Florida Congress members' attacks on Obama, it's important to be clear how dangerous Obama's policies on Honduras have been. Thanks to a WikiLeaked cable, we know that Hugo Llorens, US ambassador to Honduras, informed the State Department in July 2009 that "there is no doubt that the military, Supreme Court and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup." Yet Secretary of State Hillary Clinton avoided using the phrase "military coup," chastised Zelaya when he tried to return to his own country and eschewed a full condemnation of post-coup de facto President Roberto Micheletti, treating him as Zelaya's equal during negotiations.

ADVOCACY

US should stop supporting Honduran government

Prof. Dana Frank 2012. (professor of history at the Univ of California, Santa Cruz ) In Honduras, a Mess Made in the U.S., NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/opinion/in-honduras-a-mess-helped-by-the-us.html>

As Honduras plunges into a tragic abyss, it’s time to finally cut off all police and military aid. “Stop feeding the beast” is the way Ms. Castellanos, the academician whose son was killed, puts it. She, like other human rights advocates, insists that the Lobo government cannot reform itself. The State Department is beginning to help address the situation behind the scenes. But Honduran human-rights activists, along with many of us in the United States who care about Honduras, do not believe that this administration can, or should, manage a cleanup of the very cesspool it helped to create by supporting a government that owes its power to a coup.

94 members of Congress advocate ending aid to Honduras military and police because of human rights abuses

Dr. Mark Weisbrot 2012. (Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan; has testified before Congressional committees several times) 22 Mar 2012 “Democrats press Obama over US complicity with Honduras' dirty war” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/mar/22/democrats-press-obama-us-complicity-honduras>

On the wrong side of this fight was the Obama administration, which – after some hesitation – made some statements against the coup but went on do quite a bit to help the coup government succeed. Nearly three years and hundreds of political murders later, it seems that this administration is still on the side of repression and denial of Hondurans' basic human rights. Nothing has made this clearer than the attempts of Democratic members of the US Congress to pressure the administration to change course. On 9 March, 94 members of the US House of Representatives sent a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asking her "to suspend US assistance to the Honduran military and police given the credible allegations of widespread, serious violations of human rights attributed to the security forces".

Honduras does not need an army, much less any military aid from the USA

Dr. John Lamperti 2009. (PhD mathematics; professor emeritus at Dartmouth College; former visiting professor at Univ. of El Salvador) 30 Aug 2009 “Honduras: Lessons From the Coup: Or, Why Are We in Honduras Anyhow?” <http://archive.truthout.org/083009A>

Honduras, like Costa Rica, does not need an army or an air force. No foreign nation threatens to invade, and those tens of millions of military dollars could be far better spent on human welfare. Internal security is a police, not a military problem, and neither poverty nor domestic crime can be fought with advanced jet aircraft. The Honduran military has not provided security to the Honduran people; on the contrary, without that military the coup and subsequent ugly repression could not have taken place. The United States, of course, cannot dictate to Honduras or any other nation that it must follow Costa Rica's lead, and the example of our own enormous military spending is hardly one to emulate. Still, we could and should use our influence and our aid to strengthen the civil societies of our neighbors and seek to reduce the size, importance and influence of their military institutions. In particular, there is no good reason to continue to strengthen and legitimize the Honduran military. All US aid to Honduras should be civilian, helping to build a more prosperous and just society. Supporting the military does not help the Honduran people.

DISAD RESPONSES

“Health care aid provided by the US military” - Response: USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) has health programs in Honduras  
[Note: The word “Honduras” is not in the text of the quote, but the context is established by the name of the article in the citation; it is all about Honduras.]

The State Department’s U.S. Agency for International Development in an article last updated in November 2011. (United States Agency for International Development, also known as USAID; part of the US State Department, they provide foreign aid) “Honduras” Last updated 1 Nov 2011, <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/country/honduras/>

USAID assists the Honduran Ministry of Health and other local organizations to improve the provision of services, especially for maternal and child health, family planning, and HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support. USAID also promotes health sector reform and decentralization of services through a model where local organizations provide health services for the poor and the Ministry of Health finances, regulates and evaluates these organizations.

“US military provides humanitarian assistance” - Response: Don’t need military presence to do that

Open letter to military contractors, signed by over 20 college professors and 15 religious leaders and institutions 2011. 26 May 2011 open letter to: “Contractors and bidders on contracts for U.S. construction on military bases in Honduras” (list of names is at the end of the brief) <http://www.nlginternational.org/report/Ltr2HondurascontractorsMay2011-signers.pdf>

We recognize that U.S. forces in Honduras have been used to respond to emergencies produced by seasonal hurricanes. Yet no act of good will changes the essential mission of military forces to wage war and to use or threaten to use violent force. Responses to hurricane disasters do not require a U.S. military presence in Honduras, as the U.S. General Accounting Office has reported.

“Military provides natural disaster assistance” - Response: USAID provides disaster assistance in Honduras

USAID in an article last updated in October 2011. (United States Agency for International Development; part of the US State Department, they provide foreign aid) USAID Responds to Floods and Landslides in Central America, last updated 28 Oct 2011, (brackets added) <http://www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/modules/features/floods_central_am.html>

The October rainfall in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras has made life difficult for people living in the hardest hit areas of the region, destroying homes, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure. As it has in past disasters in Central America, USAID has worked with its government and NGO [non-governmental organizations] partners to deliver immediate humanitarian assistance and plan for rebuilding.

“Military provides humanitarian aid” - Response: Military should be a last resort. Negative has to prove that all civilian aid measures have been tried before bringing in the military

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2007. Guidelines On The Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets In Disaster Relief - “Oslo Guidelines” Updated November 2006, (Revision 1.1 November 2007) <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/8706B7B69BD77E00C1257233004F0570-OCHA-Nov2006.pdf>

5. Last Resort: Military and civil defence assets should be seen as a tool complementing existing relief mechanisms in order to provide specific support to specific requirements, in response to the acknowledged "humanitarian gap" between the disaster needs that the relief community is being asked to satisfy and the resources available to meet them. Therefore, foreign military and civil defence assets should be requested only where there is no comparable civilian alternative and only the use of military or civil defence assets can meet a critical humanitarian need.

“Need to interdict drugs” - Response: US State Department admits Honduran government is infiltrated by drug dealers

Peter J. Meyer 2011. (Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Congressional Research Service) July 14, 2011 “Honduran-U.S. Relations” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf>

In 2010, joint counternarcotics operations led to an increase in seizures of bulk cash and most illegal drugs. Likewise, a U.S.-vetted Honduran police unit seized a cocaine processing laboratory in March 2011, the first ever discovered in Central America. Despite these accomplishments, some analysts have raised serious concerns about criminal infiltration of the Honduran government, which could impede future cooperation. A former member of Honduras’ Council Against Drug Trafficking reportedly has estimated that 10% of the Honduran National Congress is linked to drug traffickers. Recent reports also suggest that U.S. arms sold to Honduras in the past have turned up in the hands of criminal groups in Colombia and Mexico. According to the U.S. State Department, corruption continues to pose a challenge to Honduras and institutional changes will need to be made in order for the country to successfully expel traffickers from its territory.

“Need to interdict drugs” - Response: Central American war on drugs has failed

BBC News 2012. (British Broadcasting Corporation) 25 Mar 2012 “Guatemala's president urges debate on drug legalisation” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17502417>

Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina has said the war on drugs has failed, and it is time to end the "taboo" on discussing decriminalisation. He was addressing a Central American summit in the Guatemalan city of Antigua. Mr Perez Molina convoked the meeting to consider decriminalisation as a way of reducing drug-related violence.

“Need to interdict drugs” - Response: Central American war on drugs strategy has failed

Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina quoted by BBC News 2012. (British Broadcasting Corporation) 25 Mar 2012 “Guatemala's president urges debate on drug legalisation” (brackets added) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-17502417>

"We have seen that the strategy that has been pursued in the fight against drug trafficking over the last 40 years has failed," he [Guatemalan President Otto Perez Molina] said. "We have to look for new alternatives. We must end the myths, the taboos, and tell people you have to discuss it," he added.

“What about Honduran police / US aid to Honduran police?” - Response: The police collapsed, the military is doing basic crime fighting now

Adam Isacson 2012. (Master of Arts in International Relations with Concentration in development policy and Latin American studies, Yale Univ.; Senior Associate for Regional Security Policy for the Washington Office on Latin America) 5 Apr 2012 “Interview with Adam Isacson” by Grace Livingstone of LATIN AMERICAN BUREAU, <http://www.lab.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1329:obama-and-honduras&catid=66:analysis&Itemid=39>

Last year, they even found a cocaine laboratory near the Caribbean coast of Honduras. They're actually taking raw coca paste out of Colombia to be processed in Honduras. This is all the result, or at least accelerated by, the 2009 coup. You've seen the Honduran national police, to all intents and purposes, collapse and go over to the other side. The only thing the government has been able to do is to send the military in to do basic crime fighting.

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*LIST OF NAMES FOR THE “20 COLLEGE PROFESSORS AND 15 RELIGIOUS LEADERS & INSTITUTIONS* [*http://www.nlginternational.org/report/Ltr2HondurascontractorsMay2011-signers.pdf*](http://www.nlginternational.org/report/Ltr2HondurascontractorsMay2011-signers.pdf)

Religious Leaders and Institutions

General Board of Church & Society, United Methodist Church

Presbyterian Peace Fellowship

Sister Mary Hughes President, Leadership Conference of Women Religious

Sister Jean Stokan, Director Sisters of Mercy of the Americas ‐ Justice Team

Rev. Dr. Nicholas T. Novitsky Episcopal Deacon, Diocese of Western Michigan (for identification purposes only)

Erin Cox 8th Day Center for Justice

Fr. Bob Bossie, SCJ

Rev. Dr. Ken Brooker Langston Director, Disciples Justice Action Network

Sarah Weintraub, Executive Director Buddhist Peace Fellowship

Rabbi Lynn Gottlieb Rabbinic elder, Shomer Shalom Network for Jewish Nonviolence

Rev. John R. Long, DD Ecumenical Liaison, Presbytery of Western New York

Rev. Richard Deats Editor Emeritus, Fellowship magazine

Columbus Peace Fellowship

Chicago Religious Leadership Network on Latin America

Sisters of St. Francis of Dubuque, Iowa, Leadership Team

Academics

Leisy J. Abrego Assistant Professor, University of California, Los Angeles

Mark Anderson Associate Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz

Arturo Arias Professor, University of Texas at Austin

César J. AyalaProfessor, Department of Sociology‐UCLA

Marc Becker Professor of Latin American History Truman State University

Jefferson C. Boyer Professor of Anthropology, Appalachian State University

Leah Carroll, Ph.D. Independent Scholar, Office of Undergraduate Research, UC Berkeley

Chris Chiappari St. Olaf College

Noam Chomsky Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Luis F. Clemente, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Ohio University

Roseann Cohen, Research Associate Anthropology Department University of California, Santa Cruz

Linda J. Craft Professor, Foreign Languages, North Park University

Jonathan Fox Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz

Dana Frank Professor of History, University of California, Santa Cruz

Alfonso Gonzales, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Lehman College

Greg Grandin New York University

Doug Hertzler Associate Director, Washington Community Scholars' Center

Karen Kampwirth Professor of Political Science, Knox College

Catherine LutzChair, Department of Anthropology, Brown University

Dr. Carlos Muñoz, Jr. Professor Emeritus, Department of Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley

Hector Perla Jr. Assistant Professor, University of California, Santa Cruz

Suyapa Portillo Professor, California State University, Northridge

James Quesada, Ph.D. Department of Anthropology, San Francisco State University

Anita Rapone Professor Emerita, State University of New York at Plattsburgh

Kelley Ready, Ph.D. Senior Lecturer, Brandeis University

Carol A. Smith Emerita Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Davis

Dr. Steven Topik Department of History, University of California Irvine

Mayo C. Toruño, Ph.D. Professor and Chair of Economics Department, California State University, San Bernardino

Sonja Wolf Post‐doctoral Researcher, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM)

Chris Zepeda PhD Candidate, Cornell University Organizations

Mark C. Johnson, Ph.D., Executive Director, Fellowship of Reconciliation

Chuck Kaufman, National Coordinator Alliance for Global Justice

Katherine Hoyt, Ph.D., National Coordinator, Nicaragua Network

James Jordan, National Coordinator Campaign for Labor Rights

Carleen Pickard, Associate Director Global Exchange

Dale Sorensen, Director, Marin Interfaith Task Force on the Americas

No Private Armies

DeKalb Interfaith Network for Peace and Justice

Southcom Watch

U.S. El Salvador Sister Cities

Andrés Thomas Conteris Americas Program Director Nonviolence International

Vic and Barby Ulmer, Co-directors Our Developing World

Camilo Perez Bustillo International Tribunal of Conscience "Pueblos en Movimiento" (Law Professor, UNAM, and lead Attorney for the TICPM)

Dorinda Moreno Fuerza Mundial Global, Principal, U.S. Liaison Secretariat FM/TICPM

Robert Naiman, Policy Director Just Foreign Policy

Bruce K. Gagnon, Coordinator Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space

Nicaragua U.S. Friendship Office

Amanda Martin, Director Guatemala Human Rights Commission

Lara Barth, Grassroots Network Liaison

Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala

Bette Hoover, Founder/Director Just Peace Circles Inc

Community Action on Latin America(Madison, Wisconsin)

Sharon Hostetler Executive Director, Witness for Peace

Jeanne Mirer, Susan Scott, Azadeh Shahshahani Co-Chairs, National Lawyers Guild International Committee

Radio La Nueva Republica

San Jose Peace and Justice Center

School of the Americas Watch

Angela Sanbrano, President National Alliance of Latin American and Caribbean Communities

2A EVIDENCE: HORN OF AFRICA

BACKGROUND

Al Shabab gained power in 2007 from backlash against US support for Ethiopian invasion of Somalia

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2012. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 21 Feb 2012 “Divisive Alliance” NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/divisive-alliance.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=somalia>

The Shabab rode to power in 2007 on a wave of public hostility toward the United States’ counterterrorism efforts and the Ethiopian army’s occupation of Mogadishu. It drove the Ethiopian forces out of the capital in 2009 and has continued to oppose the Western-backed transitional government there. Since November, it has battled relatively well-armed and disciplined troops from Ethiopia, Kenya and the African Union on three different fronts.

TFG supported by African Union - but troubled and ineffectual

Al Shabab - weakened but has considerable resources

John Norris & Bronwyn Bruton 2011. ( Norris - Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at Center for American Progress; former chief of political affairs for the UN Mission in Nepal ; former Washington chief of staff for the International Crisis Group, conducting extensive field work and senior-level advocacy for resolving conflicts in South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans; former director of communications for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot. Bruton - served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 14 Sept 2011 Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting - The Cost of Failure in Somalia <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf>

The African Union Mission to Somalia, or AMISOM, was launched by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council in January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. AMISOM’s mission is to support the structures existing under the transitional federal government, or TFG; support a new national security plan; train Somali security forces; and protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The mission continues to be renewed approximately every six months and is ongoing. While making some important gains on the ground, AMISOM is still unable to control any territory outside of the capital city. The TFG remains troubled and largely ineffectual, and Al Shabbab, though weakened, still maintains considerable resources.

US support for Ethiopia and TFG means TFG is regarded as a foreign entity in Somalia

John Norris & Bronwyn Bruton 2011. ( Norris - Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at Center for American Progress; former chief of political affairs for the UN Mission in Nepal ; former Washington chief of staff for the International Crisis Group, conducting extensive field work and senior-level advocacy for resolving conflicts in South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans; former director of communications for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot. Bruton - served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 14 Sept 2011 Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting - The Cost of Failure in Somalia (brackets added) <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf>

Ethiopia invaded Somalia in December 2006, with the TFG [Transitional Federal Government] on the verge of military defeat by Islamic Courts Union forces. The United States provided intelligence and military support for the Ethiopians, who quickly took over substantial territory while unfortunately reinforcing the notion that the TFG was more of a foreign creation than a local one.

Al Shabab fights TFG

John Norris & Bronwyn Bruton 2011. ( Norris - Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at Center for American Progress; former chief of political affairs for the UN Mission in Nepal ; former Washington chief of staff for the International Crisis Group, conducting extensive field work and senior-level advocacy for resolving conflicts in South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans; former director of communications for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot. Bruton - served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 14 Sept 2011 Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting - The Cost of Failure in Somalia (brackets added) <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf>

A U.N.-brokered peace accord was reached between the TFG [Transitional Federal Government] and a key opposition militia in June 2008. But more extremist groups, including a hardline Al Qaeda-linked splinter faction called Al Shabbab, resisted peace talks. Despite the peace accord, Al Shabbab came to control increasingly large parts of southern Somalia. TFG and AMISOM [African Union] peacekeepers were able to largely protect the TFG leadership, but struggled to exert broader control.

INHERENCY

US is increasing military support for Uganda and Burundi in the fight against al-Shabab in Somalia

MSNBC 2011. “Political payback behind US special forces deployment to Uganda?” 15 Oct 2011 <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44912923/ns/world_news-africa/t/political-payback-behind-us-special-forces-deployment-uganda/>

The Bush Administration authorized the Pentagon to send a team of 17 counterterrorism advisers to train Ugandan troops and provided millions of dollars worth of aid, including fuel trucks, satellite phones and night-vision goggles, to the Ugandan Army. In recent months, the administration has stepped up its support for Uganda. In June, the Pentagon moved to send nearly $45 million in military equipment to Uganda and Burundi, another country contributing in Somalia.The aid included four small drones, body armor and night-vision and communications gear and is being used in the fight against al-Shabab.

US commando raids, cruise missiles, and helicopters fighting in Horn of Africa

Spencer Ackerman 2012. (journalist) 26 Jan 2012 East Africa Is the New Epicenter of America’s Shadow War, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/01/battleground-africa/?utm_source=Contextly&utm_medium=RelatedLinks&utm_campaign=Previous>

Located northwest of Somalia is a former French Foreign Legion base in Djibouti called Camp Lemonnier. The U.S. military has been there for a decade. It’s a resupply point for U.S. ships passing by, as well as the home of a multinational, American-led counterterrorism team called the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Recently, more and more special operations forces have called it a temporary home. Camp Lemonnier was where the commando team took hostages Jessica Buchanan and Poul Thisted for medical care after freeing them. But the camp is much more than just a big medical facility: it’s also a staging ground for the growing Shadow War in Somalia — and particularly a drone war over it. Much of the day-to-day fight against al-Shabab is outsourced to African peacekeepers. But the raids and strikes that U.S. commandos have launched against specific Shabab targets are becoming more frequent. Cruise missiles and even, apparently, U.S. helicopter strikes have also hit the group.

US provides military aid to TFG - Transitional Federal Government - in Somalia

John Norris & Bronwyn Bruton 2011. ( Norris - Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at Center for American Progress; former chief of political affairs for the UN Mission in Nepal ; former Washington chief of staff for the International Crisis Group, conducting extensive field work and senior-level advocacy for resolving conflicts in South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans; former director of communications for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot. Bruton - served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 14 Sept 2011 Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting - The Cost of Failure in Somalia <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf>

But the United States also plays a role in bringing weapons into the country. In May 2009 the U.S. government applied for an embargo exemption to supply $2 million in cash to TFG forces to purchase weapons, which came in part from Somali arms markets. Then, in August 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged military support for the TFG that included at least 40 tons of military weaponry and equipment. Arms included assault rifles, machine guns, grenades, and mortars.

US military involvement includes drone attacks and military assistance to neighboring countries to shore up weak governments in Somalia

John Norris & Bronwyn Bruton 2011. ( Norris - Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at Center for American Progress; former chief of political affairs for the UN Mission in Nepal ; former Washington chief of staff for the International Crisis Group, conducting extensive field work and senior-level advocacy for resolving conflicts in South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans; former director of communications for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot. Bruton - served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 14 Sept 2011 Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting - The Cost of Failure in Somalia <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/pdf/somalia.pdf>

Peacekeeping, military aid, counterterror efforts, and even predator drone attacks are all part of the international community’s approach to containing and mitigating Somalia’s crisis. In some cases this military involvement is direct, such as through the U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s or the launch of predator drone attacks on suspected terrorists. Other times, Somalia serves as a proxy battleground where military assistance from the United States and others is funneled to Ethiopia, Uganda, and Burundi for their role in trying to shore up weak governments in Somalia.

US military base in southern Ethiopia

Craig Whitlock 2011. (journalist) 27 Oct 2011 WASHINGTON POST “US drone base in Ethiopia is operational” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-drone-base-in-ethiopia-is-operational/2011/10/27/gIQAznKwMM_story.html>

But U.S. military personnel and contractors have become increasingly visible in recent months in Arba Minch, a city of about 70,000 people in southern Ethiopia. Arba Minch means “40 springs” in Amharic, the national language. Travelers who have passed through the Arba Minch airport on the occasional civilian flights that land there said the U.S. military has erected a small compound on the tarmac, next to the terminal.

US drones strike Al Shabaab targets in Somalia

Ambassador David Shinn 2011. (PhD from George Washington Univ; served for thirty-seven years in the US Foreign Service with assignments at embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritania, Cameroon, Sudan and as ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia ) U.S. Policy towards the Horn of Africa, INTERNATIONAL POLICY DIGEST, 13 Oct 2011 <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2011/10/13/u-s-policy-towards-the-horn-of-africa/>

The United States continues to treat counterterrorism as an important part of its policy in the Horn, but is implementing that policy in a more nuanced manner than was the case during the Bush administration. In Somalia, surveillance drones have been in widespread use for several years. The United States has conducted occasional aerial strikes against suspected terrorist targets inside Somalia; there were several early this year. According to press reports coming out of the port city of Kismayu, which is held by al-Shabaab, U.S. drones or aircraft struck the al-Shabaab military camp at the airport and possibly other targets on 24 September.

“2-Track Policy” - Problems: 1) in south and central Somalia, we can’t contact groups in areas under Shabab control 2) it should be run by Somalis

former Ambassador David Shinn 2011. (Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington Univ; served for thirty-seven years in the US Foreign Service with assignments at embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritania, Cameroon, Sudan and as ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

The hard part of the two track policy is that which calls for reaching out to and supporting anti-Shabaab groups in south and central Somalia. From my optic, the United States has not yet figured out how to reach these groups because they are, after all, under al-Shabaab control. To the extent that the TFG can convince Somali communities on the margins of al-Shabaab control that it has something to offer them, then the international community needs to step in quickly to provide development resources. I don’t know how you reach out successfully to Somali communities firmly under the control of al-Shabaab; so far, the TFG has not demonstrated that is it the organization to carry this out. Whatever strategy is pursued to overcome this conundrum, however, it must be Somali driven and not have an outcome that by supporting sub-clans and small groups results in the permanent balkanization of the region.

MINOR REPAIR / COUNTERPLAN RESPONSES

Foreign aid isn’t working in Somalia: 96% is lost to corruption

John Norris & Bronwyn Bruton 2011. ( Norris - Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at Center for American Progress; former chief of political affairs for the UN Mission in Nepal ; former Washington chief of staff for the International Crisis Group, conducting extensive field work and senior-level advocacy for resolving conflicts in South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans; former director of communications for U.S. Deputy Sec. of State Strobe Talbot. Bruton - former program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 14 Sept 2011 Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting - The Cost of Failure in Somalia” [www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/somalia.html](http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/somalia.html)

Western and regional efforts to reduce the terror threat by establishing a central government in Somalia have failed to improve governance. A recent confidential audit of the Somali government suggests that in 2009 and 2010 some 96 percent of direct bilateral assistance to the government had simply disappeared, presumably into the pockets of corrupt officials. The repeated failure of international efforts to produce positive change in Somalia has generated fatigue among donors at a time when Somalia’s needs have never been greater.

At least 100,000 troops would be required to impose military security in Somalia

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

A much larger stabilization force capable of suppressing resistance, holding territory, and providing security for a more ambitious reconstruction effort is imaginable but even more unrealistic. The rule of thumb for the number of troops required for stability operations in an environment where the population is largely acquiescent is between five to ten soldiers per thousand people; in a nonpermissive environment the requirement jumps to twenty soldiers per thousand. Somalia’s population is not reliably known but is believed to be around nine million, which suggests a total occupying force of at least one hundred thousand to account for varying security conditions. For the United States, not to mention other potential partners, the deployment of such a force at this time given ongoing commitments in the Middle East and Afghanistan would be extremely challenging. More to the point, domestic U.S. politics precludes even trying. Public sentiment is already souring on comparable efforts in Afghanistan, and with memories of earlier failed U.S. interventions in Somalia still much alive, there will be little or no support for undertaking such a venture. The situation is no different in other potential troop supplying countries.

HARMS

Outrage and backlash. Somalis become angry at US intervention and turn against us with terrorism

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

From the beginning, the United States was viewed as a not-so-hidden partner of Ethiopia. Besides its public support for the Ethiopian invasion, the United States launched a series of missile attacks on fleeing SCIC leaders in January 2007. The missiles failed to hit their targets but caused scores of civilian casualties, and inextricably linked the United States to Ethiopia’s occupation and subsequent human rights abuses by the TFG, Ethiopian, and African Union forces. These abuses included rape, kidnapping, mortar fire on civilian hospitals and media houses, and indiscriminate shelling of civilian crowds in response to insurgent attacks. During the two years of Ethiopia’s occupation, Mogadishu was reduced to a level of human suffering, violence, and disorder unknown since the civil war, and anti-American sentiment rose to an all-time high. Outrage over the Ethiopian occupation prompted members of the far-flung Somali diaspora, including twenty youths from Minnesota, to return to their homeland to fight for the Shabaab. One of these individuals, Shirwa Ahmed, became the first known American suicide bomber in October 2008. These incidents are isolated, but for the first time have raised the specter of a homegrown radicalization problem in the United States.

US support for African Union intervention blocks human rights improvements in Uganda

Note: AMISOM is the multinational African Union military force currently intervening in Somalia

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Dr J. Peter Pham 2011. (DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. ANSARI AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL; was a tenured associate professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and Africana Studies at James Madison Univ.; has served on the Senior Advisory Group of the US Africa Command since its creation) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

I would add, Mr. Chairman, that our reliance on AMISOM causes difficulties for our policy objectives elsewhere in Africa. Take, for example, the lamentably ham-fisted way in which the regime in Uganda has dealt with political opponents in recent months. President Museveni knows that as long as the United States and other members of the international community insist on backing the corrupt and ineffective TFG, American and its partners will be constrained insofar as their ability to bring any meaningful pressure on him with respect to human rights.

US support for Ethiopia generates anti-US sentiment because of Ethiopia’s human rights abuses - weakens our counterterrorism efforts

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

The United States should also work to ensure the sustainability of its partnership with Ethiopia by publicly urging the Ethiopian government to cease human rights abuses, implement democratic reforms, and resolve its border dispute with Eritrea. Ethiopian cooperation is critical to the pursuit of U.S. strategic interests in the region, but anti-U.S. sentiment in the Horn is closely linked to the perception of U.S. complicity with Ethiopian human rights abuses in Somalia and Ethiopian abuses against ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region. The United States’ ability to successfully pursue its counterterror objectives depends on resolving that dilemma.

US intervention makes the conflict worse, with disastrous results

John Norris & Bronwyn Bruton 2011. ( Norris - Executive Director of the Sustainable Security and Peacebuilding Initiative at Center for American Progress; former chief of political affairs for the UN Mission in Nepal ; former Washington chief of staff for the International Crisis Group, conducting extensive field work and senior-level advocacy for resolving conflicts in South Asia, Africa, and the Balkans; former director of communications for U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot. Bruton - served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 14 Sept 2011 Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting - The Cost of Failure in Somalia <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/09/somalia.html>

Too often the international response to the situation on the ground in failed states is to lunge toward quick “fixes” that fail to and may actually exacerbate the dynamics of conflict. While U.S. counterterrorism efforts have led to the death or capture of a number of high-value targets, the country’s primary extremist group, Al Shabbab, retains a worrying capacity to attract international recruits and to launch terrorist attacks in the region. U.S. support for the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia—which generated wide public support for Al Shabbab—remains a particularly egregious example of an ill-advised tactical approach to Somalia that yielded disastrous long-term results.

Status quo anti-terrorism efforts are backfiring in Somalia: polarizing Somalia’s diverse Muslim community

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

Somalia has been a failed state for the better part of two decades; bereft of central government, cantonized into clan fiefdoms, and wracked by deadly spasms of violence. Repeated efforts to create a viable national government have failed. For the United States, the principal concern, especially since 9/11, has been the fear that Somalia might become a safe haven for al-Qaeda to launch attacks in the region and even conceivably against the U.S. homeland. U.S. efforts to prevent that from happening, however, have been counterproductive, alienating large parts of the Somali population and polarizing Somalia’s diverse Muslim community into “moderate” and “extremist” camps. Several indigenous militant Islamist groups have emerged and grown stronger in recent years. One coalition, headed by a radical youth militia known as the Shabaab, now controls most of southern Somalia and threatens the survival of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)—the latest UN-brokered effort to establish a functioning authority in the capital city of Mogadishu.

Outside intervention boosts Shabaab’s popularity in Somalia

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2012. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 11 Jan 2012 “Ethiopia Invades Somalia In Fight Against Al-Shabab” NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO “http://www.npr.org/2012/01/11/145046988/ethiopia-invades-somalia-in-fight-against-al-shabab

Opinion is divided in Somalia. The northern territory of Somaliland, for example, declared its independence 20 years ago, and they have no desire to be reunited with their colleagues in the south. But many other people want to see Somalia made whole again. And it - a big concern when you talk about the invasion of countries like Kenya and Ethiopia is that it is going to damage Somali pride. And it is actually going to give the Shabaab a boost because Somalis who are - who do not want to see parts of their territory effectively annexed by Kenya or by Ethiopia are potentially going to revolt.

US is providing diplomatic and military support to TFG - which motivates extremist groups to cooperate in opposing it. TFG’s odds of success are poor

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

The Obama administration has chosen to adopt and expand its predecessor’s policy of providing limited, indirect diplomatic and military support to the TFG, in hopes it will provide a bulwark against militant Islamist forces in Somalia. In August 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with the TFG president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and promised continued shipments of ammunition and diplomatic support, calling the government Somalia’s best hope for stability. But the odds of the TFG emerging as an effective body are extremely poor. The government’s writ extends to no more than a few blocks of Mogadishu, and its survival depends entirely on the protection provided by a weak African Union (AU) peacekeeping force (AMISOM). Although the TFG has the backing of some Somalis, it has failed to attract a critical mass of support. Indeed, the open blessing of the TFG by the United States and other Western countries has perversely served to isolate the government and, at the same time, to propel cooperation among previously fractured and quarrelsome extremist groups.

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY

Less US intervention in Somalia = less terrorism in Somalia

Bronwyn Bruton 2011. **(**democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

For a long time it has been common sense to assume that because it is a security vacuum, it is a terrorist threat. The reality is that after the U.S. pulled out of Somalia in 1995, after the Black Hawk Down incident that you have alluded to, Somalia became more stable, more economically viable, and less threatening than it had ever been in the past. In 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, there was virtually no discernable terrorist threat in Somalia at all. In 2006, the Counter-Terrorism Center at West Point wrote a report in which it said that Somalia was—I think the term they used was ‘‘fundamentally inhospitable to foreign terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.’’ Basically arguing that it was an inherently bad place for terrorists to work. Obviously now there are terrorists in Somalia, but the thing that changed was not the Somalis. It was the level of U.S. engagement in the country, which dramatically increased starting in 2004. The reason for that stepped-up interest on the part of the United States was nothing to do with what was happening on the ground in Somalia, and everything to do with 9/11. I am all in favor of caution, and erring on the side of caution when we are talking about counterterrorism, but in Somalia our preemptive efforts have tended to backfire in really terrible ways, and I think that should be the source of most U.S. thinking on Somalia now.

We should stop bombing Al Shabab unless someone can prove they terrorize Americans

Benjamin Friedman 2011. (research fellow in defense and homeland security studies; Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and an affiliate of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ) Al Qaeda’s Mythical Unity 7 July 2011 <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/al-qaedas-mythical-unity/>

Since our recent drone strike in Somalia on leaders of the al-Shabab insurgent group, the administration has claimed that Shabab’s leaders are plotting terrorism against American or western targets. The only evidence given for this assertion is vague claims of Shabab’s ties to Yemeni militants and its claim of responsibility for a 2010 terrorist bombing in Uganda. But that bombing came because Ugandan troops are in the African Union force fighting al-Shabab. While reprehensible, the attack does not show a desire to terrorize Americans. At the risk of sounding quaint, Congress should make the administration substantiate its claims that Shabab is targeting Americans before we bomb them further. We have enough insurgents to fight these days outside Somalia.

Drone strikes can’t kill as many terrorists as they are recruiting - could cause more resentment and make it worse

David Cortright 2012. (Director of Policy Studies at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame) The Wrong Option 27 Jan 2012 [www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/27/david-cortright/the-wrong-option/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2012/01/27/david-cortright/the-wrong-option/)

Killing the mafia dons who control these violent networks may cause some temporary disruption, but it will not end the threats of violence and could make matters worse. U.S. military attacks—of all kinds, including ground operations, conventional bombing and drone strikes—may arouse popular resentment and hatred toward American policy and increase the terrorist recruitment rate. Donald Rumsfeld asked the right question years ago, “Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrasas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?” In Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia the answer is clearly no. After years of war in Afghanistan and hundreds of drone strikes into Pakistan, the Taliban insurgency is stronger than ever. Why do we think more of the same will produce a different result?

Somali political solutions must be resolved entirely by Somalis, not outsiders

Ambassador David Shinn 2012. (PhD from George Washington Univ; served for thirty-seven years in the US Foreign Service with assignments at embassies in Lebanon, Kenya, Tanzania, Mauritania, Cameroon, Sudan and as ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia ) Al-Shabaab and Somalia in the 21st Century 25 Jan 2012 INTERNATIONAL POLICY DIGEST <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/01/25/al-shabaab-and-somalia-in-the-21st-century/>

Any future reconciliation effort must be entirely Somali driven with no foreign participation and should take place inside Somalia. Ideally, even the cost should be covered by Somalis as foreign funders will always want to influence the process. Somalis obviously have a much better understanding of the situation in their country than do non-Somalis. I have yet to meet a non-Somali who speaks the language fluently and, in my view, fully understands all the nuances of Somali society that would permit him or her to advise Somalis on a political solution.

US should oppose Ethiopian invasion of Somalia

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

Ethiopia is currently pursuing a buffer zone strategy that involves the creation and support of proxy militias (including ASWJ) in the Somali regions of Gedo, Bay, Bakol, and Hiran. The United States will have to monitor the situation closely for changes in the Ethiopian posture. In particular, Washington must be poised to dissuade Ethiopia from reinvading Somalia in response to a Shabaab capture of Mogadishu. Reinvasion would only recreate the insurgency dynamic, unify fractious Shabaab elements, and strengthen the movement’s public standing. Ethiopia has a national security imperative to keep troops engaged on its border, but the United States should encourage the UN Security Council to hold Ethiopia accountable for any preemptive incursions into Somali territory.

Disengagement is the best US policy for Somalia

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

U.S. policy options for Somalia are typically reduced to three alternative courses of action: continuation of current policy, increased military intervention for stabilization and reconstruction, and an offshore counterterrorist containment strategy. Each of these options, however, suffers from significant shortcomings. A better course of action for the United States is to pursue a policy of constructive disengagement.

We should plan that the TFG will fail - which won’t matter anyway

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

Given the unlikelihood that even that approach will help build local support for the TFG, the United States should expect that efforts to reform the TFG will likely fail and should simultaneously prepare for its demise and the eventual withdrawal of AMISOM forces. Contrary to what might conceivably be imagined, that outcome is not likely to make a substantial difference. The TFG is already so weak that collapse would only marginally enhance the Shabaab’s operational capacity.

TFG and AMISOM (African Union) will fail

Dr J. Peter Pham 2011. (DIRECTOR, MICHAEL S. ANSARI AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL; was a tenured associate professor of Justice Studies, Political Science, and Africana Studies at James Madison Univ.; has served on the Senior Advisory Group of the US Africa Command since its creation) ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILED STATE OF SOMALIA 7 July 2011 hearings of the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/67305.pdf>

There is perhaps no more telling indicator of the TFG’s dismal prospects than the fact that no fewer than three different western initiatives to train a military force for it have recruited and trained and armed more than 9,000 troops, yet fewer than 1,000 of these remain loyal. Two, AMISOM is neither sustainable as a military operation nor viable as a strategy. Despite its recent success in combat operations, the African Union force remains limited in the ways in which it can accomplish, due to lack of manpower and materiel. Even if the personnel could be found to bring the force up to the new ceiling authorized—and Ambassador Yamamoto testified earlier that that was unlikely—it would still be beyond delusional to think that a 12,000-strong contingent would succeed where infinitely more robust and better-trained U.N. forces failed just a little over a decade and a half ago.

Investment in Somalia is wasted: The TFG is corrupt and can’t fight

Morgan Roach 2010. ( research associate for Heritage Foundation; bachelor of arts degree in government from Sweet Briar College; master of science degree in European studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science) 26 Mar 2010 “Don’t Let Somalia Become a Black Hole for U.S. Counter-Terrorism Funding” <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/03/26/don%E2%80%99t-let-somalia-become-a-black-hole-for-u-s-counter-terrorism-funding/>

Investment in Somalia is being wasted. The TFG is rife with corruption and criminal activity. According to the UN, “Despite infusions of foreign training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt- a composite of independent militias loyal to senior government officials and military officers who profit from the business of war and resist their integration under a single command.” Furthermore, the TFG “has never deployed regimental or brigade-sized units on the battlefield,” and yet, the United States continues put money towards training security forces that fail to do the job they are set out to do. There is grave concern that while the U.S. must stand firm against al-Qaeda and go after international terrorism; it must be wary of being sucked into yet another doomed effort to stand-up a Somali government

Alternative strategies: Constructive disengagement

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

Before the TFG collapses, the Obama administration must prepare a new approach to Somalia, one that draws on the lessons of past failures but also accepts the limited appetite that the United States and international community have for launching any major new undertaking. Given these realities, the United States should adopt a policy of constructive disengagement—a modified containment strategy that would involve a restrained counterterrorist military component, increased efforts to contain arms or other forms of outside support to the Shabaab and minimize regional instability, and internal actions to help develop alternatives to Shabaab control.

US should not be supporting TFG, nor anyone: Whoever wins will not be able to keep the peace

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 10 Mar 2010 “Disengaging From Somalia” <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/disengaging-somalia/p21619>

The sides the United States is trying to back and combat, the TFG and the Shabaab, are both coalitions of fortune. They're opportunistic alliances that are very fragile and very shifting. They can fall apart very quickly under the right conditions. The United States needs to be looking at how they can foster the conditions that would speed the collapse, particularly of the Shabaab. It also needs to be less worried about the fate of the TFG. Both organizations are really not capable of sustaining a victory even if they were to win. One of the major points of the report is that it's not worthwhile for the international community to back one horse over another, because ultimately whoever wins is not going to be able to keep the peace.

Limited attacks from offshore would be difficult and dangerous and would block humanitarian relief

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) March 2010 “Somalia - A New Approach” download from: <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/somalia/p21421>

A similar offshore containment strategy has been proposed for Afghanistan, and it offers the prospect of minimal U.S. military engagement to satisfy core security objectives. That approach, however, is subject to some of the criticisms that have been leveled in the Afghan context. First, discriminating military attacks are difficult to accomplish without good information from local sources, which is difficult to obtain without sympathetic informants that usually come only with some presence on the ground. Second, countering the influence of the Shabaab with its highly decentralized command system is likely to be difficult with selective attacks. The likelihood of collateral damage, moreover, also risks inflaming anti-American sentiment and driving even more recruits into the arms of the Shabaab and al-Qaeda. Third, such a strategy would do little to improve the humanitarian situation inside Somalia and could conceivably worsen it by compromising Western-backed relief operations.

DISAD RESPONSES

Abandoning TFG will not help Al Qaeda

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2010. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 10 Mar 2010 “Disengaging From Somalia” <http://www.cfr.org/somalia/disengaging-somalia/p21619>

The contention of U.S. officials, that if you abandon the TFG you open Somalia to extremist groups, is actually illogical. It's a false assertion that's based on a misreading of Somalia's history and context. Somalia's history shows very clearly that in the absence of international intervention, the country has been quite--"inoculated" is that word intelligence operatives use--against al-Qaeda.

“Al Shabab = Al Qaeda = more terrorism if we don’t fight them” - Response: Al Qaeda actually weakens Al Shabab

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2012. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 21 Feb 2012 “Divisive Alliance” NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/divisive-alliance.html?_r=1&ref=somalia>

So might Somalia finally become what the West has always feared: Al Qaeda’s base in East Africa? Unlikely. Paradoxically, stronger ties between Al Qaeda and the Shabab could weaken the Shabab and help counterterrorism efforts in Somalia by exacerbating internal tensions within the group.

We can’t kill or capture our way to victory over extremists

James Q. Roberts 2011. (Principal Director, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism) statement to the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations & Management Hearing on “Denying Safe Havens: Homeland Security’s Efforts to Counter Threats from Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia” 3 June 2011<http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Roberts.pdf>

What has been called the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign -- a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military refers to as kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. In short, we recognize that the elimination of safe havens is a prerequisite to winning the current conflict and inherently requires an interagency, whole-of-government approach.

Destroying Shabab’s leaders would create a backlash that would outweigh the benefits

Bronwyn E. Bruton 2012. (democracy and governance specialist with extensive experience in Africa; former international affairs fellow in residence at the Council on Foreign Relations; born in Swaziland and spent most of her childhood in Botswana; served as a program manager on the Africa team of the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Transition Initiatives; masters in public policy from UCLA) 21 Feb 2012 “Divisive Alliance” NEW YORK TIMES, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/divisive-alliance.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=somalia>

Because the Shabab’s nationalist leaders command roughly 7,000 of the group’s 8,000-9,000 fighters, convincing them to lay down their arms is the quickest way of reducing the Shabab’s ability to do harm. Washington may not like having to tolerate these leaders, some of whom have longstanding ties to Al Qaeda, but it has few alternatives. Eliminating them carries risks of a popular backlash that far outweigh the benefits.

“Somali Pirates” - Response: Piracy is declining due to better naval security

Jim Michaels 2012. (journalist) 11 Jan 2012 “Pirate attacks around Horn of Africa sliced nearly in half” USA TODAY <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-01-10/somali-pirate-attacks-drop/52503928/1>

NATO and other forces in the region attribute recent progress against pirates to the increase in naval ships and the use of armed guards and other security measures taken by merchant vessels transiting the region. Merchant vessels also use techniques such as barbed wire or fire hoses to prevent bandits from attempting to board merchant ships. Naval officials caution that the pirates are far from defeated. Pirates have proven resilient and roamed farther from the coast of Somalia in response to the stepped-up pressure. Pirates regularly use mother ships with longer range than the smaller skiffs that are launched with gunmen to board ships. "The fight isn't over," said Canadian Navy Commodore Bruce Belliveau, an operations officer with NATO's counterpiracy command in Britain. "Clearly, if the maritime forces weren't there, the pirates would be back in force."

2A EVIDENCE: MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE

TOPICALITY

Missile defense is part of the US Army in Europe.

Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Headquarters, US Army Europe 2012. “Fact Sheet” US ARMY EUROPE, March 2012, <http://www.eur.army.mil/pdf/USAREURFactSheet.pdf>

As a U.S. Army Service Component Command, U.S. Army Europe is America's strategic forward enabler. A PROFESSIONAL FORCE: USAREUR is balanced across a corps headquarters, a mix of brigade combat teams, an aviation brigade; a theater sustainment command, a military intelligence brigade, a theater network command, a regionally focused medical command and a regionally focused air and missile defense command.

“It’s NATO not US” - Response: Europeans are not sharing the burden; program assets are American

Ivanka Barzashka, Timur Kadyshev, Göetz Neuneck , and Ivan Oelrich 2011. (Barzashka is a visiting scholar at the Center for National Security and Defense Research at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Kadyshev is a senior research scientist at the Moscow's Center of Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies. Neuneck is the deputy director and head of the Interdisciplinary Research Group on Disarmament at the Arms Control and Risk Technologies at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. Oelrich was the former vice president of the Strategic Security Program at the Federation of American Scientists; formerly worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, the Office of Technology Assessment, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency) “How to avoid a new arms race” 25 July 2011 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS <http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-to-avoid-new-arms-race>

The Obama administration's missile defense policy was never meant only to protect "allies and partners" but also to enable "them to defend themselves." In June, Rasmussen stressed that, to be "effective in protecting all European Allied territory, the American assets need to be accompanied by other nations' missile defense sensors and interceptors." But alliance members do not yet seem interested in any serious burden-sharing; and Europe's participation has been constrained by differing perceptions of the Iranian threat.

US is paying the entire cost of European missile defense

Rep. Buck McKeon 2012. (chairman of the House Armed Services Committee) 29 Feb 2012 Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command (in context, “2% of GDP” refers to the expectation that all NATO members should spend 2% of their Gross Domestic Product on defense) <http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=2b59e4b4-e7fe-4647-9d92-7b3016d9cd9e&Statement_id=62461a29-f8ca-4fbb-a762-8c3415ffc867&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed&Group_id=41030bc2-0d05-4138-841f-90b0fbaa0f88&MonthDisplay=2&YearDisplay=2012>

I also want to highlight my continuing concerns about President Obama's missile defense strategy. It appears the United States is spending $4 on regional missile defense, like the European Phased Adaptive Approach, for every $1 it is spending on homeland defense. What's more, European missile defense will be a 'national contribution' to NATO, meaning the cost will be borne entirely by the U.S. at a time when most of NATO is failing to meet even the 2% of GDP threshold for NATO membership.

MINOR REPAIR RESPONSES

“Just invite Russia to participate” - Response: We already tried for a year, didn’t work.

Tom Collina 2012. (over 20 years of Washington DC experience in arms control and global security issues. He has held senior leadership positions such as Executive Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, Director of Global Security at the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Senior Research Analyst at the Federation of American Scientists; has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and regularly briefs congressional staff; degree in International Relations from Cornell University) Apr 2012 NATO to Declare Missile System Ready <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_04/NATO_to_Declare_Missile_System_Ready>

NATO allies plan to announce at their May 20-21 summit in Chicago that the European missile interceptor system has reached an “interim capability,” a senior U.S. official said on March 26. Meanwhile, Russian officials said in March that President-elect Vladimir Putin is not expected to attend the summit because a year-long effort to reach agreement on NATO-Russian missile defense cooperation has not succeeded.

“Just provide more info to Russia / invite them to observe” - Response: Already tried, they don’t accept it

Prof. Richard Rousseau 2012. (Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan. He teaches on Russian politics, Eurasian geopolitics, international political economy and globalization) 9 May 2012 Is Russia’s Opposition To US Missile Defense System Justified? – Analysis EURASIA REVIEW, <http://www.eurasiareview.com/09052012-is-russias-opposition-to-us-missile-defense-system-justified-analysis/>

The Obama administration has recently floated alternative ideas to assuage Russian concerns, real or otherwise. For instance, it has invited Russian observation missions to observe the future Aegis SM-3 missile defense flight tests scheduled to take place in Hawaii. The Americans seek to convince the Russians that interceptors to be deployed in Eastern Europe are technically incapable of shooting down Russian strategic missiles. Moscow, however, has generally not been forthcoming to these American proposals. One can expect that talks between Russia and the United States on building a cooperative missile defense system in Europe are to go nowhere until after the U.S. Presidential Elections in November 2012.

“Just share info with Russia” - Response: Too risky - sensitive technology could leak

Prof. Sean Kay 2012. (Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan Univ.; Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State Univ and a Fellow in National Security at the Eisenhower Institute, Washington) NATO’s Missile Defense – Realigning Collective Defense for the 21st Century, PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2012 Vol XVII No 1,<http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SeanKay2.pdf>

There is also a tension in NATO’s missile defense plans between the diplomatic objective of engaging Russia within the program, and the technological-operational dynamics behind the missile shield concept. This is particularly true, as Richard Weitz has shown, in the areas of information sharing, rapid decision-making, and the sensitivities of technology transfer. As Weitz notes, sharing sensitive technology even among the NATO allies has always been difficult – thus either opening sensitive NATO technology to Russia or relying on Russian technology for the NATO defense plans would be a risky proposition. This would be especially true if, as Weitz writes: “NATO policymakers fear that intelligence about their BMD systems and tactics might find its way to Iran, North Korea, or other states of proliferation concern.”

INHERENCY

Obama has 10-year missile defense deployment plan for Europe

Dr. Micah Zenko 2010. (PhD political science, Brandeis Univ. Fellow for conflict prevention in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations; worked for five years at Harvard Univ Kennedy School of Govt., and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning) Nov 2010 “Toward Deeper Reductions in US and Russian Nuclear Weapons,” <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/toward-deeper-reductions-us-russian-nuclear-weapons/p23212>

The Obama administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) ballistic missile defense strategy for Europe is a ten-year plan whereby U.S. interceptors will be deployed in four stages based on missile threat trend lines from Iran or other adversaries. Like other missile defense schemes, this ambitious strategy—particularly in the later stages—is based on a belief that unproven military capabilities can be supported and funded by Congress, demonstrated through realistic testing, and deployed on time.

Missile defense is being deployed in Europe. US Navy and land-based units are involved, with further deployments scheduled for 2015 and 2018

Tom Collina 2012. (over 20 years of Washington DC experience in arms control and global security issues. He has held senior leadership positions such as Executive Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, Director of Global Security at the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Senior Research Analyst at the Federation of American Scientists; has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and regularly briefs congressional staff; degree in International Relations from Cornell University) Apr 2012 NATO to Declare Missile System Ready <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_04/NATO_to_Declare_Missile_System_Ready>

Speaking at a Washington, D.C., missile defense conference, the U.S. official, Department of State Special Envoy for Strategic Stability and Missile Defense Ellen Tauscher, said that the Aegis-equipped ship USS *Vella Gulf* “is providing our at-sea Phase 1 missile defense presence” along with the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey. “We expect NATO to announce that it has achieved an ‘interim capability,’” she said, according to a text of her remarks released by the State Department. “That basically means that Allies will start operating under the same playbook.” Although a Navy ship and the radar have been deployed for months, this would mark their integration with NATO’s existing systems. (See *ACT*, November 2010.) The European missile interceptor program is being deployed in phases. The first phase is now operating, with ship-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors in the Mediterranean Sea and a tracking radar in Turkey. Subsequent phases include the stationing of land-based SM-3s of increasing capability and number in Romania (2015) and Poland (2018) and the 2020 deployment of the SM-3 IIB, which is advertised to have some capability against long-range ballistic missiles.

“Moving towards cooperation with Russia” - Response: US Senate won’t allow it

Prof. Sean Kay 2012. (Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan Univ.; Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State Univ and a Fellow in National Security at the Eisenhower Institute, Washington) NATO’s Missile Defense – Realigning Collective Defense for the 21st Century, PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2012 Vol XVII No 1, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SeanKay2.pdf>

Even if the Obama administration wanted to involve Russia at an operational level or to agree to treaty limits, it would not gain approval in the United States Senate. Some Senators argue that defenses should be deployed in the Republic of Georgia- seemingly guided by a desire to signal that America can and will do what it wants, regardless of Russia’s concerns.

Obama's official defense policy has increased role for missile defense

Josh Rogin April 2010. (journalist) 6 Apr 2010 Obama embraces missile defense in nuclear review <http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/06/obama_embraces_missile_defense_in_nuclear_review>

For an Obama team that has been skeptical of the past U.S. administrations' efforts to rapidly deploy ballistic missile-defense systems around the world, missile defense sure does get star billing in the United States' newly released report on overall nuclear strategy. The document claims that missile defense is critical to allowing the United States to shift away from nuclear weapons, especially now that the U.S. will no longer threaten to use nukes to retaliate against non-nuclear attacks, such as from chemical or biological weapons. The review even features a photo of a missile being shot from an Aegis destroyer in 2007, in what many outside experts saw at the time as a clear demonstration of the fact that U.S. missile defense capabilities can also have offensive uses as well, such as shooting down a satellite. "Major improvements in missile defenses and counter-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities have strengthened deterrence and defense against CBW attack," reads the document, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, which will stand as the Obama administration's guiding document on all things nuclear.

RISKS

Even if missile defense were ineffective, Russia could still have serious concerns

Dr. Yousaff Butt & Dr. Theodore Postol 2011. ( Butt - PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) Upsetting the Reset : The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, Sept 2011 <http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf>

The focus here is on what would be the main concern of cautious Russian military planners —the capability of the missile defense interceptors to simply reach, or “engage,” Russian strategic warheads—rather than whether any particular engagement results in an actual interception, or “kill.” Interceptors with a kinematic capability to reach Russian ICBM warheads would be sufficient to raise concerns in Russian national security circles – regardless of the possibility that Russian decoys and other countermeasures might defeat the system in actual engagements. In short, even a missile defense system that could be rendered ineffective could still elicit serious concern from cautious Russian planners.

Russia is right: NATO missile defense has the *capability* to work against Russia even if it isn’t the intent

Prof. Sean Kay 2012. (Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan Univ.; Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State Univ and a Fellow in National Security at the Eisenhower Institute, Washington) NATO’s Missile Defense – Realigning Collective Defense for the 21st Century, PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2012 Vol XVII No 1, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SeanKay2.pdf>

The problem for NATO is that Russian concerns about the higher speed missile interceptors which would be deployed in Phase Three and Four have scientific legitimacy behind them. As leading missile defense physicist Theodor Postol and analyst Yousaf Butt write: “whether or not the planned system is intended against Russia, the salient point is that it will have some inherent capability against Russia’s strategic forces.”

Russia could withdraw from New START if we deploy missile defense

Dr. Yousaff Butt & Dr. Theodore Postol 2011. ( Butt - PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) Upsetting the Reset : The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, Sept 2011<http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf>

From the point of view of Russian analysts, and the political leaders they advise, SM-3 Block II interceptors might impose some level of attrition on Russian warheads that could be interpreted as an unacceptable infringement on the balance of arms agreed to in New START. Since this interplay between strategic offense and defense is recognized explicitly in the preamble to New START, it could be seen as legitimizing Russian concerns in a legal sense. In fact, Russian President Medvedev threatened to terminate New START over this perceived violation of parity when he said, in May 2011: “If missile defense systems are to be developed -- which would mean the disruption of strategic parity -- the treaty could be suspended or even terminated.”

NATO missile shield is a litmus test for future relations with Russia

Fred Weir 2012. (journalist) 22 Mar 2012 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR “Russia exasperated with US over missile defense,” <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0322/Russia-exasperated-with-US-over-missile-defense>

A top Russian defense official warned Thursday that NATO's plans to install an anti-missile shield in Europe are a "litmus test" for future relations between Moscow and the West. The tough statement by deputy defense minister Anatoly Antonov comes ahead of a planned summit between Russian president-elect Vladimir Putin and President Obama, and signals Moscow's growing exasperation with the US position after a flurry of optimism earlier this month.

Russia will re-arm in response to European missile defense

Fred Weir 2012. (journalist) 22 Mar 2012 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR “Russia exasperated with US over missile defense,” (ellipses in original) <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2012/0322/Russia-exasperated-with-US-over-missile-defense>

At a Defense Ministry meeting Tuesday, President Dmitry Medvedev said Russia was already preparing a range of countermeasures to defeat NATO missile defense, including forward deployments of tactical nuclear missiles in Russia's Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad. "We are not closing the doors for communication, but we really need to prepare ourselves to the change of situation," Mr. Medvedev said. "We need to be fully armed by 2017-18 ... we must get ready for a serious rearming of the armed forces so that we could be in a due shape and capable to respond to the missile defense in Europe."

Missile defense causes distrust in Russia and wastes money on expensive programs that provide little capability

Dr George N. Lewis & Dr. Theodore Postol 2010. (Lewis - Ph.D. in experimental physics and is associate director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan May 2010 <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol>

The negative effects of a costly and energetic U.S. program that appears to Russian and Chinese leaders to be aimed at blunting Russian and Chinese strategic retaliatory strike forces will sow distrust of the United States within those governments and will create significant barriers to future arms reductions efforts with Russia. This has already been seen in recent U.S.-Russian discussions over the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. If future arms reduction efforts with Russia come to a halt, this will have serious adverse effects on Russian and U.S. efforts to maintain the viability of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which is already under considerable pressure. In general, the new missile defense architecture will produce serious doubts about the reliability of small nuclear forces for deterrence. These doubts are unjustified by detailed technical analysis of the true capabilities of these systems, but they will occur and could produce impenetrable new barriers to further nuclear arms reductions. None of these unwanted outcomes need to be a result of the current Obama plan, but without a judicious and careful national assessment of the capabilities and limitations of these ballistic missile defense systems, the pressure to expand them will be both tremendous and without rationale. This new missile defense program could then lead to the usual results: gigantically expensive systems that have little real capability but create uncertainties that cause other states to react in ways that are not in the security interest of the United States.

Missile defense reduces security by provoking reactions to it

Dr. Yousaff Butt & Dr. Theodore Postol 2011. ( Butt - PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) Upsetting the Reset : The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, Sept 2011 (brackets added) <http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf>

Missile defense could also strengthen over-cautious, misinformed, opportunistic or hawkish elements within the Russian and Chinese political and military establishments. The interplay of the unknown future and pressure from internal constituencies to react to missile defenses can lead to an increase of deployed stockpiles and military expenditures. Advocates who argue for a response to the missile defenses could play up the uncertainties about future missile defense developments by pointing to the inflated claims made in documents like the BMDR [Ballistic Missile Defense Review] and by senior U.S. government officials. Over time, these internal constituencies may pressure or intimidate their political leaders into actions that would have adverse consequences to U.S. security, as well as for the security of their own states.

Missile defense will never be able to distinguish warheads from decoys

Dr. Yousaff Butt & Dr. Theodore Postol 2011. ( Butt - PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) Upsetting the Reset : The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, Sept 2011 <http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf>

However, because the trajectories of lightweight decoys as well as heavy warheads are the same in the vacuum of space, it is straightforward for a missile to release dozens of simple, lightweight decoys that will be indistinguishable to infrared sensors on the interceptor or to radars on the ground. Making matters yet more problematic, it would be quite easy to inflate a balloon around the warhead, or hang material from the warhead, that would make it look different from its expected appearance to these sensors. Since the decoys and warheads would all look different from the expected appearance of the warhead, there would fundamentally be no way for the defense to identify warheads from decoys. In sum, the simple scientific reason why the GBIs and SM-3s will never be able to reliably function in real combat conditions is because the infrared emissions and reflected radio waves from targets can be modified by an attacker to disguise, remove, deny, or simply overwhelm (e.g., via decoys and other countermeasures) critical information needed by the defense to find attacking warheads.

Missile defense leads to increases in global nuclear weapons

Dr. Yousaff Butt & Dr. Theodore Postol 2011. ( Butt - PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) Upsetting the Reset : The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, Sept 2011 (brackets added) <http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf>

So midcourse missile defense is, and will be, an empirical failure at dissuading countries of concern to the United States from pursuing ballistic missile programs – or their equivalent space launch programs. On the contrary, instead of dissuading countries from pursuing ballistic missiles, missile defense may well lead to more missiles and more nuclear weapons in the world. The BMDR [Ballistic Missile Defense Review] report states, “Both Russia and China have repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S. missile defenses adversely affect their own strategic capabilities and interests.” And the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission points out that, “China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.”

Exaggerated claims for missile defense are dangerous

Dr. Yousaff Butt & Dr. Theodore Postol 2011. ( Butt - PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) Upsetting the Reset : The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, Sept 2011 (brackets in original) <http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf>

Exaggerating the abilities of missile defense is dangerous. It suggests that political and military leaders have capabilities and options that they, in fact, do not have. For instance, the BMDR claims, “The United States now possesses a capacity to counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future.” And that “[t]he United States is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack, as a result of investments made over the past decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense.” There have been no tests of these systems under realistic conditions to substantiate either of these claims: the current systems cannot reliably intercept a single test warhead that is launched at a known time and on a known trajectory, even when there are no countermeasures or decoy warheads involved.

Missile defense is a waste of money

Dr. Thomas Barnett 2008. (PhD in political science from Harvard; visiting scholar at the University of Tennessee's Howard Baker Center; former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College) 14 Nov 2008 SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, Obama's chance to unwind missile defense, <http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/37980>

If the envisioned program is completed deep into the next decade, missile expert Scott Ritter estimates the total cumulative cost could top a trillion dollars.In return, we'll own a missile defense network easily overwhelmed by any major attack theoretically launched by Russia or China, and one easily fooled by even a minor attack mounted by a North Korean-sized entity.Of course, none of that would matter whatsoever because America's invulnerable ability to strike back and totally decimate potential attackers would dominate any regime's decision-making. Such capability would nonetheless be useless in the face of the most likely threat we face: a nuclear device smuggled into the United States and detonated by terrorists. So why do we keep spending? Simple industrial greed, combined with the archaic mindset of Cold Warriors still living in the 20th century -- where they should have remained.

Missile defense blocks cooperation with Russia on reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles

Greg Thielmann 2012. (Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association; former senior professional staffer of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; former U.S. Foreign Service Officer for 25 years; former Director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs Office in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research) 6 Mar 2012 “NATO’s Future Deterrence Posture: What Can Nuclear Weapons Contribute?” <http://www.armscontrol.org/events/ACA-Senior-Fellow-speaks-about-Territorial-Missile-Defense-at-Paris-Conference>

All NATO states have enormous stakes in the success of U.S.-Russian negotiations to further reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles. U.S. missile defense forces are more likely to be an obstacle rather than an inducement to Russian movement in the desired direction. Russia’s attitude is not pathological. Russia is doing what the United States did when the tables were reversed. During the Cold War, U.S. fears about Soviet ABM systems helped stoke the large increase in U.S. ballistic missile warheads. It was only after the 1972 ABM Treaty capped strategic missile defenses that the path was opened toward eventual reductions in deployed offensive warheads.

Russia may withdraw from New START if we deploy missile defense

Article 4 of the Russian parliamentary resolution ratifying the New START treaty, as quoted by Dr. Yousaff Butt & Dr. Theodore Postol in 2011. ( Butt - PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) Upsetting the Reset : The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, Sept 2011 (brackets and ellipses in original) <http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf>

Article 4 [...]

(3) e Russian Federation shall exercise the right provided by Article XIV of the New START Treaty to withdraw from it in case of extraordinary events that jeopardize its supreme interests. ese events may include: […] deployment by the United States of America, another state, or a group of states of a missile defense system capable of significantly reducing the effectiveness of the Russian Federation’s strategic nuclear forces.”

Russia opposes US missile defense in Romania

Russia has same objections to Obama's missile defense plan as it had to Bush's plan

Jonathan Landay March 2010. (journalist) 1 March 2010 McClatchy Newspapers, U.S.-Russia treaty stalls over Obama missile defense plan <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/03/01/89641/us-russia-treaty-stalls-over-obama.html>

Obama's decision replaced a Bush administration plan to place a tracking radar in Poland and 20 interceptors in the Czech Republic to shield the U.S. from a limited Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile strike. Iran currently doesn't have such missiles. Russia hailed Obama for canceling the Bush plan, but Moscow has raised the same objection to Obama's plan, contending that the medium-range interceptors that would be deployed in Romania could threaten Russia's long-range nuclear missile force. "Russia has serious questions regarding the true purpose of the U.S. missile defense in Romania," Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko said in a statement Friday. "That is why we will consistently oppose any dubious unilateral actions in the missile defense field."

Missile defense will poison cooperation with Russia on a range of issues

Prof. Sean Kay 2012. (Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan Univ.; Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State Univ and a Fellow in National Security at the Eisenhower Institute, Washington) NATO’s Missile Defense – Realigning Collective Defense for the 21st Century, PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2012 Vol XVII No 1, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SeanKay2.pdf>

American officials repeatedly insist that the missile defense system is not a threat to Russian security- but seldom account for the possibility that Russia might define its own national security perceptions. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov asserts that missile defense will seriously poison Euro-Atlantic cooperation on a range of issues.

Weaker security: weaknesses of a NATO missile defense would actually weaken our security, not strengthen it.

Prof. Sean Kay 2012. (Professor of Politics and Government at Ohio Wesleyan Univ.; Mershon Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State Univ and a Fellow in National Security at the Eisenhower Institute, Washington) NATO’s Missile Defense – Realigning Collective Defense for the 21st Century, PERCEPTIONS, Spring 2012 Vol XVII No 1, <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/SeanKay2.pdf>

Sometimes a defensive capacity can make offensive war more tempting- and thus scare other countries into balancing efforts or even incentivize “use-it-or-lose-it” pre-emptive wars. Finally, even if ballistic missile defenses were effectively deployed to cover all NATO territory, these systems would not stop cruise missiles, which fly low and fast and can carry a nuclear payload, or terrorists with a weapon parked on a boat in a harbour. There are about 75,000 cruise missiles worldwide relative to less than a dozen, mainly friendly, nations that have ballistic missiles with ranges longer than 1,000 kilometers. The point about cruise-missiles is important because even if a ballistic missile defense system works, its presence creates incentives to circumvent the system. Defenses that do not work can create a false-sense of security, while simultaneously damaging essential security relationships.

Reliance on missile defense diverts attention and resources away from more effective alternatives

Dr George N. Lewis & Dr. Theodore Postol 2010. (Lewis - Ph.D. in experimental physics; associate director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell Univ. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan May 2010 <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol>

If policymakers decide that a strategic defense system should continue to be a central part of the U.S. approach, there are alternative defense systems that could defend the United States from ICBM attack from Iran and North Korea and defend northern and western Europe from intermediate-range ballistic missile attack from Iran. Yet, because the new missile defense plan assumes that everything works and nothing is broken, it de-emphasizes these defense systems in favor of unproven, unworkable, and far more expensive alternative systems. By deploying ballistic missile defenses that are easy to defeat, the United States could fail to deter or actually stimulate ballistic missile proliferation. Proliferators such as Iran and North Korea have already demonstrated the capability and can be expected to introduce highly effective countermeasures against the missile defense systems (GMD, SM-3, THAAD, and possibly even Patriot) that the United States has currently chosen to emphasize. These proliferators could and likely would sell these countermeasures to client states.

ADVOCACY

Reliance on missile defense is wrong and misguided

Dr. Yousaf Butt 2010. (PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences) 8 May 2010 The myth of missile defense as a deterrent BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent>

The Obama administration's long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) "establishes U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities and force posture for the next five to ten years." The review signals a fresh approach to nuclear doctrine; however, its reliance on missile defense as an element of nuclear deterrence is wrong. Such systems are useless, dangerous, and destabilizing, and ramping up reliance on missile defenses because of planned reductions to the U.S. operational nuclear stockpile is deeply misguided.

ADVANTAGES

Cost savings: $4-8 billion just for the Aegis systems, radars, sensors and Command & Control. Missile defense advocate Riki Ellison said in 2011:

Riki Ellison 2011. (Chairman and Founder of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance) “US Congress Ignores Cost of Missile Defense,” 6 Apr 2011 PRNewswire, <http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/us-congress-ignores-cost-of-missile-defense-in-europe-119337939.html>

More importantly, the total cost to the American tax payers for the full implementation of the Aegis Ashore System, additional Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships and missiles, forward based AN/TPY-2 radars, future sensors, additional force protection and Command and Control integration for the protection of Europe has not been announced, nor was it addressed. Absent from the hearing was a discussion about the authorization of additional funding to cover these costs that are instrumental in the full implementation of the President's plan to protect Europe. This unidentified cost could be approximately $4-8 billion and will have to compete for funding with the United States combat commanders missile defense demands for their areas of responsibility in the U.S., Middle East, East Asia, Israel and Northern Africa.

Missile defense increases the value of nuclear weapons: We need to rethink our missile defense policy

Dr. Yousaf Butt May 2010. (PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences) 8 May 2010 The myth of missile defense as a deterrent BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (brackets added) <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent>

Just as with nuclear weapons, the U.S. infatuation with missile defense will cause other nations to desire this expensive and destabilizing technology. Following the U.S. lead, both China and India now have missile defense test programs. It doesn't take much imagination to anticipate Pakistan's response. There will be legitimate pressure for Islamabad to attempt to redress this perceived Indian defense by producing more missiles and nuclear weapons. In response, India and subsequently China will likely increase their own stockpiles--in turn increasing pressure on U.S. and Russian strategists to respond. So rather than reducing the value of nuclear weapons, missile defense actually increases it. Unfortunately, much of the wrongheaded and inaccurate thinking about the deterrent value of missile defense has seeped into the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review]. Thus, there's now an urgent need for an informed, unbiased reappraisal of U.S. strategic thinking on the conceptual basis of nuclear missile defense policy.

Russia Relations Impact: We need Russia's cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism and nuclear war

Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia 2009. (chaired by former Senators Chuck Hagel and Gary Hart; a joint project of The Nixon Center and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, a research center within Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government) March 2009 The Right Direction for US Policy Toward Russia, <http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf>

The detonation of even a single nuclear warhead in the United States would have catastrophic consequences for America and its future. Likewise, the use of only one nuclear weapon anywhere else would also profoundly affect the United States through its considerable global political and economic consequences. Without deep Russian cooperation, no strategy is likely to succeed in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear terrorism, and nuclear war.

Recognizing Russia’s interest in European security issues is vital because we cannot remove threats without Russia’s help

Karaganov, Bordachev & Suslov 2009. Sergey Karaganov (Chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and Dean of the School of World Economics and World Politics at the State University–Higher School of Economics), Timofei Bordachev (Research Programs Director of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs), Dmitry Suslov (Deputy Director for Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; co-authored over 150 analytical papers for government agencies concerning the internal development of the European Union and relations between Russia and the European Union ) 5 Sept 2009 Russia and the U.S.: Reconfiguration, Not Resetting, RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, <http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13588>

Moscow needs support for its idea of a new pan-European treaty on collective security, which implies new universal rules of the game in the Euro-Atlantic space. The Russian Federation should be entitled to a decision-making right in resolving European security issues that Moscow regards as threatening its security. This would not violate vital American interests. These interests are now concern not so much the proliferation of the American security regime to all European countries as retaining U.S. military and political presence in Europe, bolstering NATO as the main security institution in Western and Central Europe, and eliminating threats to security in the Euro-Atlantic region. These threats mostly come from the outside (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and the Middle East), and removing them without Russia’s participation seems to be highly improbable.

(Links to Afghanistan card in 1AC - need Russia’s cooperation for success in Afghanistan)

Impact: Failure in Afghanistan means Western security structures could collapse  
See also NEG brief in Blue Book about disadvantages of US failure in Afghanistan

Boris Gromov & Dmitry Rogozin in 2010. Gromov (governor of the Moscow region, commanded the 40th Soviet Army in Afghanistan) Rogozin (Russia’s ambassador to NATO) 11 Jan 2010 NEW YORK TIMES, Russian Advice on Afghanistan <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/12/opinion/12iht-edrogozin.html>

That is precisely why the ISAF operation in Afghanistan is the moment of truth for NATO. If the alliance does not accomplish its task, the mutual commitments of its 28 member-states would be undermined and the alliance would lose its moral foundation and raison d’être. We know all too well what happens to unions that become meaningless. The war in Afghanistan was one of the major factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Officials in Brussels and Washington who are thinking of a rapid exit strategy for the ISAF mission are engaged in elaborating on a suicide plan. Withdrawal without victory might cause a political collapse of Western security structures.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Not reliable: None of the tests have been under realistic conditions, and decoys can easily defeat them

Greg Thielmann 2012. (Senior Fellow, Arms Control Association; former senior professional staffer of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; former U.S. Foreign Service Officer for 25 years; former Director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs Office in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research) 6 Mar 2012 “NATO’s Future Deterrence Posture: What Can Nuclear Weapons Contribute?” (brackets in original) <http://www.armscontrol.org/events/ACA-Senior-Fellow-speaks-about-Territorial-Missile-Defense-at-Paris-Conference>

Last October, Secretary of Defense Panetta referred to the existing strategic missile defense system as “very remarkable.” Senior military figures have joined the official chorus attesting to its effectiveness against future Iranian or North Korean missiles. Yet none of the ongoing tests of these systems have occurred under operationally realistic conditions. U.S. intelligence officials have acknowledged that any state capable of building an ICBM can also build simple decoys to spoof missile defenses. But U.S. strategic missile defenses have never demonstrated the ability to discriminate decoys and other clutter. The Pentagon’s Director of Operational Test and Evaluation reported in January: “To date [the system] has demonstrated a **limited** capability against a simple threat.” He also noted that the last two flight tests had failed. The last successful test under carefully controlled conditions was in 2008; the next test has been postponed to allow for causes of the last failure to be addressed.

“Allies relying on US security guarantees” - Response: Few people in Czech Republic and Poland see a real threat from Iran or North Korea

Nikolaus von Twickel, St Petersburg Times, Sept 2009. (journalist) 1 Sept 2009 The St. Petersburg Times (Florida newspaper) U.S. RECONSIDERS CONTROVERSIAL MISSILE DEFENSE PLANS <http://www.allvoices.com/s/event-4041110/aHR0cDovL3Jzcy5mZWVkc3BvcnRhbC5jb20vYy84NTAvZi8xMDgzNy9zLzVlYjA2ZWIvbC8wTDBTc3B0aW1lczBCcnUwQ3N0b3J5MEMyOTcwQTMvc3RvcnkwMS5odG0>=

Jiri Pehe, a Czech political analyst and director of New York University in Prague, said that even though Prague and Warsaw would officially voice disappointment if the missile plans were abandoned, such a change should be welcomed because they are unpopular in both countries. “Very few people actually see a real threat from Iran or North Korea here,” he said by telephone from Prague.

Missile defense adds nothing to nuclear deterrence: What deters is the certainty of nuclear retaliation

Dr. Yousaf Butt May 2010. (PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences) 8 May 2010 The myth of missile defense as a deterrent BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (brackets added) <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent>

If the enemy is irrational and suicidal enough to discount the threat of massive nuclear retaliation, then a missile defense system that can theoretically intercept only some of the attacking missiles most certainly isn't going to be a deterrent. In wonk parlance, the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] conveniently conflates *reprisal* deterrence with *denial* deterrence. Reprisal deterrence is the 800-pound gorilla, and denial deterrence is the flea. If our adversaries are thinking twice about using nuclear weapons it's because they're scared of reprisal deterrence. And if they aren't sufficiently scared of reprisal, fractional denial certainly isn't going to stop them. To borrow an analogy used by Thomas Schelling, a Nobel laureate with a deep knowledge of arms control and game theory: Denial deterrence adds to reprisal deterrence like tying an extra cotton string adds to the strength of an aircraft carrier's anchor chain.

Missile defense will never make a shred of difference in protecting against nuclear missile attack

Dr. Pavel Podvig 2009. (researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Univ; worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT); worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University; Podvig received his degree in physics from MIPT and his PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations) 14 Sept 2009 The false promise of missile defense <http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/09/the_false_promise_of_missile_d.shtml>

The notion of missile defense as a good thing even entered the nuclear abolition debate earlier this year, with many experts ready to grant it a useful role at the final stages of disarmament, arguing that it might provide protection against those who cheat the system and attempt to build/use a nuclear weapon. The fundamental problem with this argument is that missile defense will never live up to these expectations. Let me say that again: Missile defense will never make a shred of difference when it comes to its primary mission--protecting a country from the threat of a nuclear missile attack. That isn't to say that advanced sensors and interceptors someday won't be able to deal with sophisticated missiles and decoys. They probably will. But again, this won't overcome the fundamental challenge of keeping a nation safe against a nuclear threat, because it would take only a small probability of success to make such a threat credible while missile defense would need to offer absolute certainty of protection to truly be effective.

Missile defense would not help us in a nuclear crisis: Too many uncertainties

Dr. Pavel Podvig 2009. (researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Univ; worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT); worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University; Podvig received his degree in physics from MIPT and his PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations) 14 Sept 2009 The false promise of missile defense <http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/09/the_false_promise_of_missile_d.shtml>

But now that the Cold War is over and the threat involves a handful of warheads (if that many), the goal of building a working missile defense system seems within reach. Indeed, how hard would it be to intercept a rudimentary missile launched by North Korea? The answer seems simple: Not easy, but definitely doable. But it's the wrong question to ask. Instead, we should ask: Would missile defense change Washington's strategic calculation in a potential conflict with North Korea or Iran? The answer to this question is a firm no. In a real confrontation, missile defense would be irrelevant at best. For starters, the probability of a country such as North Korea successfully launching a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to U.S. territory is low. So when all of the uncertainties in missile and warhead performance are added up, the chance of success probably wouldn't be higher than a few percent (which, by the way, is considered a highly potent threat worthy of a multibillion dollar investment in missile defense). Missile defense eventually might be able to reduce that chance, maybe even considerably, but it will never reduce it to zero. In other words, the defending side would still face a threat that isn't much less credible than it was without missile defense. So the best missile defense can do is to replace one small probability with another. Yet, since nobody knows what exactly these probabilities are in the first place, it would just add one more level of uncertainty to an already uncertain situation without making a fundamental difference.

European missile defense would offer no meaningful protection whatsoever

Dr. Pavel Podvig 2009. (researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Univ; worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT); worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University; Podvig received his degree in physics from MIPT and his PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations) 14 Sept 2009 The false promise of missile defense <http://russianforces.org/blog/2009/09/the_false_promise_of_missile_d.shtml>

It's understandable that people often talk about European missile defense as one of the ways in which to deal with the missile threat posed by Iran. Or that someday missile defense could provide insurance for nuclear disarmament--this is the vision that Ronald Reagan had. When framed in this way, missile defense seems like a promising way out of difficult situations. But this promise is false. If a real confrontation ever comes about (and let's hope it never happens), we quickly would find out that missile defense offers no meaningful protection whatsoever.

No facts to support the claim that US can defend against ICBM attacks - Missile defense tests have failed

Dr. George N. Lewis and Prof. Theodore Postol 2010. (Ph.D. in experimental physics and is associate director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University) and Theodore Postol (professor of science, technology, and national security policy at the Mass. Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations ) May 2010 A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol>

With regard to current missile defense technologies, there are no new material facts to support any of the claims in the report that suggest that the United States is now in a position to defend itself from limited ICBM attacks or that any of the fundamental unsolved problems associated with high-altitude ballistic missile defenses have been solved. In fact, as this article will show, the most recent ballistic missile defense flight-test data released by the Department of Defense and the most recent failed test of the ground-based missile defense system in January show quite the opposite.

“Defense against Iran” is pure fantasy - European missile defense is really about Russia

Dr. Thomas Barnett 2012. (MA in Regional Studies: Russia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia; Ph.D in Political Science from Harvard; former Senior Strategic Researcher and Professor in the Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College) Apr 2012 The New Rules: Obama's Missile Defense Fantasy a Pentagon Dream Come True, WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, (parentheses in original) <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11795/the-new-rules-obamas-missile-defense-fantasy-a-pentagon-dream-come-true>

The storyline that says an attacked or emboldened Iran will pop off nuclear missiles in the direction of East-Central Europe is pure fantasy. In any war against the combined forces of Israel and the U.S., Iran will not be wasting missiles on Poland or the Czech Republic. If Europeans really want this missile defense capacity, it is not because they fear Iranian retaliation. They want it as insurance against Russia, pure and simple. This is a classic case of symbolically threatening to kill the chicken (Tehran) to scare the monkey (Moscow).

Abandoning missile defense will not impact deterrence of Iran

Missile defense may encourage Iran to develop more nuclear weapons

Dr. Yousaff Butt & Dr. Theodore Postol 2011. ( Butt - PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences. Postol - PhD nuclear engineering; professor of science, technology, and national security policy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former scientific adviser to the chief of naval operations) Upsetting the Reset : The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense, Sept 2011 <http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defense%20Report.pdf>

Abandoning the fielding of Block II interceptors will not impact the deterrence calculus between the United States and a (possible future) nuclear-armed Iran since both Block I and Block II interceptors have the same Achilles's Heel: they are equally susceptible to decoys and countermeasures. A (possible future) nuclear-armed Iran could be a threat to the Unites States whether it has no missile defenses, has just Block I interceptors, or even has Block II interceptors. Midcourse missile defense would not alter the fundamental deterrence equation (with respect to Iran – or Russia) but it may, in the Russian view, constitute an infringement of New START –especially the Block II interceptors due to their theoretical capability to engage Russian warheads. Missile defense may also encourage a (possible future) nuclear-armed Iran to increase its stockpile of nuclear warheads and the number of conventionally armed ballistic missiles that could appear to carry nuclear weapons, to overwhelm U.S. missile defenses in a nuclear attack.

Iran wouldn't use nuclear weapons in a suicidal first strike, they just want them for deterrence

Poland doesn't fear Iranian attack

Dr. Yousaf Butt May 2010. (PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences) 8 May 2010 The myth of missile defense as a deterrent BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent>

Plus, many experts agree that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it wouldn't use them in a suicidal first strike. A detailed National Defense University study concluded that Tehran desires nuclear weapons mainly because it feels strategically isolated and that "possession of such weapons would give the regime legitimacy, respectability, and protection." Basically, Iran wants a nuclear capability for deterrence purposes--just like every other nuclear-armed nation. The Polish foreign minister has even admitted that Warsaw is involved with U.S. missile defense plans in Europe to improve diplomatic ties with Washington, not out of any fear of Iranian nuclear attack.

Missile defense could not eliminate the threat that a single missile could penetrate the system

No effect on neutralizing Iran

Dr. Yousaf Butt May 2010. (PhD in nuclear physics; physicist in the High-Energy Astrophysics Division at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Previously, he was a fellow in the Committee on International Security and Arms Control at the National Academy of Sciences) 8 May 2010 The myth of missile defense as a deterrent BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-myth-of-missile-defense-deterrent>

But if Tehran does obtain nuclear weapons, surrounding it with missile defenses, no matter how effective, will never eliminate the threat that a single missile could penetrate the defense system. Thus, the United States can never neutralize the deterrent value of any possible future Iranian nuclear ballistic missiles with any incarnation of missile defense. A nuclear-armed Iran would have to be treated identically by Washington whether or not missile defenses were in play.

Iran would have no incentive to use Nuclear weapons

Dr. John Mueller, 2010. (PhD in Political Science from UCLA and professor of political science at Ohio State University), January/February 2010, “Think Again: Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Policy,<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/think_again_nuclear_weapons?page=full>

“Moreover, Iran will most likely "use" any nuclear capability in the same way all other nuclear states have: for prestige (or ego-stoking) and deterrence. Indeed, as strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling suggests, deterrence is about the only value the weapons might have for Iran. Such devices, he points out, "should be too precious to give away or to sell" and "too precious to 'waste' killing people" when they could make other countries "hesitant to consider military action."

2A EVIDENCE: NATO TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

**(Jonathan Edelblut contributed some of the evidence in this brief)**

HARMS: General

Opener: reasoning for maintaining nuclear weapons is very flimsy and they carry dangerous risks

Dr. David Krieger 2008. [Ph.D., J.D.; Former judge on the Hawaii Superior Court; Former Assistant Professor at the University of Hawaii; founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and has served as President of the Foundation since 1982; a founder and a member of the Global Council of Abolition, a network of over 2000 organizations and municipalities committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons; Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii; J.D. from Santa Barbra College of Law; MA in Political Science from the University of Hawaii]: “NATO Nuclear Weapons: Power Without Purpose” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Aug 2008 <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2008/08/14_krieger_nato_nuc_power.php?krieger>

NATO reasoning for maintaining nuclear weapons seems very flimsy. If there is anything that is clear about nuclear weapons, it is that they cannot protect their possessors. All of the nuclear weapons in Europe cannot protect any European city from a nuclear attack by an extremist organization. Reliance upon these weapons provides an incentive for nuclear proliferation, increasing the possibilities that these weapons will fall into the hands of such an organization and will be used.

HARMS: NUCLEAR TERRORISM RISK

Risk of nuclear terrorism equivalent justifies effort needed for saving 50K people

Dr. Graham T. Allison 2007. (Ph.D. in Political Science; Professor at Harvard University, the John F. Kennedy School of Government; Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; was a special advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans; received Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service) “How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?” Published by the Council On Foreign Relations in April 2007 <http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097>

Let’s run a little with Michael Levi’s numbers. Imagine that he is correct, and terrorists have “a 90 percent chance of failure” if they attempt a nuclear 9/11. On the flip side, that would mean a 10 percent chance of success. What should a 10 percent possibility of success mean in terms of U.S. policy? Remember, risk equals probability times consequences. On a normal workday, half a million people crowd the area within a half-mile radius of New York City’s Times Square. If, in the heart of midtown Manhattan, terrorists detonated a ten-kiloton nuclear bomb (the yield of the bomb an intelligence source codenamed “Dragonfire” claimed was in New York one month after 9/11), the blast would kill them all instantly. Hundreds of thousands of others would die from collapsing buildings, fire, and fallout in the hours and days thereafter. Multiply the consequence of such an attack (five-hundred thousand souls) by a 10 percent probability, and one would conclude that the U.S. government should mobilize an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism equivalent to saving fifty thousand Americans lives.

Risk equals probability time’s consequences; even skeptics find it difficult to discount the risk

Dr. Graham T. Allison 2007. (Ph.D. in Political Science; Professor at Harvard University, the John F. Kennedy School of Government; Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; was a special advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans; received Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service) “How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?” Published by the Council On Foreign Relations in April 2007 <http://www.cfr.org/weapons-of-mass-destruction/likely-nuclear-terrorist-attack-united-states/p13097>

“From the technical side, Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb who Enrico Fermi once called, “the only true genius I had ever met,” told Congress in March that he estimated a “20 percent per year probability with American cities and European cities included” of “a nuclear explosion—not just a contamination, dirty bomb—a nuclear explosion.” My Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn has created a probability model in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science that estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over a ten-year period to be 29 percent—identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005. Rather than quibble over percentage points, the bottom line is recognition that risk equals probability times consequences. Even skeptics who believe that experts overestimate the probability find it difficult to discount the risk.”

HARMS: NUCLEAR WAR RISK - through conventional war escalation

TNW in Europe are integrated with conventional forces, implying their intended use in case of large conflict

Dr. Alexei Arbatov 2009. (Ph.D. in History, Moscow State Institute of International Relations; professor of the Academy of Defense, Security & Police by the President of Russia; Head of the Center for International Security Center of the Institute for International Economy and International Relationships of the Russian Academy of Sciences) “Existing Nuclear Armed States And Weapons” International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation & Disarmament Aug 2009<http://icnnd.org/Documents/Arbatov_Existing_Nuclear_States.pdf>

Whatever the theory or war plans, it should be clear that any massive use of tactical nuclear weapons would be virtually equal by its devastating immediate and long term consequences to the use of strategic nuclear arms in densely populated regions, such as Europe (including European part of Russia), Japan, north-eastern and eastern coastal areas of China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Korean peninsula. This is all the more so that the large numbers of TNW still remaining in Europe and their integration with conventional armed forces and their infrastructure imply just such massive employment in case of a large-scale armed conflict. As a matter of fact Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were purely tactical by the present standards.”

Risk of nuclear confrontation is real - stressful situation may trigger unthinkable outcome

Dr. Martin Hellman 2008. (Ph.D. from Stanford University; Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford University)“Soaring, Cryptography and Nuclear Weapons” Published on NuclearRisk.org on October 21, 2008: <http://nuclearrisk.org/soaring_article.php>

Even though they are clearly equivalent, one chance in a thousand of dying sounds a lot riskier than 99.9% safe. The perspective gets worse when it's recognized that the fatality rate is one in a thousand per execution of the maneuver. If a pilot does a 99.9% safe maneuver 100 times, he stands roughly a 10% chance of being killed. Worse, the fear that he feels the first few times dissipates as he gains confidence in his skill. But that confidence is really complacency, which pilots know is our worst enemy. A similar situation exists with nuclear weapons. Many people point to the absence of global war since the dawn of the nuclear era as proof that these weapons ensure peace. The MX missile was even christened the Peacekeeper. Just as the laws of physics are used to ensure that a pilot executing a low pass will gain enough altitude to make a safe landing, a law of nuclear deterrence is invoked to quiet any concern over possibly killing billions of innocent people: Since World War III would mean the end of civilization, no one would dare start it. Each side is deterred from attacking the other by the prospect of certain destruction. That's why our current strategy is called nuclear deterrence or mutually assured destruction (MAD). But again, it's important to read the fine print. It is true that no one in his right mind would start a nuclear war, but when people are highly stressed they often behave irrationally and even seemingly rational decisions can lead to places that no one wants to visit. Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted to teeter on the edge of the nuclear abyss during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, but that is exactly what they did. Less well known nuclear near misses occurred during the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and NATO's Able Archer exercise of 1983. In each of those episodes, the law of unintended consequences combined with the danger of irrational decision making under stress created an extremely hazardous situation.”

HARMS: NUCLEAR WAR RISK - through nuclear proliferation

TNWs are promoting the spread of nuclear weapons and crisis instability

Pomper, Potter and Sokov 2009. Miles A. Pomper (Senior Research Associate with James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; master's degree in international affairs from Columbia Univ) Dr. William Potter (PhD; Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies) and Dr. Nikolai Sokov (worked at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and later Russia, and participated in START I and START II negotiations; Ph.D. from the University of Michigan) Dec 2009 The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, " Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe" <http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf>

“The longer the stalemate over TNW continues, the greater the chance that negative features associated with U.S. and Russian TNW will spread to other countries. The arsenals of short-range missiles and other delivery vehicles in China, India, and Pakistan continue to grow along with the potential risk that they will be fitted with nuclear weapons. The bulk of the (still very small) arsenals of the latter two consist of short- and intermediate-range weapons, which are apparently not permanently equipped with nuclear warheads. Consequently, they present the same challenges of unauthorized access as described above with regard to American and Russian arsenals. Reliance on sub-strategic nuclear weapons in these countries and potentially in China is also fraught with the danger of crisis instability along the lines outlined above.”

HARM: NUCLEAR TERRORISM / RISK OF THEFT

TNWs are vulnerable to theft and/or unauthorized use

Pomper, Potter and Sokov 2009. Miles A. Pomper (Senior Research Associate with James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; master's degree in international affairs from Columbia Univ) Dr. William Potter (PhD; Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies) and Dr. Nikolai Sokov (worked at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and later Russia, and participated in START I and START II negotiations; Ph.D. from the University of Michigan) Dec 2009 The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, " Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe" <http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf>

TNW continue to present a serious challenge in several respects. They remain the only element of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces that are not subject to a formal arms control regime. While the United States and Russia continue to reduce their TNW arsenals, the lack of a regime governing these weapons creates problems due to their relative lack of transparency, potential to aggravate crisis instability, and greater vulnerability to theft and/or unauthorized use. The deadlock that has continued for almost two decades also raises doubts about the commitment of the nuclear superpowers to Article VI of the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which included a specific reference to further reductions in TNW.”

TNWs provide an incentive for proliferation and increase risk nukes will fall into terrorist hands.

Dr. David Krieger 2008. (Former judge on the Hawaii Superior Court; Former Assistant Professor at the University of Hawaii; founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Hawaii; J.D. from Santa Barbra College of Law) “NATO Nuclear Weapons: Power Without Purpose” Published by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation August 2008: <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2008/08/14_krieger_nato_nuc_power.php?krieger>

“NATO reasoning for maintaining nuclear weapons seems very flimsy. If there is anything that is clear about nuclear weapons, it is that they cannot protect their possessors. All of the nuclear weapons in Europe cannot protect any European city from a nuclear attack by an extremist organization. Reliance upon these weapons provides an incentive for nuclear proliferation, increasing the possibilities that these weapons will fall into the hands of such an organization and will be used.”

Tactical nuclear weapons are vulnerable to being diverted to terrorism

General Sir Hugh Beach 2010. (with the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy - lead author , former deputy commander-in-chief of United Kingdom Land Forces) ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapons: A dangerous anachronism <http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt2010%20B5%20-%20Tactical%20NWs.pdf>

Tactical nuclear weapons are portable, vulnerable and readily usable. They are potentially destabilizing and create additional risks and insecurities, including possible acquisition and use by terrorists. The risk of terrorist acquisition should not be over-stated, and the bombs are protected by a variety of timers, switches, mechanical and electronic locks and procedural safeguards against any attempt to bring about an unauthorised nuclear explosion, but the possibility of detonating at least a radiological ‘dirty’ bomb cannot be discounted.

TNWs are vulnerable to theft, unauthorized use, and easy escalation in battlefield situations

Mark Stout 2010. (researcher and analyst at Air War University’s National Space Studies Center; background includes missile operations, training, launch operations, budget programming, missile warning; Former Air Force squadron and installation commander) “The Tactical versus Strategic Distinction: It’s A Big Deal, Right?” Published by the Air War College (in the ‘Wright stuff’) 13 May 2010 <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssc/op-ed/tactical_versus_strategic_distinction.pdf>

“From a non-proliferation point of view, the world should consider the fact that non-strategic nuclear weapons pose a much greater danger than their strategic counterparts. This is because they are more vulnerable to non-authorized use, including theft, than strategic weapons, which almost always have dedicated delivery vehicles, better physical security, and better-established and mature methods and procedures. Additionally, because non-strategic nuclear weapons tend to have lower yields and are inclined towards “battlefield‟ use, it can be argued that their inherent nature makes their authorized use more probable.”

Terrorists are seeking nuclear capabilities

Dr. Scott D. Sagan 2009. (Professor and co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University) "The Role of U.S. Strategic Posture in Deterring and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism” <http://www.usip.org/files/In%20the%20Eyes%20of%20the%20Experts%20full.pdf> Web.

“It is widely recognized that al Qaeda has a strong interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Osama Bin Laden issued a statement justifying the use of nuclear weapons against the United States prior to the 9/11 attacks, and after 9/11, crude drawings of nuclear weapons designs were found in caves in Afghanistan and retired Pakistani scientists from the Khan Research Laboratory were discovered to have established ties to al Qaeda. Earlier cases of terrorist interest in nuclear weapons, however, are less well known. The Baader-Meinhof gang attacked a U.S. Army base in West Germany in the 1970s seeking to steal the nuclear weapons there; the Red Army in Italy kidnapped U.S. Brigadier General James Dozier in 1981 and questioned him about locations of NATO nuclear weapons storage sites; the Aum Shinrkyo sought uranium in Australia and penetrated the Russian military seeking weapons and expertise, prior to settling for the use of chemical weapons (sarin gas) in Tokyo in 1995. Al Qaeda was not the first terrorist group to seek nuclear weapons; nor is it likely to be the last.”

Even if terrorist nuclear weapon risk is low, the potential costs are monstrous - we must act now

Prof. Chuck Freilich 2010. (Ph.D. from Columbia University; Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, an Adjunct Professor at New York University; Senior Analyst at the Israel Ministry of Defense, focusing on strategic affairs, Policy Adviser to a cabinet minister and a Delegate at the Israeli Mission to the United Nations)“The Armageddon Scenario: Israel and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism” Published by the Begin-Sadat Center For Strategic Studies , April 2010: <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/docs/perspectives104.pdf>

To date, no terrorist group has apparently acquired a nuclear weapon or the materials needed to make one. Al-Qaeda has tried repeatedly, but currently the technical challenges are daunting. This good news comes with a crucial caveat; it is true only “as far as we know.” Even if the risk may be low at this time, the potential costs are monstrous and the threat assessment is likely to change significantly in the coming years. Israel must take into account that a nuclear terrorist threat could emerge in the foreseeable future and therefore devote greater attention and resources to it, in order to develop the necessary doctrine and undertake the preparations possible. The time to act is now.”

HARMS: TNW NUCLEAR BLAST IMPACT

TNWs have immense impact: they are as bad or worse than Hiroshima

Major Cappello, Lieutenant Colonel Hall, and Major Lambert, with the US Air Force 2002 **(**Major John T. Cappello US Air Force, Assistant Director of Operations/Chief Long Range Planning, Operational Support Squadron, Ellsworth Air Force Base; Former member of the Political Science Dept at US Air Force Academy. Dr. Gwendolyn M. Hall - Ph.D. in Policy Studies from the University of Maryland; Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Commander of the Dean of Faculty Squadron Section and a Sequential Tour Officer at the Air Force Academy, where she is a Professor of Political Science. Major Stephen P. Lambert - Special Air Missions Pilot at Andrews AFB; Former assistant professor in Military Strategic Studies at the Air Force Academy) “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Debunking the Mythology” US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, Aug 2002 <http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/OCP46.pdf>

“In order to fully exploit this argument, it would be helpful to take a step back and briefly review the only historical example of an actual nuclear use during wartime. More often than not, the discussion relating to “tactical” nuclear weapons tends to be ensnared in the day-to-day technical debates regarding arms control, deterrence strategy, or targeting policy. Decision makers, academics, and military planners alike loose sight of the immense capabilities of the weapons they are theorizing about. After all, both atomic weapons dropped on Japan during World War II were below 20 kilotons in their explosive power. Most today would consider that a relatively low-yield “tactical” weapon.”

“Stolen TNW Detonation Cannot Occur” - Response: Air Force Review says detonation may occur

Hans Kristensen 2005.(Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists; consultant to the nuclear program at the Natural Resources Defense Council)“U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe” A presentation for members of the German national parliament [the German Bundestag] in February 2005: (brackets added) <http://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/Eurobrief1.pdf>

April 1997: US A[ir]F[orce] safety review of F-15 and F-16 D[uel] C[apable] A[ircraft] found [that]: ‘It cannot be assured that the B61 meets military characteristics (MC) requirements in abnormal environments when the electrical regions are breached and the nuclear systems remain functional. Under these conditions, nuclear detonation may occur if energy capable of initiating the nuclear system is present.’

INHERENCY: PRESENCE OF TNWs IN EUROPE

US has about 200 TNW deployed in Europe - left over from the Cold War

Anatoly Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov, and Timur Kadyshev 2011. ( Anatoly Diakov is director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, where Eugene Miasnikov is a senior research associate and Timur Kadyshev is a senior research scientist.) May 2011 “Nuclear Reductions After New START: Obstacles and Opportunities” <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_05/Miasnikov>

The United States and Russia have never declared their holdings of nonstrategic weapons. According to estimates of nongovernmental experts, the United States currently has about 500 such weapons in its active arsenal, of which about 200 are deployed on the territories of U.S. allies in Europe. During the Cold War, the principal mission of U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Europe was providing nuclear assurance for European allies and extended nuclear deterrence against the threat from the superior conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.

US has had tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for 50 years. Currently about 150-250 in 5 NATO countries

Daryl Kimball 2010. ( Executive Director of the Arms Control Association; The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a private, non-profit membership organization dedicated to public education and support of effective arms control measures pertaining to nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons) March 2010 Eliminate NATO's Nuclear Relics <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/Focus>

Nearly 50 years ago, the United States introduced so-called tactical nuclear weapons into NATO forces in Europe to deter and, if necessary, use against a Soviet land attack. Not long after, the Soviet Union followed suit. The U.S.-Soviet military rivalry is now over. Yet, both countries cling to the remnants of their massive tactical nuclear arsenals. An estimated 150-250 U.S. nuclear gravity bombs remain at six bases in five NATO countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Russia is estimated to possess about 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons in various states of readiness.

“We can never know how many TNW are in Europe” Response: Undersecretary of Defense has validated the estimates

Prof. Robert S. Norris & Hans Kristensen 2011. ( Norris -Ph.D. in political science from New York University; Former Professor at New York University, Miami University, and American University; senior research associate with the Natural Resource Defense Council nuclear program. Kristensen - Director at the Federation of American Scientists, the Nuclear Information Project) “US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011” Published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 2011: <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full.pdf+html>

We estimate that the United States now deploys 150-200 B61 bombs in Europe. A reference to 180 warheads made by US Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Jim Miller during a July 2009 NATO briefing appears to validate our estimate.

INHERENCY: WAITING FOR RUSSIA

Obama Administration will not cut US tactical nuclear weapons until Russia agrees to cuts

New York Times, April 2010. Mark Landler (Journalist) 22 Apr 2010 NEW YORK TIMES, U.S. Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html>

“Speaking Thursday at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers here, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said the Obama administration was not opposed to cuts in these battlefield weapons, mostly bombs and short-range missiles locked in underground vaults on air bases in five NATO countries. But Mrs. Clinton ruled out removing these weapons unless Russia agreed to cuts in its arsenal, which is at least 10 times the size of the American one. And she also appeared to make reductions in the American stockpile contingent on Russia’s being more transparent about its weapons and willing to move them away from the borders of NATO countries.”

Status Quo stalemate: We won’t remove TNW until Russia does, and Russia won’t until we do

Joyce Sabina Lobo 2011. (Ph.D. Candidate from Jawaharlal Nehru University; M. Phil from Center for Russian and Central Asian Studies; MA in Political Science; BA from St. Aloysius’s College, Mangalore University; she holds PG Diploma in Human Rights from Indian Institute of Human Rights, New Delhi; Research Assistant at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis) “Russia-US Stalemate On Tactical Nuclear Weapons” Eurasia Review 18 Mar 2011 <http://www.eurasiareview.com/russia-us-stalemate-on-tactical-nuclear-weapons-17032011/>

“Russia possesses many more TNWs than the US. Various unverifiable estimates give Russia between 2050 and 6000 TNWs, and the United States considerably less, out of which only 200 are estimated to be in Europe. During the New START ratification process, US Senators called on the Obama Administration to address reductions in, and the security of, Russian TNW stockpiles. But Russia has been reluctant to proceed on this front. One reason is because it “has revised its national security and military strategy several times in the past 20 years, with successive versions appearing to place a greater reliance on nuclear weapons.” Reiterating Russia’s position on TNWs, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued, at a press conference on 13 January 2011, in favour of a comprehensive approach by taking into account the totality of factors including the need to implement the new START Treaty. Russia also wants the United States to remove all its tactical nuclear weapons deployed on foreign soil.The United States has TNWs in six bases spread over five European states—Netherlands, Turkey, Belgium, Germany, and Italy. For its part, the United States is ready to agree to remove these weapons only when Russia acquiesces to reduce its stock.”

Waiting for Russia to negotiate on TNW means inaction & delay

Daryl Kimball quoted by the Arms Control Association in May 2010. Daryl Kimball (Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, a private, non-profit membership organization dedicated to public education and support of effective arms control measures pertaining to nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons) quoted by the Arms Control Association 17 May 2010 MEDIA ADVISORY: NATO 'Experts' Miss Mark on N-Weapons Policy <http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/NATOExpertsMissMark>

"While the Experts Group calls for efforts to work with Russia to reduce the overall number of tactical nuclear bombs, they implicitly acknowledge that linking NATO actions on its tactical nuclear stockpile to Russian action is a formula for inaction and delay," noted Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association.

INHERENCY: POOR SECURITY

Air Force study finds: European TNWs failing to meet security requirements

Eben Harrell with TIME magazine 2010. (journalist) “What to Do About Europe's Secret Nukes” Published by 4 Jan 2010: <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1943799,00.html>

There are an estimated 200 B-61 thermonuclear-gravity bombs scattered across these four countries. Under a NATO agreement struck during the Cold War, the bombs, which are owned by the U.S., can be transferred to the control of a host nation's air force in time of conflict. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Dutch, Belgian, Italian and German pilots remain ready to engage in nuclear war. These weapons are more than a historical oddity. They are a violation of the spirit of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — the 1968 agreement governing nuclear weapons that provides a legal restraint to the nuclear ambitions of rogue states. Because "nuclear burden-sharing," as the dispersion of B-61s in Europe is called, was set up before the NPT came into force, it is technically legal. But as signatories to the NPT, the four European countries and the U.S. have pledged "not to receive the transfer ... of nuclear weapons or control over such weapons directly, or indirectly." That, of course, is precisely what the long-standing NATO arrangement entails. While burden-sharing was tolerated during the Cold War, it has become an irritant at NPT review conferences, where some countries have used it as an example of the U.S.'s failure to take serious steps toward nuclear disarmament — part of its obligation under the treaty. Last year a U.S. Air Force report found that the European bases storing the weapons were failing to meet security requirements to safeguard the weapons. These revelations cemented the unpopularity of the agreement.

US Air Force study admits: most nuke bases in Europe are lacking in security

Sam Nunn 2010. (co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and a former U.S. Senator from Georgia) “NATO, Nuclear Security and the Terrorist Threat” NEW YORK TIME S 16 Nov 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/17/opinion/17iht-ednunn.html?pagewanted=2&_r=3&ref=global>

In the meantime, NATO could take additional essential steps regarding the security of these remaining weapons — an issue highlighted in a 2008 U.S. Air Force Blue Ribbon Security Review, which concluded that most sites in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons were lacking in security.

US TNW’s in Europe are not secure

Prof. Robert S. Norris & Hans Kristensen 2011. (Norris - Ph.D. in political science from New York University; Former Professor at New York University, Miami University, and American University; senior research associate with the Natural Resource Defense Council nuclear program. Kristensen - Director at the Federation of American Scientists, the Nuclear Information Project) “US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011” Published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in January 2011 <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full.pdf+html>

A series of intrusions at Kleine Brogel by unauthorized personnel in recent years has raised serious questions about security there and how the weapons are stored at the base. In the latest known incident, in late January 2010, activists from the peace group Vredesactie (“Peace Action) organized a “Bombspotting” campaign in which they climbed the fences and were able to walk freely to inspect 15 of the 26 aircraft shelters before eventually being arrested by authorities. The activists believe they were able to identify 8 of the 11 shelters equipped with nuclear weapons storage vaults in two main areas of the base (Bombspotting, 2010). A similar intrusion occurred in November 2009. A Belgian defense official insisted that the activists “never, ever got anywhere near a sensitive area,” and that it “would be another cup of tea” if they approached “sensitive areas” (Dougherty, 2010). If the official is correct, then the absence of immediate security force intervention would suggest that the 11 shelters the activists missed include the three vaults holding nuclear weapons. Three vaults could potentially store 12 weapons, but it is hard to believe that the activists happened to miss exactly the three vaults with weapons. Possible explanations that could account for the apparently lax security include a permissive security culture at the base, overconfidence in the intrinsic security provided by the underground vaults, a decision to ignore the activists in order not to reveal the actual location of weapons, or that Kleine Brogel no longer stores nuclear weapons. The continued presence of the 701st MUNSS suggests that weapons are still stored there; however, the slow response by security forces does not bestow confidence in the security of US nuclear weapons in Europe.

SOLVENCY

US Air Force owns and controls all NATO nuclear bombs in Europe

General Sir Hugh Beach 2010. General Sir Hugh Beach, lead author (former deputy commander-in-chief of United Kingdom Land Forces) with the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapons: A dangerous anachronism <http://www.acronym.org.uk/npt/npt2010%20B5%20-%20Tactical%20NWs.pdf>

“NATO’s nuclear bombs in Europe are all owned by the United States and are stored under the control of the US Air Force, in specially constructed underground vaults. According to policy, it is intended that they would be transferred to the host nations only at the point of use, assuming that to be when NATO is at war.”

ADVOCACY & ADVANTAGES

General Cartwright (vice-chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff) says European nukes are not needed

Wilbert van der Zeijden & Susi Snyder 2011. (Zeijden - political scientist with a MA in International Relations from the Vrije University in Amsterdam; Formerly worked for the Dutch think-tank Transnational Institute as Peace & Security program coordinator. Snyder - Nuclear Disarmament Programme Leader for IKV Pax Christi; She has also spoken at more than 40 U.S. governmental hearings regarding nuclear weapons, power and waste, including presentations to the National Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Dept of Energy) “Withdrawal Issues: What NATO countries say about the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe” 30 Mar 2011 <http://www.nonukes.nl/media/files/withdrawal-issues-report-nospread.pdf> (brackets in original)

The U.S. is a crucial player in this debate as it provides the warheads as well as the technological support for their deployment. In addition, U.S. F-16’s are involved in nuclear missions flown from Aviano Base in Italy. Talks with U.S. diplomats in Brussels, but also public documentation show that U.S. thinking on the matter is shifting towards removal of the TNW from Europe, largely because of the redundancy argument.When asked in April 2010 if there is “any military mission performed by these [B61] aircraft-delivered weapons that cannot be performed by either U.S. strategic forces or U.S. conventional forces?” General Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt confident enough to simply answer “No”.

Net Benefits: The Benefits of removing nuclear weapons from Europe far outweigh the costs

Hans Kristensen June 2008. Hans Kristensen (director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists) 26 June 2008, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn From the United Kingdom <http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/06/us-nuclear-weapons-withdrawn-from-the-united-kingdom.php>

What is at stake is not whether NATO should be protected with nuclear weapons, but why it is still necessary to deploy *tactical* nuclear weapons in Europe. Japan and South Korea are also covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but without tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Asia. The benefits from withdrawing the remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe far outweigh the costs, risks and political objectives of keeping them there. The only question is: who will make the first move?

The U.S. should remove TNWs without waiting for Russia

Blair, Cochran, Dean, Fetter, Garwin, Gottfried, Gronlund, Kelly, Kristensen, Nelson, Norris, Oelrich, Paine, Hippel, Wright, and Young 2008. (Dr. Bruce G. Blair - Ph.D. in operations research at Yale Univ; president of the World Security Institute. Dr. Thomas B. Cochran - Ph.D. in physics from Vanderbilt Univ; Fellow of the American Physical Society at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Ambassador Jonathan Dean - Ph.D. in political science from George Washington Univ. former US representative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact force reduction negotiations in the 1970s. Prof. Steve Fetter - Ph.D. from Univ of Calif-Berkeley; former Assistant Director in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Prof. Richard L. Garwin - Ph.D. in physics from the Univ of Chicago; chairman of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Board for the US State Department. Prof. Kurt Gottfried - Ph.D.; emeritus prof. of physics at Cornell Univ; served on the staff of the European Center for Nuclear Research in Geneva . Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund - Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Cornell Univ; senior scientist and co-director of the Global Security Program at Union of Concerned Scientists. Dr. Henry Kelly - Ph.D. physics from Harvard; Former assistant Director for Technology in the Office of Science and Technology in the White House. Hans M. Kristensen - Nuclear specialist; Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Fed. of American Scientists. Prof. Robert Nelson - Ph.D.; Prof. at the Univ of Maryland; has been a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution,, former visiting scholar at the Political Economy Research Center. Dr. Robert S. Norris - Ph.D. in political science from N.Y. Univ. Dr. Ivan Oelrich - Ph.D. from Princeton Univ; Senior Fellow for the Strategic Security Program at the Federation of American Scientists. Christopher Paine - Nuclear specialist; Director of Natural Resources Defense Council's nuclear program. Dr. Frank N. von Hippel - Ph.D. Oxford Univ; former asst. director for national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology. Dr. David Wright - Ph.D. in physics from Cornell Univ; research affiliate in the Program on Science, Technology, and Society at MIT. Stephen Young - .Former fellow in the Bureau of Human Rights at the Dept of State; master's degree in International Affairs from Columbia Univ. )“Toward True Security: Ten Steps The Next President Should Take To Transform U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy” Feb 2008 [www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/toward-true-security.pdf](http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/toward-true-security.pdf)

“The United States should therefore promptly retire all nonstrategic nuclear weapons and dismantle them in a manner transparent to Russia and the international community, again allowing verification, including on-site inspection, by a consortium of other nations. Although the United States should make every attempt to encourage Russia to reciprocate, it should not make this effort contingent on Russian actions.”

Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway + top US & European leaders say tactical nukes are obsolete and should be removed

Daryl Kimball 2010. ( Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, a private, non-profit membership organization dedicated to public education and support of effective arms control measures pertaining to nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons) March 2010 Eliminate NATO's Nuclear Relics <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/Focus>

“At last, key European leaders are pressing for changes in NATO’s outdated defense doctrine, which claims that forward deployed U.S. nuclear forces in Europe “provide an essential political and military link” between alliance members. In a Feb. 26 letter to NATO’s secretary-general, the foreign ministers of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway called for NATO support for action on nuclear arms control, including “sub-strategic nuclear weapons in subsequent steps towards nuclear disarmament.” NATO is due to revamp its “strategic concept” by November. The five ministers’ letter is but the latest in a series of statements from top U.S. and European leaders calling for changes in NATO nuclear policy. Last April, German then-foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told the German magazine Der Spiegel that "these weapons are militarily obsolete today" and promised that he would take steps to ensure that the remaining U.S. warheads "are removed from Germany.””

Pentagon's Defense Science Board advocates eliminating forward-based TNWs

Dr. Oliver Meier in 2006. (PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin; fellow at the Center for Arms Control and International Security at Stanford University) News Analysis: An End to U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe? July/Aug 2006 <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/NewsAnalysis>

“Indeed, some in the Pentagon favor ending nuclear sharing. A February 2004 report by the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board recommended that the secretary of defense “consider eliminating the nuclear role for Tomahawk cruise missiles and for forward-based, tactical, dual-capable aircraft” because “there is no obvious need for these systems, and eliminating the nuclear role would free resources that could be used to fund strategic strike programs of higher priority.”

Don’t need to wait for a treaty: U.S. should remove its remaining TNW from Europe and then we can work on a treaty later

Dr. Alexander Pikayev 2008. (Ph.D., Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences; M.A., Moscow State University; former co-director of the Carnegie Moscow Center's Non-Proliferation Program; chief counselor of the State Duma's Committee on Defense; He is a member of the Russian Academy of Science's Commission on Military Reform) “TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS” Published by International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (misspelling “Russian” was in original) <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=%22air%20force%20and%20naval%20bases%20and%20consign%20them%20to%20centralised%22&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Ficnnd.org%2FDocuments%2FPikayev_Tactical_Nuclear_Weapons.rtf&ei=GruFT6TcK8mw0QWusKHLBw&usg=AFQjCNGOQuP35DNatJIsSvRl1J9OOQxVVg>

“At the very least, the US should remove its remaining TNW from Europe, and both Russian and the US should remove them from Air Force and Naval bases and consign them to centralised storages on national territories. Later on, if the talks on an FMCT and then FMT are successful, the physical elimination and utilization of tactical nuclear warheads from storages could be implemented in a verified way, together with strategic nuclear warheads, within the context of advanced nuclear disarmament treaties.

Unilateral withdrawal of US TNW from Europe would motivate Russia to reduce theirs

Pomper, Potter and Sokov 2009. Miles A. Pomper (Senior Research Associate with James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; master's degree in international affairs from Columbia Univ) Dr. William Potter (PhD; Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies) and Dr. Nikolai Sokov (worked at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and later Russia, and participated in START I and START II negotiations; Ph.D. from the University of Michigan) Dec 2009 The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, " Reducing and Regulating Tactical (Nonstrategic) Nuclear Weapons in Europe" <http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/tnw_europe.pdf>

Second, the first step is also the most difficult one as a result of political inertia and the enduring deadlock, which have become almost a habit on both sides of the Atlantic. The Russian position seems particularly strongly entrenched, and our analysis has failed to identify domestic actors that favor and/or would expend political resources to change Moscow's current stance. Two options for the all-critical first step appear feasible. (a) A "grand package" involving an exchange of concerns: action on sub-strategic nuclear weapons and NATO steps to modify and expedite entry into force of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. (b) Unilateral withdrawal of U.S. TNW that remain in Europe. This action would remove the main justification--whether genuine or politically motivated-- for Russia to refuse to reduce further its own TNW. We anticipate that such a step would increase pressure on Russia to respond positively to initiatives involving both TNW reductions and a transparency regime.”

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

TNW have no military role, and don’t improve security

Wilbert van der Zeijden & Susi Snyder 2011. (Zeijden - political scientist with a MA in International Relations from the Vrije University in Amsterdam; Formerly worked for the Dutch think-tank Transnational Institute as Peace & Security program coordinator. Snyder - Nuclear Disarmament Programme Leader for IKV Pax Christi; She has also spoken at more than 40 U.S. governmental hearings regarding nuclear weapons, power and waste, including presentations to the National Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Dept of Energy) “Withdrawal Issues: What NATO countries say about the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe” 30 Mar 2011 <http://www.nonukes.nl/media/files/withdrawal-issues-report-nospread.pdf>

Their old function gone, B61 bombs do not have a new military role to play. They are regarded all but useless in stand-offs or open confrontations with sub-state enemies. They are no help to prevent, combat or retaliate against terrorism, or piracy. Nor do they have a role in bolstering border security or resource security. For cyber warfare, they are a liability rather than a functional tool. When reflecting on emerging threats, only four countries listed the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a priority issue. Ten countries indicated that terrorism was a more grave threat, and three countries said that there were no more conventional threats to the alliance as a whole from any other country. Only one country mentioned a possible role for TNW in a standoff or even an open confrontation with Iran. But the only NATO country bordering Iran, Turkey, openly wondered: “would we really use nukes in our own neighbourhood?” And even if scenarios could be made up in which U.S. TNW deployed in Turkey could be used, the redundancy argument still stands: The same functions could be performed better, more efficiently and perhaps less expensively by existing conventional or strategic nuclear forces. Whether countering emerging or existing threats, TNW no longer have a military role.”

CONSULT WITH NATO FIRST Disad responses

“Have to consult with NATO allies before removing TNW” - Response: Allied support for nukes is extremely low

Wilbert van der Zeijden & Susi Snyder 2011. (Zeijden - political scientist with a MA in International Relations from the Vrije University in Amsterdam; Formerly worked for the Dutch think-tank Transnational Institute as Peace & Security program coordinator. Snyder - Nuclear Disarmament Programme Leader for IKV Pax Christi; She has also spoken at more than 40 U.S. governmental hearings regarding nuclear weapons, power and waste, including presentations to the National Academy of Sciences, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Dept of Energy) “Withdrawal Issues: What NATO countries say about the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe” 30 Mar 2011 <http://www.nonukes.nl/media/files/withdrawal-issues-report-nospread.pdf>

“Allied support for continuing the current nuclear deployment situation is extremely low. There is a slim chance that the TNW can have a last positive contribution towards building a cooperative security climate in Europe. As Russia and NATO seek to adjust their mutual postures to the new reality, one in which they are no longer military opponents, but mutual security partners, action on TNW is long overdue.”

“Have to consult with NATO allies before removing TNW” - Response: They’ve already told us they want them removed

Eben Harrell with TIME magazine 2010. (journalist) “What to Do About Europe's Secret Nukes” Published by 4 Jan 2010 <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1943799,00.html>

Belgium's Parliament had already unanimously requested that NATO withdraw the weapons, while a 2006 poll found that almost 70% of people in the four countries want the U.S. nukes withdrawn. In October, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle declared that Barack Obama's speech in Prague in April, in which the U.S. President called for countries to renew the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, had "opened the door" to a nuke-free Europe.

“NATO Expert Group says we need deterrence” - Response: TNWs are irrelevant for NATO defense

Dr. Oliver Meier quoted by the Arms Control Association in 2010. Oliver Meier (PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin; fellow at the Center for Arms Control and International Security at Stanford University) quoted by the Arms Control Association 17 May 2010 MEDIA ADVISORY: NATO 'Experts' Miss Mark on N-Weapons Policy <http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/NATOExpertsMissMark>

“"The expert group asserts its statements without background justification. It does not attempt to justify the continued deployment of 200 U.S. tactical bombs in Europe on military grounds, yet boldly states they 'reinforce the principle of extended nuclear deterrence and collective defence'", said Oliver Meier, with ACA in Berlin. "In fact, tactical nuclear bombs are not 'credible' weapons and are irrelevant for the defense of the alliance," he noted.”

“RUSSIAN THREAT” DISAD RESPONSES

TNWs aren’t needed because Russia poses no threat

Blair, Cochran, Dean, Fetter, Garwin, Gottfried, Gronlund, Kelly, Kristensen, Nelson, Norris, Oelrich, Paine, Hippel, Wright,and Young 2008. (Dr. Bruce G. Blair - Ph.D. in operations research at Yale Univ; president of the World Security Institute. Dr. Thomas B. Cochran - Ph.D. in physics from Vanderbilt Univ; Fellow of the American Physical Society at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Ambassador Jonathan Dean - Ph.D. in political science from George Washington Univ. former US representative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact force reduction negotiations in the 1970s. Prof. Steve Fetter - Ph.D. from Univ of Calif-Berkeley; former Assistant Director in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Prof. Richard L. Garwin - Ph.D. in physics from the Univ of Chicago; chairman of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Board for the US State Department. Prof. Kurt Gottfried - Ph.D.; emeritus prof. of physics at Cornell Univ; served on the staff of the European Center for Nuclear Research in Geneva . Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund - Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Cornell Univ; senior scientist and co-director of the Global Security Program at Union of Concerned Scientists. Dr. Henry Kelly - Ph.D. physics from Harvard; Former assistant Director for Technology in the Office of Science and Technology in the White House. Hans M. Kristensen - Nuclear specialist; Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Fed. of American Scientists. Prof. Robert Nelson - Ph.D.; Prof. at the Univ of Maryland; has been a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution,, former visiting scholar at the Political Economy Research Center. Dr. Robert S. Norris - Ph.D. in political science from N.Y. Univ. Dr. Ivan Oelrich - Ph.D. from Princeton Univ; Senior Fellow for the Strategic Security Program at the Federation of American Scientists. Christopher Paine - Nuclear specialist; Director of Natural Resources Defense Council's nuclear program. Dr. Frank N. von Hippel - Ph.D. Oxford Univ; former asst. director for national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology. Dr. David Wright - Ph.D. in physics from Cornell Univ; research affiliate in the Program on Science, Technology, and Society at MIT. Stephen Young - .Former fellow in the Bureau of Human Rights at the Dept of State; master's degree in International Affairs from Columbia Univ. )“Toward True Security: Ten Steps The Next President Should Take To Transform U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy” Feb 2008 [www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/toward-true-security.pdf](http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/toward-true-security.pdf)

U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons were developed and deployed primarily to defend Western Europe from a potential Soviet conventional attack, and Taiwan and South Korea from potential Chinese and North Korean conventional attacks, respectively, at a time when the United States and its allies feared that their conventional forces were much inferior to those of their potential attackers. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact no longer exist. Russia poses no conventional threat to Europe. U.S. conventional forces are now far superior to those of other nations, and there is no plausible future need for U.S. nonstrategic nuclear forces. In recognition of that fact, President George H.W. Bush unilaterally deactivated and began dismantling most U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in 1991, and removed all such weapons from South Korea and U.S. naval ships and submarines.

“Need to deter Russia” - Response: Theft risk outweighs deterrence because we can use strategic nukes to deter and get rid of the vulnerable non-strategic nukes

Blair, Cochran, Dean, Fetter, Garwin, Gottfried, Gronlund, Kelly, Kristensen, Nelson, Norris, Oelrich, Paine, Hippel, Wright,and Young 2008. (Dr. Bruce G. Blair - Ph.D. in operations research at Yale Univ; president of the World Security Institute. Dr. Thomas B. Cochran - Ph.D. in physics from Vanderbilt Univ; Fellow of the American Physical Society at the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Ambassador Jonathan Dean - Ph.D. in political science from George Washington Univ. former US representative to the NATO-Warsaw Pact force reduction negotiations in the ‘70s. Prof. Steve Fetter - Ph.D. from U of Calif-Berkeley; former Asst Director in the White House Office of Science & Technology Policy. Prof. Richard L. Garwin - Ph.D. in physics at U of Chicago; chairman of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Board for the US State Dept. Prof. Kurt Gottfried - Ph.D.; emeritus prof. of physics at Cornell Univ; served on the staff of the European Center for Nuclear Research in Geneva . Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund - Ph.D. in theoretical physics from Cornell Univ; senior scientist and co-director of the Global Security Program at Union of Concerned Scientists. Dr. Henry Kelly - Ph.D. physics from Harvard; Former assistant Director for Technology in the Office of Science & Tech. in the White House. Hans M. Kristensen - Nuclear specialist; Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Fed. of American Scientists. Prof. Robert Nelson - Ph.D.; Prof. at the Univ of Maryland; has been a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution,, former visiting scholar at the Political Economy Research Center. Dr. Robert S. Norris - Ph.D. in poli sci from N.Y. Univ. Dr. Ivan Oelrich - Ph.D. from Princeton; Senior Fellow for the Strategic Security Program at the Fed. of Am. Scientists. Christopher Paine - Nuclear specialist; Director of Natural Resources Defense Council's nuclear program. Dr. Frank N. von Hippel - Ph.D. Oxford Univ; former asst. director for national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology. Dr. David Wright - Ph.D. in physics from Cornell; research affiliate in the Program on Science, Technology, and Society at MIT. Stephen Young - .Former fellow in the Bureau of Human Rights at the Dept of State; master's degree in Int’l Affairs )“Toward True Security: Ten Steps The Next President Should Take To Transform U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy” Feb 2008 [www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/toward-true-security.pdf](http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/toward-true-security.pdf)

If the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter and, if necessary, respond to the use of nuclear weapons by others, the United States has no need for nonstrategic nuclear weapons that could not be fulfilled by strategic weapons. Because nonstrategic nuclear weapons are often stored and deployed under less secure conditions than strategic weapons, eliminating nonstrategic nuclear weapons would reduce the dangers of unauthorized use and theft, particularly if Russia reciprocates.

“Need to deter Russia’s aggressive foreign policy” - We don’t need TNWs to counter Russia

Łukasz Kulesa 2009. (analyst of international security and Acting Head of the Research Office at the Polish Institute of International Affairs; MA in International Relations and European Studies from Central European University) “Reduce US Nukes in Europe to Zero, and Keep NATO Strong (and Nuclear). A View from Poland.” Polish Institute of International Affairs , March 2009 <http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo10/doc/Strategic_File_7_NATO_nuclear.pdf>

At the same time, the Alliance should avoid overreacting to Russian actions and statements, especially when planning the future of its nuclear component. From a Central European perspective, it is important to signal to Russia that Article 5 commitments remain viable without reducing them to a narrow insistence on the presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. The proposed actions on the part of the Alliance should rather include the resumption of contingency planning for Article 5 scenarios, more frequent NATO exercises including in-area defence tasks (including participation by the NATO Response Force), and the beefing up of the general presence and the infrastructure of the Alliance within the new member states. To counter the assertive foreign and security policies of Russia, NATO does not need tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.

“What about Russia’s TNW?” - Response: They have been secured

Anatoly Diakov, Eugene Miasnikov, and Timur Kadyshev 2011. ( Anatoly Diakov is director of the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, where Eugene Miasnikov is a senior research associate and Timur Kadyshev is a senior research scientist.) May 2011 “Nuclear Reductions After New START: Obstacles and Opportunities” <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_05/Miasnikov>

According to Russian officials, the number of Russian nonstrategic weapons currently is less than 25 percent of what it was in 1991. Unofficial estimates of Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal vary from 2,000 to 5,000, but the most reliable sources agree that Russia currently has about 2,000 such weapons in its active stockpile. According to official information, all Russian nonstrategic weapons were removed from their delivery vehicles and placed at central storage facilities located within Russian national territory so that adequate measures to ensure their safety and security are implemented.

TURKEY DISAD RESPONSES

TNWs in Turkey would take months to launch.

Alexandra Bell& Benjamin Loehrke 2009. (roject manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow]. She recently traveled to Turkey and has written about U.S. nuclear weapons stationed there for” Good Magazine.” Loehrke - research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the Univ of Maryland School of Public Policy) Bulletin for Atomic Scientists 23 Nov 2009 <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-status-of-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey>

Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella. So in effect, U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey are without military value or purpose.

Turkey nukes are a “half posture” since they have no aircraft that can use them

Prof. Robert S. Norris & Hans Kristensen 2011. (Norris - Ph.D. in political science from New York University; Former Professor at New York University, Miami University, and American University; senior research associate with the Natural Resource Defense Council nuclear program. Kristensen - Director at the Federation of American Scientists, the Nuclear Information Project) “US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists , January 2011 <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/67/1/64.full.pdf+html>

Turkey hosts an estimated 60-70 B61 bombs at Incirlik AB, down from the 2001 level of 90 weapons; however, the posture is unique in NATO. Most of the bombs (approximately 50) are for delivery by US aircraft, but the US Air Force does not have a fighter wing based at Incirlik. Requests to deploy a wing there have been turned down by Turkey, so the NATO nuclear posture at Incirlik is more of a half-posture. In a crisis, US aircraft from other bases would have to first deploy to Incirlik to pick up the weapons before they could be used.

Turkish officials would not insist on keeping TNWs - they would still be protected by US strategic nukes

Johan Bergenäs 2010.(research associate at the Monterey Institute of International Studies ) “Bombs Away: Removing Tactical Nukes from Europe” World Politics Review 2 Mar 2010 <http://www.connectusfund.org/blogs/bombs-away-removing-tactical-nukes-europe>

“A third barrier to removing these weapons is Turkey's perceived desire to keep them within its territory. However, senior Turkish officials recently indicated that they "would not insist" that NATO retain its forward-deployed nuclear weapons, and that conventional forces were sufficient to satisfy Ankara's security requirements. Such a position is perhaps motivated by the knowledge that Turkey would still be covered by the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella. But were NATO to remove its weapons from other nuclear-sharing nations, Turkey would be left as the sole nation hosting them. That's a scenario Ankara would prefer to avoid having to explain to its Middle Eastern neighbors, some of whom already view the current situation as a violation of the NPT.”

Turkey’s decision to build its own nuclear weapons would take more than removal of TNWs

Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp 2010. (Ph.D. from the University of the German Armed Forces; Director of the Research Division of NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy. He is a member of the "International Institute for Strategic Studies", the "German Atlantic Society", the "German Council on Foreign Relations" and other national and international institutions]: “NATO’s Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Beyond “Yes” or “No”” Research Division at NATO Defense College at Rome (No. 61) September 2010: <http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/documents/rp_61.pdf>

The interconnection between commitments and non-proliferation had led to the longstanding but hidden argument that US nuclear weapons in Europe should keep NATO members – other than France and the UK – from acquiring national nuclear forces. It is still used by some as a justification for the current NATO nuclear posture. This line of reasoning hardly seems convincing today, as it would mean – in a reverse conclusion – that NATO member nations might strive to acquire nuclear weapons if the B-61 bombs were with drawn. In the case of four of the five stationing countries (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands and Italy) this can definitively be excluded. Only with respect to Turkey might it be a theoretical option, given its geographical proximity to the middle Eastern “powder keg”. However, even for a geographically exposed country like Turkey, the decision to go nuclear (and to abrogate the Non-Proliferation Treaty) would be such a fundamental one that it would take much more than the presence or absence of Us nuclear weapons to justify it.

NATO countries, including Turkey, won’t develop their own nuclear weapons if we pull out TNWs

Bob van der Zwaan & Prof. Tom Sauer 2009. (Zwaan - senior scientist at the Energy Research Center of the Netherlands and Columbia University’s Earth Institute, previous research associate at Harvard University’s Managing the Atom Project and Energy Technology Innovation Policy research group; council member of the Pugwash Conferences on science and world affairs. Sauer - former research fellow at Harvard University’s International security program; assistant professor of international politics at the University of Antwerpen in Belgium. Previously a visiting fellow of the EU Institute for security studies in Paris) “Time to reconsider U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists , Nov 2009: <http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/time-to-reconsider-us-nuclear-weapons-europe>

Today, the political climate is starkly different. NATO currently includes every Central European country plus the three Baltic states that previously were part of the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, Russia is now a strategic NATO partner--at least officially. Additionally, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are committed non-nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with little interest in building nuclear programs of their own. The same applies for Turkey--more or less. (Its case is a bit more complicated because some experts claim that Turkish hard-liners might push for a domestic nuclear arsenal if Iran develops a nuclear weapons capability; that said, the hard-line position probably won't be change by the absence, or the presence for that matter, of U.S. nuclear weapons.)”

Removing nukes from Turkey does not mean Turkey will build their own nuclear weapons capability; the government wants them eliminated

Daryl Kimball in March 2010. (Executive Director of the Arms Control Association; The Arms Control Association (ACA) is a private, non-profit membership organization dedicated to public education and support of effective arms control measures pertaining to nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons) March 2010 Eliminate NATO's Nuclear Relics <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/Focus>

Still, there are some who still believe in the 1960s-era notion that forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons reduce the incentive for allies such as Turkey to acquire their own nuclear weapons capability. In reality, U.S. and NATO security commitments make the presence of these weapons irrelevant to Turkey’s defense, and a Turkish nuclear weapons program would reduce not increase that nation’s security. Furthermore, Ankara’s leaders government is on record in support of “the inclusion of all non-strategic nuclear weapons” in the disarmament process “with a view to their reduction and elimination.”

It is doubtful that Turkey would go nuclear if the U.S. withdrew its TNWs

Prof. Tom Sauer 2010. (Ph.D. in International Relations Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; assistant professor in international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen in Belgium; research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Univ and a visiting fellow at the European Union Institute of Security Studies in Paris) “U.S. tactical nuclear weapons: A European perspective” Published by the Bulletin of Atomic scientists in October 2010: <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/66/5/65.full>

It is also doubtful whether Turkey would go nuclear if the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons. The reason for Turkey to build nuclear weapons would be to counter Iran. The current Turkish government, however, seems to have better relations with Iran than with Israel (Kibaroglu, 2010). Turkey is, for instance, willing to host Iranian uranium as part of the May 2010 Brazilian-Turkish-Iranian deal. If Turkey really believes that possessing nuclear weapons is a vital national interest, it is extremely doubtful whether the presence of the remaining—and dwindling in number—U.S. nuclear weapons would make a difference in its calculation.

Turn: Nuclear weapons in Turkey may spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts

Mustafa Kibaroglu June 2010. (teaches courses on arms control and disarmament in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He has held fellowships at Harvard University’s BelferCenter for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) June 2010 Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_06/Kibaroglu>

The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian security analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a “nuclear-weapon state.” There is, therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify the country’s continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities.

Ending nuclear sharing in Turkey would promote nuclear non-proliferation

Prof. Paul Ingram & Claudine Lamond 2009 (Ingram - Professor of systems approaches at the National School of Government; executive director of the British American security Information Council. Lamond - former British American Security Information Council London contributor, at the London office; BA in International Relations and Asian Studies from the Australian National University; Masters Candidate in Southeast Asian Studies) “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states” 23 Jan 2009 <http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf>

Turkey has a unique opportunity to play a positive role in promoting non-proliferation. Ending nuclear sharing and fully complying with the NPT would act as a powerful example to neighboring states and strengthen Turkey’s legitimacy. Moreover, efforts by the Turkish government to play a leading role in the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would receive overwhelming public support.

“VITAL LINK BETWEEN US & EUROPE” DISAD RESPONSES

“Weakens commitment - makes Europe more vulnerable” - Response: Don’t need TNW physically present in Europe to accomplish anything

Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, 2010. (former German ambassador to USA; Chairman of the Munich Security Conference and Co-Chairman of the Euro Atlantic Security Initiative ) March 2010 Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Towards a New Grand Bargain With Russia <http://www.securityconference.de/Monthly-Mind-Detailansicht.67+M5fdbdf2167c.0.html?&L=1>

Those who argue that a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe would constitute a material change to Alliance defense commitments and would make European NATO members more vulnerable miss an important point. As early as 1987, NATO Foreign Ministers proposed significant reductions of short range nuclear weapons in their Reykjavik declaration. And when 15 years ago US-Secretary of Defense William Perry pledged that NATO would have no intention, no need, and no plan to deploy nuclear weapons to the new member states, he correctly clarified that European NATO countries would be covered by the US nuclear umbrella regardless of whether or not nuclear weapons are stationed on their territory. In other words: extended defense does not require the physical presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of the countries covered.”

“TNW in NATO are a vital link between US and Europe” - Response: 1) relationship doesn’t depend on nukes 2) other links exist 3) NATO will develop other role-sharing methods in the future

Prof. Tom Sauer 2010. (Ph.D. in International Relations Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; assistant professor in international politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen in Belgium; research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Univ and a visiting fellow at the European Union Institute of Security Studies in Paris) “U.S. tactical nuclear weapons: A European perspective” Published by the Bulletin of Atomic scientists in October 2010: <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/66/5/65.full>

Some proponents of tactical nuclear weapons still think the weapons are necessary for deterrence purposes; their argument is that U.S. nuclear weapons should stay in Europe because they are the link between the United States and Europe. An unnamed NATO diplomat warned: The weapons are the foundation of that solidarity. Take them away and what have we left? (Global Security Newswire, 2009b). A few qualifications can be made. First, it’s hard to believe that the U.S.- European relationship depends more on the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on European territory than it does on social, economic, financial, and historical ties. If the strength of NATO depends on the presence of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, it says a lot about the vitality of NATO. Second, other kinds of burden-sharing are imaginable. Even during the Cold War, not all NATO member states accepted tactical nuclear weapons within their borders: Spain and Norway are examples. Third, with limited defense budgets, NATO will make increased use of pooling and task specialization in the future. Would it not be logical if the United States, Britain, and France (NATO’s nuclear states) were to specialize in nuclear weapons inside NATO, and that the current host nations were to spend money on other tasks?”

NATO DISSENSION / DEBATE DISAD

“Corrosive Debate within NATO” - Response: Everyone agrees tactical nukes have no military value - it’s not part of the debate

Dr. Pavel Podvig February 2010. (physics degree from Moscow Institute of Physics & Tech.; PhD. in political science from Moscow Institute of World Economy & International Relations; researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Univ.; worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; former leader of a major research project and the editor of the book Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces) 25 Feb 2010, What to do about tactical nuclear weapons,<http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/02/what_to_do_about_tactical_nucl.shtml>

I believe, however, that the task of dealing with tactical nuclear weapons would be much easier if we take them for what they are--weapons with no military value whatsoever--instead of trying to balance them with everything else. There is more agreement on this issue than you might think. If there is any consensus in NATO's "corrosive internal debate," it's that the U.S. weapons in Europe are irrelevant militarily.”

NATO should welcome debate, not shy away from it

Dr. Pavel Podvig February 2010. (physics degree from Moscow Institute of Physics & Tech.; PhD. in political science from Moscow Institute of World Economy & International Relations; researcher at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford Univ.; worked at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology; former leader of a major research project and the editor of the book Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces) 25 Feb 2010, What to do about tactical nuclear weapons, <http://russianforces.org/blog/2010/02/what_to_do_about_tactical_nucl.shtml>

Nonetheless, there are still influential players who want the weapons to remain in Europe. Their key argument is that if the U.S. nuclear weapons are removed, NATO members would no longer trust Washington's commitment to protecting Europe. Such a move, the argument goes, will lead to all kinds of negative consequences--from triggering "a corrosive internal debate" within NATO to Turkey deciding to pursue its own nuclear weapon capability. These arguments usually are taken quite seriously. But in the end, NATO should admit that if its members cannot trust each other unless they are held together by a nuclear booby trap, the alliance has significant problems. Some of these problems are already beginning to surface. For instance, the internal debate about the strength of Washington's commitment to NATO members has been underway for some time, and it's as "corrosive" as predicted. What isn't clear is why anyone should be scared of it; NATO is supposed to be the type of alliance that welcomes debate, not shies away from it.”

2A EVIDENCE: NATO EXIT

FAILURES

Afghanistan mission proves NATO is dysfunctional

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2010. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) FOREIGN POLICY Mar/Apr 2010 “Let Europe Be Europe”<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/let_europe_be_europe>

Afghanistan provides the most important leading indicator of where Washington's attempt to nurture a muscle-flexing new NATO is heading; it is the decisive test of whether the alliance can handle large-scale, out-of-area missions. And after eight years, the results have been disappointing. Complaints about the courage and commitment of NATO soldiers have been few. Complaints about their limited numbers and the inadequacy of their kit have been legion. An immense complicating factor has been the tendency of national governments to impose restrictions on where and how their forces are permitted to operate. The result has been dysfunction.

NATO more likely to draw the US into war than to contribute to peace

Doug Bandow 2012. (law degree from Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 2 Jan 2012 NATO and Libya: It's Time to Retire a Fading Alliance <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-libya-its-time-retire-fading-alliance>

Donilon claimed that NATO provides "real burden-sharing for the American taxpayer." In fact, the alliance creates far more responsibilities than capabilities. In practice, NATO stands for North America and The Others. The U.S. must defend Europe and fight for European interests outside of Europe. Which requires increased American defense outlays. The problem has been made worse by the expansion of NATO eastward to countries far more likely to draw America into war than to contribute to the peace.

NATO’s offer of assistance after 9/11 was refused by the US

Difficult to apply NATO’s concept of military defense to today’s threats

Dr. Oliver Meier 2009. (senior researcher with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policyat the Univ. of Hamburg; PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin; served on the staff of Uta Zapf - a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the German parliament) “Securing collective defence without missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons – feasible and desirable?” Spring 2009, THE SHADOW NATO SUMMIT <http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_309_natoshadow_v11.pdf>

Yet even NATO’s immediate invocation of Article V in response to the 9/11 attacks, which arguably were masterminded “abroad”, in retrospect, is of dubious value. While the decision of NATO allies states to invoke the collective defence clause was an important gesture of solidarity with the United States, the Bush administration’s subsequent refusal to seriously take up the transatlantic offer of assistance as well as today’s difficulties of reaching agreement to terminate the invocation of Article V demonstrate how difficult it is to apply the concept of military defence to today’s security threats.

NATO’s military defense commitment is largely irrelevant: non-military issues are more important today

Dr. Oliver Meier 2009. (senior researcher with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policyat the Univ. of Hamburg; PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin; served on the staff of Uta Zapf - a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the German parliament) “Securing collective defence without missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons – feasible and desirable?” Spring 2009, THE SHADOW NATO SUMMIT <http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_309_natoshadow_v11.pdf>

One reason for the decreasing relevance of Article V commitments is the growing disparity between perceived security threats to the Alliance and NATO’s policy toolbox of predominantly military instruments. Today’s security agenda is dominated by soft security issues, including the economic crisis, energy security, climate change and cyber security. Yet on these issues, the type of military response envisaged under Article V has become largely irrelevant.

NATO is not well-equipped for the military missions its members want

Dr. Martin Smith 2009. (PhD, Univ. of Bradford; Senior Lecturer in Defence and International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, Great Britain) The NATO Response Force: Flagship or Shipwreck? Spring 2009, THE SHADOW NATO SUMMIT <http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_309_natoshadow_v11.pdf>

It is important to remember that there are few actual ‘NATO forces’. The main integrated assets are the military planning and command structures and the AWACs early-warning planes. Ground forces are overwhelmingly national: assigned or earmarked for possible NATO tasking by the member states. Overall therefore, we should maintain a realistic sense of what ‘NATO’ can and cannot contribute to international military operations. It may well be true, as Gareth Evans stated yesterday, that NATO is “the world’s best multilateral military institution”. But competition for this accolade is not fierce and it does not therefore mean that NATO is necessarily terribly well-equipped to effectively undertake the kind of operations its member states have allowed it to be drawn into.

INHERENCY

The US threatens to pull out of its NATO commitment, but never does

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter 2011. (PhD in US diplomatic history, U. of Tex.; senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) 13 June 2011 “NATO: The Potemkin Alliance” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-potemkin-alliance>

But Washington's threats to de-emphasize its commitment to NATO are probably as hollow as the alliance's military capabilities themselves. The Europeans have heard this all before. Burden-sharing controversies go back to the early 1950s, punctuated by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's warning that the United States might have to conduct "an agonizing reappraisal" of its security commitment to Europe if the allies did not put forth a more serious effort. The Europeans suspected that threat was a bluff (which it was), and they probably suspect that the warning from Gates is merely the latest in a long, dreary series of empty threats.

US pursues useless effort to persuade European NATO allies to spend more on defense: They won’t do it, and there’s no reason they should

Prof. Stephen M. Walt 2011. ( international relations at Harvard University)[GatestoNATO: Dropdead?](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/13/gates_to_nato_drop_dead) 13 June 2011 FOREIGN POLICY <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/13/gates_to_nato_drop_dead>

Americans want Europe to spend more on defense, so that they can contribute more to our far-flung global projects. But why should they? Europe is peaceful, stable, democratic, and faces no serious external military threats. Its combined GNP exceeds ours, and the European members of NATO spend almost eight times more on defense than Russia does. So where's the threat? The plain truth is that Europe has little reason to invest a lot of money on defense these days, no matter how much Americans implore them to, and so they turn a deaf ear to American entreaties.

Europe will not take up more responsibility within NATO as long as the US sustains it

Doug Bandow 2011. (law degree from Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 25 July 2011 “NATO: An Alliance That Divides Rather Than Unites,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-alliance-divides-rather-unites>

The Europeans no longer face an existential military threat and are not willing to trim their welfare states to maintain militaries of little practical use. Until now NATO has provided the ultimate free ride: join and receive an insurance policy from the globe's sole superpower, without having to do much in return. The Europeans aren't going to change that deal voluntarily.

ADVOCACY / ADVANTAGES

US troops should come home from Europe and the US should drop its defense commitment

Doug Bandow 2012. (law degree from Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 2 Jan 2012 NATO and Libya: It's Time to Retire a Fading Alliance <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-libya-its-time-retire-fading-alliance>(brackets added)

In October his successor, [US Secretary of Defense] Leon Panetta, sounded slightly kinder, but no less frustrated, warning of "legitimate questions about whether, if present trends continue, NATO will again be able to sustain the kind of operations that we have seen in Libya and Afghanistan without the United States taking on even more of the burden." The answer obviously is no. Washington should change course. For years it opposed any independent European defense capability. However, that now should become America's objective. U.S. troops, currently about 40,000, should come home from Europe. The automatic defense commitment should be abrogated and the U.S. force structure reduced accordingly. The point is not to leave Europe undefended, but to let the Europeans, with a larger collective economy and population than America, do the defending.

US should leave NATO and let Europe run it

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2010. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) FOREIGN POLICY Mar/Apr 2010 “Let Europe Be Europe” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/let_europe_be_europe>

Like Nixon setting out for Beijing, like Sadat flying to Jerusalem, like Reagan deciding that Gorbachev was cut from a different cloth, the United States should dare to do the unthinkable: allow NATO to devolve into a European organization, directed by Europeans to serve European needs, upholding the safety and well-being of a Europe that is whole and free -- and more than able to manage its own affairs. As with Nixon and Sadat and Reagan, once the deed is done everyone will ask: Why didn't we think of that sooner?

Obama should withdraw US from NATO

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2009. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) 2 Apr 2009 LOS ANGELES TIMES “How do we save NATO? We quit” <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/02/opinion/oe-bacevich2>

When he visits Strasbourg, France, this week to participate in festivities marking NATO's 60th anniversary, President Obama should deliver a valedictory address, announcing his intention to withdraw the United States from the alliance. The U.S. has done its job. It's time for Europe to assume full responsibility for its own security, freeing the U.S. to attend to more urgent priorities.

US exit would make Europe defend itself

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2009. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) 2 Apr 2009 LOS ANGELES TIMES “How do we save NATO? We quit” <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/02/opinion/oe-bacevich2>

The difference between 1949 and 2009 is that present-day Europe is more than capable of addressing today's threat, without American assistance or supervision. Collectively, the Europeans don't need U.S. troops or dollars, both of which are in short supply anyway and needed elsewhere. Yet as long as the United States sustains the pretense that Europe cannot manage its own affairs, the Europeans will endorse that proposition, letting Americans foot most of the bill. Only if Washington makes it clear that the era of free-riding has ended will Europe grow up. NATO's anniversary bash promises to be an historic event. As part of his promise to promote change, Obama should make it a farewell party.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Europeans don’t want to spend money on defense - makes NATO’s future “dismal” in Status Quo

Note: This is useful for defeating “Uniqueness” on Disads. If NATO is dismal in the Status Quo, then disadvantages of “weak NATO” are going to happen anyway, so they are not unique to the AFF plan.

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter 2011. (PhD in US diplomatic history, U. of Tex.; senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) 13 June 2011 “NATO: The Potemkin Alliance” (brackets added) <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-potemkin-alliance>

Addressing the leaders of the alliance at a meeting in Brussels late last week, [US Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates criticized European spending priorities, which have led to penny-pinching on military spending as governments shift financial resources to domestic programs. If that did not change, he warned, NATO's future was "dim, if not dismal." Gates did not mince words. "The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress, and in the American body politic writ large, to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense."

NATO not needed for US security - and Russia is no threat

Doug Bandow 2011. (law degree from Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 25 July 2011 “NATO: An Alliance That Divides Rather Than Unites,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-alliance-divides-rather-unites>

Today the alliance has virtually nothing to do with American security. Russia is but a pale military imitation of the former Soviet Union. The likelihood of a revived Red Army marching on Berlin or Paris is below nonexistent. In fact, Germany and France now are selling military technologies and even weapons to Russia.

“Need NATO for Afghan war” - Response: Continuing NATO mission in Afghanistan will only compound its errors

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2009. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) 2 Apr 2009 LOS ANGELES TIMES “How do we save NATO? We quit” <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/02/opinion/oe-bacevich2>

If it persists in attempting to pacify Afghanistan (vainly trying to prod the Germans and other reluctant allies into deploying more troops with fewer strings attached), it will only further expose its internal weakness. NATO won't survive by compounding its own recent errors. Salvation requires taking a different course.

“Afghan War” - Response: NATO is pulling out of Afghanistan anyway, and will likely never run a mission like that again

Jamie Shea 2012. (NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges ) Keeping NATO Relevant, Apr 2012 [http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/keeping-nato-relevant/acl9#](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/19/keeping-nato-relevant/acl9)

Next year, NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan will transform from a combat into a training and support mission, even if some units may still be involved in combat. In 2014, ISAF’s time in country will come to an end. NATO will almost certainly remain engaged in Afghanistan, training the Afghan security forces and carrying out a long-term partnership arrangement to assist in areas such as defense reform and military education. But NATO’s primary nation-building role, which at its height involved more than 150,000 troops from 50 countries deployed in Afghanistan, will belong to the past. Given widespread public disillusionment with large-scale military interventions on both sides of the Atlantic and rapidly declining defense budgets along with personnel and equipment cuts, it will be difficult for NATO governments to launch a mission of this sort again, even if they can muster the political will.

“Need NATO for Afghan war” - Response: NATO cannot succeed at counter-insurgency in Afghanistan

Prof. Andrew J. Bacevich 2010. (professor of history and international relations at Boston University) FOREIGN POLICY Mar/Apr 2010 “Let Europe Be Europe” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/let_europe_be_europe>

This doesn't mean that NATO is without value. It does suggest that relying on the alliance to sustain a protracted counterinsurgency aimed at dragging Afghans kicking and screaming into modernity makes about as much sense as expecting the "war on drugs" to curb the world's appetite for various banned substances. It's not going to happen.

“NATO vital to Afghanistan” - Response: Afghan war is unjustified and NATO partners are bailing out

Doug Bandow 2011. (law degree from Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 25 July 2011 “NATO: An Alliance That Divides Rather Than Unites,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-alliance-divides-rather-unites>

Washington then squeezed its partners to contribute men and materiel to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both wars turned out to be stupid, especially for Europe, which was a bystander as the Bush administration unleashed the dogs of war. Iraq never was popular, since many European nations had far more realistic assessments of the disaster-to-come than did the Bush administration. At least Afghanistan initially could be justified in response to September 11. However, a decade later continuing the conflict makes no sense. Today Canada and even stalwart Great Britain are heading for the exit.

Eastern Europe: Russia can’t do much and nothing justifies US intervention

Doug Bandow 2011. (law degree from Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 25 July 2011 “NATO: An Alliance That Divides Rather Than Unites,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-alliance-divides-rather-unites>

Conflict is still possible farther to the east, where Russia and other former Soviet republics bicker over borders, the rights of ethnic Russians, and other leftover disputes. However, Moscow remains able to do little more than beat up on hapless Georgia, which started their 2008 war. A Russian attempt to swallow the Baltic States or Ukraine would be a prescription for disaster. And, truth be told, the U.S. has nothing at stake in such squabbles to warrant confrontation with a nuclear-armed power in a region viewed as vital by the latter.

“Need NATO for missile defense” - Response: NATO missile defense would actually weaken collective defense commitments: false sense of security and weaker efforts at addressing root causes of proliferation

Dr. Oliver Meier 2009. (senior researcher with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policyat the Univ. of Hamburg; PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin; served on the staff of Uta Zapf - a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the German parliament) “Securing collective defence without missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons – feasible and desirable?” Spring 2009, THE SHADOW NATO SUMMIT <http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_309_natoshadow_v11.pdf>

Collective defence is based on a common threat assessment, sharing of risks and a basic agreement on how to respond to common threats. Viewed from this perspective, a decision by NATO to deploy a missile defencesystem is likely to negatively affect collective defence commitments. First, missile defences may lead to a false sense of security and reduction of non-military efforts to tackle proliferation challenges. If (at least a significant number of) NATO allies feel they are protected against a limited missile strike, they may conclude that there is no urgency to address to root causes of proliferation.

“Need NATO tactical nuclear weapons for deterrence” - Response: Nukes outside of NATO will do the job

Dr. Oliver Meier 2009. (senior researcher with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policyat the Univ. of Hamburg; PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin; served on the staff of Uta Zapf - a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the German parliament) “Securing collective defence without missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons – feasible and desirable?” Spring 2009, THE SHADOW NATO SUMMIT <http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_309_natoshadow_v11.pdf>

According to the current Strategic Concept, NATO nuclear forces “preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war”. They “fulfil an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the Allies' response to military aggression”. But the Strategic Concept states that strategic nuclear forces are the “supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies”, specifically those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France. Thus, ending nuclear sharing does not mean that NATO will not rely on nuclear deterrence.

“Need NATO tactical nuclear weapons for US/Europe cohesion” - Response: Cold War relic, they’re not relevant in today’s security environment.

Dr. Oliver Meier 2009. (senior researcher with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policyat the Univ. of Hamburg; PhD in political science from the Free University of Berlin; served on the staff of Uta Zapf - a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the German parliament) “Securing collective defence without missile defence and tactical nuclear weapons – feasible and desirable?” Spring 2009, THE SHADOW NATO SUMMIT <http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-downloads/2009_artrel_309_natoshadow_v11.pdf>

Third, US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are described as “an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance”. This argument stems from the Cold War and is rooted in the anachronistic doctrine of “flexible response”. Linking Europe and North America through the deployment of short-range nuclear weapons seems hardly relevant in today’s security environment.

Responses to “Without the US in NATO we...”

* “Can’t stop Russian imperialism”
* “Can’t moderate German power”
* “Can’t keep Turkey engaged in Europe”
* “Can’t defend Israel”
* “Can’t contain rogue states and WMDs”
* “Can’t defend Persian Gulf”
* “Can’t defend Pacific allies”
* “Would have to spend the same amount of money to replace it”

Doug Bandow 2012. (law degree from Stanford Univ.; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan) 2 Jan 2012 NATO and Libya: It's Time to Retire a Fading Alliance <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-libya-its-time-retire-fading-alliance>

A decade ago neoconservative activist Bruce Pitcairn Jackson worried that without NATO "the United States would be without an immediate brake on Russian imperial recidivism. We would be unable to moderate and guide the rise of German power. We would lack incentives to keep Turkey engaged in Europe. The reinforcement and defense of Israel in extremis would be vastly more difficult. The boundary lines within which we now contain rogue states and pursue the containment of weapons of mass destruction would have to be abandoned and moved thousands of miles closer to the territory of the United States. The defense of the Gulf States would be problematic at best. And a credible Pacific security policy would be heavily burdened by the requirement to maintain major forces in an unsettled Atlantic region. At a minimum, the disestablishment of NATO would require military expenditures at near wartime levels." But the end of U.S.-dominated NATO would mean no such thing. Rather than the end of NATO, there would be a new form of NATO, whatever the name, without the U.S. That reconstituted alliance, along with the EU, could contain Russian imperial recidivism, guide the rise of German power, and create incentives to keep Turkey engaged in Europe — all of which matter much more to Europe than to America.

2A EVIDENCE: PAKISTAN

INHERENCY

US-Pak relations are likely going to get worse

John R. Schmidt 2011. (teaches at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ. He served in senior positions in the State Department during a 30-year foreign service career, including as political counselor in the U.S. embassy in Islamabad in the three years leading up to 9/11) 17 June 2011 THE NATIONAL INTEREST “Untangling the U.S.-Pakistan Alliance” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/untangling-the-us-pakistan-alliance-5487>

Washington, for its part, fears that if the Afghan Taliban succeed in Afghanistan they will simply return that country to the unacceptable status quo that existed prior to 9/11. But the United States has been unwilling to pursue any major initiatives aimed at fundamentally improving India-Pakistan relations because New Delhi resolutely opposes third-party involvement. So it has been left with little choice but to hector the Pakistanis regarding the Afghan Taliban and to steadily ratchet up the pressure, ignoring Pakistani sensibilities along the way. As recent events have amply illustrated, this is only likely to result in increased acrimony and confrontation and to make a bad situation even worse.

JUSTIFICATIONS

TERRORISM

The US government lists Pakistan’s own government intelligence agency - the “Inter-Services Intelligence,” or ISI -- as a terrorist sponsoring organization

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 4 May 2011 “Pakistan, America’s Feckless Ally,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pakistan-americas-feckless-ally>

A report last year by the London School of Economics found that elements of the ISI not only fund the Taliban, but are also represented on the militant movement's leadership council. When compared to its tumultuous partnership with the U.S., Pakistan appears to have better working relations with militants who attack America. According to leaked documents from Guantanamo Bay obtained by WikiLeaks, prison detainees associated with the ISI may have provided support to al Qaeda. The September 2007 document, titled "Matrix of Threat Indicators for Enemy Combatants," lists the ISI as one of 65 "terrorist and terrorist support entities."

Alliance with US makes Pak leaders targets for assassination

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 2 Dec 2011 “Digging our grave in AfPak” <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/digging-our-grave-in-af-pak/>

Pakistan’s alliance with the United States has always been a liability. After 9/11, Musharraf forced the reassignment or resignation of officers regarded as pro-Taliban or Islamist, because his decision to support U.S. counterterrorism efforts undermined his support among key military officials. In 2003, he narrowly escaped two attempts on his life—within 11 days of each other—that involved the collaboration of junior officers. The attacks came two months after al Qaeda’s second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released an audiotape urging Pakistanis to overthrow the military general.

MISTRUST

Obama Administration doesn’t trust Pakistan

CBS News 2011. “Pakistan alliance "too big to fail" for U.S.?” 5 May 2011 <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/05/05/501364/main20060025.shtml>

The bin Laden operation has revealed the shifting ground: The Obama administration trusted its partner so little that it only told the government of the military incursion when it was over. And in a statement Tuesday, the Pakistani government warned that an "unauthorized unilateral action cannot be taken as a rule," calling it a "threat to international peace and security." It has made clear that it had nothing to do with the operation.

Neither the US nor Pakistan view each other as a reliable ally

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 28 Oct 2011 “Pakistan Does Not Respond to U.S. Pressure,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pakistan-does-not-respond-us-pressure>

Neither the United States nor Pakistan views the other as a reliable ally. U.S. officials have tried to sweep this uncomfortable truth under the rug for too long. Colluding with militants, which Pakistan views as vital to its strategic interests, continues to hamper coalition efforts in Afghanistan. But it is time for U.S. officials to accept that no amount of pressure or persuasion will affect Pakistan's decision to tackle militants more vigorously.

Pak army and people are increasingly anti-American

John R. Schmidt 2011. (teaches at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ. He served in senior positions in the State Department during a 30-year foreign service career, including as political counselor in the U.S. embassy in Islamabad in the three years leading up to 9/11) THE NATIONAL INTEREST “Solving a Problem Like Pakistan,” 12 Sept 2011 <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/solving-problem-pakistan-5871>

During the past year, U.S. actions and Pakistani reactions—including incessant drone attacks against Afghan Taliban forces, Pakistani detention of a CIA contractor arrested for killing two ISI informants and the clandestine raid against Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad—have brought relations close to the breaking point. Pakistan’s army has become increasingly anti-American, and ordinary Pakistanis now tell pollsters they regard the United States as a greater enemy than India.

WASTED MONEY

US should stop making Pakistan fight America’s battles - and we can stop funding it

Dr George Perkovich 2011. (PhD; vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy) 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf>

Stop Pushing and Funding the Pakistan Army to Fight America’s Battles  
 Washington should recognize the futility of demanding that the Pakistan army enter North Waziristan to fight the Haqqani Network and other insurgents who are projecting violence into Afghanistan. Pakistanis see this as America’s war. The army already is overstretched trying to hold other Pakistani territory from which the Pakistani Taliban has been cleared and also contributing to reconstruction from the June 2010 floods. The army therefore will not do what the United States asks. Once Washington stops pressing Pakistan to conduct military operations along the Afghan border, it can also fairly withdraw the pledge of billions of dollars in military assistance that has been tied to Pakistan’s combat operations in this theater. The June announcement that the United States is withholding $800 million slated for such operations reflects this logic. If Pakistanis do not welcome the mission, they do not need the funding for it.

ENABLING DYSFUNCTIONAL PAK MILITARY

We need to stop enabling Pakistan’s security establishment

Dr George Perkovich 2011. (PhD; vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy) 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf>

The eminent Pakistani writer Ahmed Rashid trenchantly summarizes the challenge facing Pakistan and those who care about it. “What Pakistanis desperately need is a new narrative by their leaders—a narrative that does not blame the evergreen troika of India, the United States, and Israel for all the country’s ills, that breaks the old habit of blaming outsiders and instead looks at itself more honestly and more transparently.” Psychology is at the heart of the matter. “Pakistanis,” Rashid writes, “as a nation seem incapable of self-analysis, or apportioning blame according to logic and reason rather than emotion.” Can Washington Learn? If Washington is smart, it will stop enabling the Pakistani security establishment’s dysfunctional domination of state and society and truly help Pakistanis who increasingly realize that the source of their ills is internal. To do this, the administration and Congress must accept the bountiful evidence that behaviorist policies of incentives and punishments will not change the army’s psychology and actions. The army’s and ISI’s obsessions are too neurotic to be affected by American techniques of behavior modification. And it would be exceedingly dangerous for anyone to seek to defeat the army and ISI in war.

Pakistan’s army blames the US for Pakistan’s problems

Dr George Perkovich 2011. (PhD; vice president for studies and director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; adviser to the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Policy) 6 Sept 2011 “U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_dysfunction.pdf>(brackets added)

In a further effort to shift attention to an external source of threat, [Pakistan army chief of staff GeneralAshfaq Parvez] Kayani declared that the number of U.S. troops stationed in Pakistan had been “drastically cut down,” and that “no intelligence agency can be allowed to carry out independent operations on our soil.” He closed by insisting that Pakistan has “no room for terrorism,” and that the army will “continue supporting the democratic system without any preference to any particular party.” Mirrored in each part of this remarkably defensive declaration appears an implicit admission of the army’s past policies and roles. Yet the attempt to substitute the United States for India as Pakistan’s bête noir indicates that the army and ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s intelligence agency] have not given up the habit of relying on an external threat to rally support for the security establishment. Blaming the United States for Pakistan’s problems now could provide more room for Pakistan to try to normalize relations with India, but the statement still positions the army as the most important, privileged institution in the country, against which no opposition will be tolerated. The army will remain more of a problem than a solution in Pakistan’s effort to heal itself. It is incapable of creating a positive national identity or leading political processes to reconcile the myriad internal conflicts that cause Pakistan’s decline.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

“Need Pakistan as an ally” - Response: Not much of an ally. Pakistan has cut cooperation and refused to target a known Taliban group

John R. Schmidt 2011. (teaches at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington Univ. He served in senior positions in the State Department during a 30-year foreign service career, including as political counselor in the U.S. embassy in Islamabad in the three years leading up to 9/11) 17 June 2011 THE NATIONAL INTEREST “Untangling the U.S.-Pakistan Alliance” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/untangling-the-us-pakistan-alliance-5487>

The Bin Laden caper reminded them that Washington, whatever pledges it may have made, was still conducting operations inside Pakistani territory without their knowledge or permission. To say the least. The Pakistanis decided to crack down. In recent weeks, they have reportedly cut intelligence cooperation across the board, evicted U.S. military advisors and instituted a moratorium on the issuance of visas to CIA officers newly assigned to Pakistan. They have also put increasing pressure on Washington to sharply cut back its drone attacks in the tribal areas. These attacks have overwhelmingly targeted members of the Haqqani network, the major Afghan Taliban group based in the region. This is the very same group the Pakistanis have steadfastly refused to go after—despite relentless U.S. pressure that they do so—because they see them as a hedge against what they fear will be an unfriendly Afghan government allied to their archenemy India once the United States departs the region.

“Lose Pak supply routes into Afghanistan” - Response: Just an inconvenience. NATO is finding other supply routes

Jon Boone 2011. ( journalist) 27 Nov 2011 THE GUARDIAN (British newspaper) “Pakistan border closure will have little effect on Nato's Afghanistan campaign” http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/27/pakistan-border-nato-afghanistan-supplies?intcmp=239

Pakistan's government once had the power to bring Nato's war machine to a shuddering halt through its control of a key route into landlocked Afghanistan. But today it can only aspire to cause inconvenience and slightly push up the cost of a war already running at $120bn a year. As Washington's relationship with Islamabad soured in recent years, Nato's logistics chiefs tried to break their reliance on Pakistan for getting enough food, fuel and other vital supplies to their troops in Afghanistan.

“Lose Afghan war supply routes” - Response: Other supply routes exist

Cheryl Pellerin with American Forces Press Service 2011. US Dept of Defense, 3 Jan 2012, “US Military Dialogue Continues With Pakistan,” <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66657> (brackets added)

“We are hopeful,” he [Pentagon Press Secretary George Little] added, “that our Pakistani partners will reopen the ground supply routes.” Supplies are adequate to continue the war effort in Afghanistan, Little said, adding that supplies are coming into Afghanistan through air routes and through the northern distribution network, a series of commercially based logistic arrangements connecting Baltic and Caspian ports with Afghanistan via Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

“Hurts Afghan war effort” - Response: Afghanistan is not a vital US security interest anyway.

Malou Innocent 2011. (Masters in International Relations, U of Chicago; member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) 4 May 2011 “Pakistan, America’s Feckless Ally,” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pakistan-americas-feckless-ally>

Pakistan wants to have its cake and eat it too, much like a cheating spouse. And U.S. myopia allows this to happen. Afghanistan is not a vital security interest to the U.S., yet trotting out an endless array of justifications for remaining in Afghanistan increases Pakistan's leverage by allowing it to take advantage of America's dependence.

“Pakistan nukes at risk” - Response: Taliban success/failure will not affect Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. ( Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

In reality, success or failure against the Afghanistan Taliban will not affect the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The issues are unrelated. The logic behind the administration’s concern is that militants will have a better chance of acquiring nuclear weapons if they operate from a secure foothold. The stronger the Taliban become in Afghanistan, the more dangerous they will become to Pakistan. And because political instability in Afghanistan is likely to spill across the border, the government in Islamabad will be less capable of stopping them. This logic is wrong. For the reasons discussed above, fear of a safe haven in Afghanistan is wildly exaggerated. Afghan militants may find some protection from U.S. forces by hiding in Pakistan, but Pakistani militants will find no similar refuge in an Afghanistan dominated by Islamic militants.

Current strategy is wrong: We don’t need to build a strong Afghan state and Pakistan’s nukes are not vulnerable to Taliban

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Coalition strategy is based on the assumptions that the only way to deny al Qaeda safe haven is by building a strong central Afghan state and that Pakistan’s nuclear complex will become increasingly vulnerable to militant attacks if the Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan. Both assumptions are wrong. The United States does not need to build a state in Afghanistan because the conditions that allowed al Qaeda safe haven in the 1990s have permanently changed. Moreover, the steps needed to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal have nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan. Policymakers should scale back their ambitions in Afghanistan. If they do so, they could cut troop levels by 80–90 percent while defending core U.S. interests and dramatically reducing the costs to America in both blood and treasure.

Decline of Afghan central state will not be a problem: Al Qaeda will not recreate safe havens and Pak militants won’t find sanctuary there

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

The upshot of this analysis is that state building is not necessary to succeed in Afghanistan. The decline of the central state will not lead to a domino effect in the region. Al Qaeda will not be able to recreate its old safe haven there even if the government collapses. Pakistani militants will not find reliable sanctuary either, regardless of what happens in Kabul.

“Al Qaeda will take over” - Response: Al Qaeda will have to remain in hiding, and won’t get a safe haven in Afghanistan

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

A state-building failure would not mean victory for al Qaeda or the Taliban. Even if the United States substantially reduces its ground forces in Afghanistan and the Kabul government remains weak and ineffectual, al Qaeda would not be able to recreate anything like the safe haven it once enjoyed.The original circumstances that made sanctuary possible no longer exist today. In the 1990s there was little domestic support for aggressive U.S. counterterrorism operations abroad, and the Clinton administration debated at length whether to strike large al Qaeda training camps. Today there would be little debate; indeed, the Obama administration would surely welcome the opportunityto conduct strikes against well-defined terrorist strongholds without having to cross over into Pakistan. The Afghan Taliban, which by now is very familiar with U.S. air power, has much to lose by inviting al Qaeda back. As the Afghanistan Study Group aptly concludes, senior al Qaeda leaders “will likely have to remain in hiding for the rest of their lives, which means Al Qaeda will have to rely on clandestine cells instead of large encampments.”

We don’t need a policy to block safe havens for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan

We don’t need to worry about securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. (Joshua Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Austin Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, policymakers have emphasized two basic national security interests at stake in Afghanistan. The first is preventing al Qaeda and its Taliban allies from reestablishing a safe haven. The second is preventing the violence in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan, thus putting its nuclear forces at risk and increasing the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Coalition strategy is based on the assumptions that the only way to deny al Qaeda safe haven is by building a strong central Afghan state and that Pakistan’s nuclear complex will become increasingly vulnerable to militant attacks if the Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan. Both assumptions are wrong. The United States does not need to build a state in Afghanistan because the conditions that allowed al Qaeda safe haven in the 1990s have permanently changed. Moreover, the steps needed to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal have nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we continue to operate on the bases of these mistaken beliefs, and the result is that American strategy has become incoherent.

“Pak nukes at risk” - Response: Militants don’t have the capability to pull it off.

Prof. Joshua Rovner & Prof. Austin Long 2011. ( Rovner is assistant professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College. Long is assistant professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ) 14 June 2011 “Dominoes on the Durand Line? Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan” <http://www.cato.org/publications/foreign-policy-briefing/dominoes-durand-line-overcoming-strategic-myths-afghanistan-pakistan>

Rather than attacking facilities directly, militants could conceivably try to intercept weapons or fissile material in transit. So far, none of the Pakistani groups have shown anything close to the sophistication and resources needed to pull off such an audacious attack. In any case, a safe haven far away in Afghanistan would not help militants seeking to mass forces inside Pakistan to intercept nuclear weapons.

“Pakistan loose nukes” - Response: Pak nukes are secured

Christopher Clary 2010. (country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; previously served as a research associate in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School) Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Sept 2010 , published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_PakistansNuclearSecurity.pdf> (ellipses and parentheses in original)

When questioned in May 2009, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, summarised his views on the topic:

I remain comfortable that the nuclear weapons in Pakistan are secure, that the Pakistani leadership and in particular the military is very focused on this… We, the United States, have invested fairly significantly over the last three years, to work with them, to improve that security. And we’re satisfied, very satisfied with that progress. We will continue to do that. And we all recognise obviously the worst downside… (is if) those nuclear weapons come under the control terrorists. I don’t think that’s going to happen. I don’t see that in any way imminent whatsoever at this particular point in time. But it is a strategic concern that we all share. And I’m comfortable that the military leadership in particular is capable of dealing with the particular issue right now.

Also that month, the head of US Central Command, General David Petraeus, gave a similar assessment, saying, “With respect to the nuclear weapons and sites that are controlled by Pakistan…, we have confidence in their security procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.” Both officers apparently reflect the views of President Barack Obama, who has stated, “We have confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is safe; that the Pakistani military is equipped to prevent extremists from taking over those arsenals.”

“Pakistan will collapse” - Response: Pakistan is not a “failed state” and not likely to become one

Christopher Clary 2010. (country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; previously served as a research associate in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School) Pakistan’s Nuclear Security Sept 2010 , published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. <http://www.idsa.in/system/files/OP_PakistansNuclearSecurity.pdf> (ellipses and parentheses in original)

The fifth scenario is some sort of sudden, multifaceted state collapse. Here, to borrow from Mark Twain, rumours of Pakistan’s death have been greatly exaggerated. The Pakistani state has profound challenges that jeopardise not just Pakistan but the planet, but state failure is still quite rare in the international system. In Adam Smith’s phrase, there is a “great deal of ruin in a nation,” and while Pakistan has suffered much, it seems likely to endure. Anatol Lieven, writing from Karachi, observes:

Karachi demonstrates as well as anywhere else the fact that while Pakistan is a troubled state, it is as yet very far from being a failed one. Only in its northwestern fringe has state power collapsed—and state power there wasn’t always very real anyway.

“Pakistan Instability” - Responses:

1) Not unique - Pakistan is on a downward course in Status Quo

2) US aid not effective

Varun Vira and Anthony H. Cordesman 2011. (Vira - Chicago-based writer on international affairs; Cordesman - holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal) “PAKISTAN: VIOLENCE VS. STABILITY - A National Net Assessment” CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives; established in 1962) 5 May 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110504_stabilizing_pakistan.pdf>

At present, Pakistan seems to be on a downward course.Its leadership is not adequately addressing either the causes of Pakistan's internal violence, or the needs of its people. Its politics are corrupt and self-serving, and far too many indicators reflect its failure to adopt policies that serve popular needs or meet popular expectations. It is playing a form of the “great game” which forces it to confront India on a region-wide basis and into a nuclear arms race. It has unleashed levels of religious extremism that not only threaten its Shi‟ite minorities but also its moderate Sunni majority. At the same time, it continues a long history of shifting the blame for its own actions to other states, and relying on political rhetoric as a substitute for effective action. This presents major problems for the United States both in finding some favorable outcome to the Afghan conflict, and in helping to create some form of regional stability in South Asia – a greater US strategic interest than the future of Afghanistan and Central Asia. However, US options are limited. US military intervention inside Pakistan is deeply resented by both the Pakistani people and its leadership elite. US military assistance has so far won only grudging and limited support and economic assistance has failed to win broad support or achieve any major objectives.

2A EVIDENCE: SAUDI ARABIA

INHERENCY

US/Saudi military cooperation based on agreements/policies initiated in 1953, 1973 and 2008

Associated Press 2011. “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties With Saudis” 19 May 2011 <http://www.military.com/news/article/us-quietly-expanding-defense-ties-with-saudis.html>

The newly established specialized force is separate from the regular Saudi military and is also distinct from Saudi Arabian National Guard, an internal security force whose mission is to protect the royal family and the Muslim holy places of Mecca and Medina. The U.S. has had a training and advising role with the regular Saudi military since 1953 and began advising the National Guard in 1973. The new arrangement is based on a May 2008 deal signed by then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef.

US has military personnel in a joint training effort with special Saudi security force

Associated Press 2011. “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties With Saudis” 19 May 2011 <http://www.military.com/news/article/us-quietly-expanding-defense-ties-with-saudis.html>

Details about the elite force were learned from interviews with U.S. officials speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of Saudi security concerns, as well as in interviews with private analysts and public statements by former U.S. officials. The special security force is expected to grow to at least 35,000 members, trained and equipped by U.S. personnel as part of a multiagency effort that includes staff from the Justice Department, Energy Department and Pentagon. It is overseen by U.S. Central Command. The force's main mission is to protect vital oil infrastructure, but its scope is wider. A formerly secret State Department cable released by the WikiLeaks website described the mission as protecting "Saudi energy production facilities, desalination plants and future civil nuclear reactors."

US-Saudi alliance established in 1945, guarantees Saudi security in exchange for supply of oil

Dr. Jeremy Ghez 2011. (Ph.D. in policy analysis, Pardee RAND Graduate School; M.A. in economics, Paris School of Economics) “Alliances in the 21st Century - Implications for the US-European partnership” <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP340.pdf>

The notion that some alliances are more resilient than others because they capitalize on a long historical tradition of cooperation is very intuitive. For instance, the claim that the US-Saudi alliance is strategic not merely because it is tactical but also because it relies on a long tradition of cooperation is straightforward. The partnership was first formalized by President Roosevelt and King Abdul-Aziz on the USS Quincy at Great Bitter Lake in Egypt in February 1945. In exchange for a continuous supply of oil from Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt guaranteed the kingdom’s long-term security. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity, the persistence of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the fall of Saddam Hussein, though they profoundly changed the strategic landscape in which Saudi Arabia operates, never challenged the foundations of the initial partnership. The two countries have continuously reinvented the purpose of the alliance despite ruptures in the international system.

US has joint military exercises with Saudi Arabia

Doug Bandow 2011. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) 21 Mar 2011 Riyadh Scores One for Tehran <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/riyadh-scores-one-tehran>

The real test of American commitment to democracy is long-time ally Saudi Arabia. U.S. and Saudi Arabian troops conducted a joint military training exercise in early March. Riyadh acts as the critical "swing" oil producer, upon which Washington long has relied to stabilize the international oil market. Saudi Arabia also is a major arms buyer. Perhaps most important, the Saudi royals have spread their wealth around Washington, collecting many influential friends.

The US is vastly expanding its defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia

Associated Press 2011. “US Quietly Expanding Defense Ties With Saudis” 19 May 2011 <http://www.military.com/news/article/us-quietly-expanding-defense-ties-with-saudis.html>

Despite their deepening political divide, the United States and Saudi Arabia are quietly expanding defense ties on a vast scale, led by a little-known project to develop an elite force to protect the kingdom's oil riches and future nuclear sites. The U.S. also is in discussions with Saudi Arabia to create an air and missile defense system with far greater capability against the regional rival the Saudis fear most, Iran. And it is with Iran mainly in mind that the Saudis are pressing ahead with a historic $60 billion arms deal that will provide dozens of new U.S.-built F-15 combat aircraft likely to ensure Saudi air superiority over Iran for years. Together these moves amount to a historic expansion of a 66-year-old relationship that is built on America's oil appetite, sustained by Saudi reliance on U.S. military reach and deepened by a shared worry about the threat of al-Qaida and the ambitions of Iran.

The United State is expanding its military commitment to Saudi Arabia (and other Persian Gulf nations)

THOM SHANKER and STEVEN LEE MYERS 2011 (New York Times Journalists) October 29, 2011 “U.S. Planning Troop Buildup in Gulf after Exit from Iraq” THE NEW YORK TIMES <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/world/middleeast/united-states-plans-post-iraq-troop-increase-in-persian-gulf.html?pagewanted=all>

With an eye on the threat of a belligerent Iran, the administration is also seeking to expand military ties with the six nations in the Gulf Cooperation Council — Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman. While the United States has close bilateral military relationships with each, the administration and the military are trying to foster a new “security architecture” for the Persian Gulf that would integrate air and naval patrols and missile defense.

Obama has no intention of promoting reform in Saudi Arabia

Suzanne Maloney 2011. ( Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former U.S. State Department policy advisor, she has also counseled private companies on Middle East issues) The Alliance That Dare Not Speak Its Name 20 May 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0520_obama_middle_east_maloney.aspx>

The administration needs to guard against ploys to undercut the President’s proclaimed agenda, including the fallacious argument that the Arab spring empowers Tehran. In reality, developments in Bahrain and elsewhere only confirm that continuing regional repression offers an opening rather than an antidote to Iranian influence. Finally, the Administration must carefully think through how to square the president’s call for efforts to promote reform across the region when we have neither the capacity nor the intention to do so with respect to our most important ally, Saudi Arabia.

Inherency: Obama fails to speak out against Saudi abuses

Solvency: Last time we pressured Saudis to reform, they did (Pres. Kennedy, 1960s)

Dr. Mitchell Bard 2011. (Ph.D. in political science from UCLA; master’s degree in public policy from U of Calif-Berkeley) Why Doesn't Obama Call for Democracy In Saudi Arabia? <http://www.mitchellbard.com/articles/obamasaudis.html>

Has anyone noticed that President Obama’s newfound affection for democracy in the Middle East has not resulted in a call for an end to the autocratic regime of Saudi Arabia? We also have heard of no serious protests in Saudi Arabia -- although we will see what the planned "day of rage" for March 11 will bring --despite the fact that the country is one of the most serial abusers of human rights in the world and practices a policy of apartheid toward Saudi women. How can this be explained? Obama’s failure to speak out against Saudi Arabia reflects a 70-year-old policy of U.S. administrations ignoring Saudi abuses against not only their own people, but American citizens. In fact, the only president to stand up to the Saudis was John Kennedy when he demanded that the kingdom abolish slavery in the early 1960s. And, contrary to the State Department Arabist views that you can’t impose our values on the Arabs, the Saudis complied.

FAILURES

Military support for Saudis allows them to undermine our values and interests

Dr. Mitchell Bard 2012. (Ph.D. in political science from UCLA; master’s degree in public policy from U of Calif-Berkeley) Uneven exchange with Saudis <http://www.mitchellbard.com/articles/uneven.html>

Why is the Obama administration silent while the Saudis undermine our values and interests? The answer can be found in the unspoken Faustian bargain. To satisfy the Saudis’ insecurity, Obama agreed to sell them $30 billion worth of arms they don’t need and can’t use on the pretext that it will help them defend themselves against Iran. The sale is really about getting some of our oil money back and satisfying defense contractors and the Pentagon. The deal is made with a wink and a nod, knowing the Saudi’s only defense against Iran is the U.S. military. Members of Congress, nevertheless, look the other way because the contracts mean jobs for their constituents. Meanwhile, the Saudis have pumped more oil throughout the Arab turmoil to prevent the price from going so high that it will throw the U.S. economy into a more severe decline, which would imperil Obama’s reelection. In exchange, all Obama has to do is sell them arms and continue to support the totalitarian theocrats in Riyadh.

Saudis block peace and stability in the Middle East - they sabotage peace negotiations with Israel

Dr. Mitchell Bard 2012. (Ph.D. in political science from UCLA; master’s degree in public policy from U of Calif-Berkeley) Uneven exchange with Saudis <http://www.mitchellbard.com/articles/uneven.html>

First, the Saudis undermine our interest in peace and stability in the Middle East. They do everything in their power, for example, to prevent the Arab world from making peace with Israel. When Israel and Egypt were negotiating peace, Anwar Sadat told President Carter that Saudi support was essential to achieving a comprehensive peace. Carter assured Sadat the Saudis would back his efforts, but, instead, they did everything possible to sabotage the negotiations, ostracizing Egypt and discouraging others from joining the peace process. Obama ran into the same obstructionism when he sought Saudi backing for his peace efforts in his first two years. He hoped the Saudis would make some gestures toward Israel to show that a broader peace would be possible if an agreement with the Palestinians was reached. Instead, the Saudis refused and increased their belligerence toward Israel.

Saudis undermine our values: One of the world’s worst human rights abusers

Dr. Mitchell Bard 2012. (Ph.D. in political science from UCLA; master’s degree in public policy from U of Calif-Berkeley) Uneven exchange with Saudis <http://www.mitchellbard.com/articles/uneven.html>

Second, the Saudis undermine our values. This is a country that practices gender apartheid toward women, discriminates against Jews and Christians and is one of the world’s worst human rights abusers. Just recently, the Saudis beheaded a woman for “witchcraft and sorcery.”

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY

US should stop the pretense of friendship with Saudi Arabia

Doug Bandow 2011. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) 21 Mar 2011 Riyadh Scores One for Tehran <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/riyadh-scores-one-tehran>

Riyadh's intervention in Bahrain raises the stakes. The Pentagon has authorized the removal of military dependents and non-essential civilians from its Bahraini base, suggesting some doubt about the future of Khalifa family rule. If the latter survives only with the assistance of Saudi bayonets, Riyadh will have committed a form of aggression. What then of the West's devotion to liberal international norms? Through all this Iran looms ominously in the background. The Bush administration's foolish invasion of Iraq eliminated one of the most important constraints on Tehran. Saudi Arabia has now handed Shiite Iran a powerful recruiting tool. This potential disaster suggests the imperative of nuanced disengagement. The U.S. government should stop trying to constantly and publicly micromanage Middle Eastern developments; advice is best given sparingly and in private. Moreover, the administration should drop the well-publicized pretense of a warm friendship between Washington and Riyadh. Cooperation on shared interests will remain important. However, U.S. officials need to put distance between America and the Saudi regime. Especially now that the latter is aggressively imposing its system on its much smaller neighbor. Americans can hope that everything will work out in Bahrain. However, the odds are stacked against a happy outcome. Neither stability nor democracy likely will be the result.

US military aid props up corrupt Saudi regime

Prof. Anthony Dimaggio 2010. (prof. of politics, Illinois State U.) The Permanent War Economy: What’s Really Behind the U.S.-Saudi Military Alliance <http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/09/22/the-permanent-war-economy-what%E2%80%99s-really-behind-the-u-s-saudi-military-alliance/>

The historic $60 billion military “aid” package between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is a classic example of the dangers of the American war machine. Al Jazeera reports that it represents the “largest ever U.S. deal to sell advanced fighter jets to Saudi Arabia.” The deal speaks to the vital role of U.S. imperial planners in committing massive resources to entrenched oil oligarchies in the Middle East. As is well known, these regimes are more interested in providing cheap oil to the U.S. than in allowing democratic representation for their people. The new U.S.-Saudi agreement represents only the most recent attempt to prop up corruption throughout the region. This policy reaches back six and a half decades to the early efforts of FDR to establish ties to the fundamentalist medieval regime of Abdul Aziz bin Saud, the political and political founder of modern day Saudi Arabia.

Pressure works: Bush Administration pressured Saudis and they implemented some reforms

Dr. Ali Alyami 2008. (PhD from Claremont Graduate Univ; originally a native of Saudi Arabia; Executive Director and founder of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia ) JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, Fall 2008 “Saudi Arabia: The Gathering Storm” <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/15/alyami.php>

The Bush administration’s “Freedom Agenda,” meanwhile, has shaken the foundations of U.S.-Saudi relations in a fundamental way. Under private, and for the first time public, pressure from the Bush administration, the Saudi government introduced limited political reform initiatives between 2003 and 2005. These included the passage of royal decrees establishing a governmental human rights association and human rights commission, a committee to fight corruption, limited media association, national dialogue, and permitting Saudi reformers to petition the king. Limited municipal elections were also held in 2005 (although women, all citizens under 21, and all military and security personnel were excluded). For Saudi Arabia, these primitive steps represent a seismic shift in a country considered the property of one family, the House of Saud. Even these cosmetic gestures, however, could never have happened were it not for the pressure exerted on the Saudi princes by the Bush administration, the President himself, and by Condoleezza Rice, the first Secretary of State with the courage to tell Arab regimes that the days of unconditional American support for them and their repressive policies were over.

DISAD RESPONSES

“Radical new regime in Saudi Arabia would be worse” - Response: Couldn’t get any worse than status quo

Dr. Mitchell Bard 2011. (Ph.D. in political science from UCLA; master’s degree in public policy from U of Calif-Berkeley) Why Doesn't Obama Call for Democracy In Saudi Arabia? <http://www.mitchellbard.com/articles/obamasaudis.html>

Now why doesn’t Obama call for democracy in Saudi Arabia? One reason is fear. While the administration is happy to ignore warnings about the possibility of a radical Islamist regime taking power in Egypt, the administration is petrified of that happening in Saudi Arabia. But could a different regime be worse than the Sauds who undermine American interests and values in the region and threaten our security as the leading sponsors of international terror.

“Oil supplies at risk” - Response: Oil supplies have never been in danger - Saudis are motivated by their own survival

Dr. Mitchell Bard 2011. (Ph.D. in political science from UCLA; master’s degree in public policy from U of Calif-Berkeley) Why Doesn't Obama Call for Democracy In Saudi Arabia? <http://www.mitchellbard.com/articles/obamasaudis.html>

The Saudis have cleverly played on our fears by warning the oil would be threatened by our relations with Israel, then the threat of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser followed by the Soviet Union and now Iran. The truth is our oil supplies have never been in danger because the prime motivation for Saudi policy is to guarantee that the royal heads remain connected to the royal shoulders, and the Saudis decided very early in their history that the United States was the only country that could guarantee their security.

China is the principal export destination for Saudi oil, not the US. Dr John Alterman, who advocates US intervention in the Middle East, nevertheless admits in 2011:

Dr. John B. Alterman 2011. ( PhD History, Princeton Univ. Director of the Middle East Program at Center for Strategic & International Studies; former member of the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State and as a special assistant to the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs) “Fierce or feeble - Persian gulf assessments of U.S. power”<http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_alterman_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf>

In this regard, what many in the Gulf are watching closely are signs of diminished U.S. commitment to provide free passage of energy resources out of the region. U.S. economic ties to the Gulf have always been secondary to security concerns. The United States is not the principal oil export market for any country in the region, nor is any Middle Eastern country the principal source for U.S. imported oil. In fact, Saudi exports to the United States have flattened, and China is now the principal destination for Saudi oil.

“Saudis are key to oil market” - Response: Saudi Arabia is losing its economic importance

Dr. Ali Alyami 2008. (PhD from Claremont Graduate Univ; originally a native of Saudi Arabia; Executive Director and founder of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia ) JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, Fall 2008 “Saudi Arabia: The Gathering Storm” <http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/15/alyami.php>

Other factors are also chipping away at the House of Saud’s strategic and economic importance to the U.S. Chief among them is the global energy market, and Riyadh’s declining role in it. In recent years, more than a few experts have argued that Saudi oil fields have peaked, and urged the international community to pressure the Saudi government to allow independent experts to examine its reserves. New players in OPEC and on the Middle East political stage, meanwhile, are increasingly thinking beyond Saudi Arabia in economic terms. Iraq, for example, is said to have as much or more oil than the Kingdom. Once the Iraqis solve their internal problems, something that seems increasingly probable, and start focusing on repairing and modernizing their oil facilities, they could produce enough oil to render Saudi influence irrelevant. The procurement of other energy alternatives by oil consumers, as well as the growing independence of other Gulf rulers, will reduce the Saudis’ political and economic influence still further.

Oil prices have very small effect on the economy

Dr. Lutz Kilian 2009. (Ph.D. in Economics; prof. of economics at University of Michigan) Oil Price Volatility: Origins and Effects, December 1, 2009 <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201002_e.pdf>

The second problem is that, to the extent that oil prices affect domestic output, under standard assumptions their impact should be bounded by the cost share of oil in domestic production, which is known to be very small. For example, for the United States, the ratio of imported and domestically produced crude oil in GDP has been fluctuating between 1 and 5 percent (see Edelstein and Kilian 2007). Thus, if oil price shocks are viewed as cost shocks for the oil-importing economy, their effect by construction cannot be very large. Indeed, Backus and Crucini (2000) have demonstrated that standard production-based general equilibrium models of the transmission of oil price shocks are not capable of explaining large fluctuations in real GDP. This type of result came as a surprise to many researchers who expected oil price shocks to be a major determinant of the business cycle.

“Need Saudi support for US policies” - Response: Saudis are developing new policies independent of ours

Suzanne Maloney 2011. ( Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy; former U.S. State Department policy advisor, she has also counseled private companies on Middle East issues) The Alliance That Dare Not Speak Its Name 20 May 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0520_obama_middle_east_maloney.aspx>

For their part, the Saudis are in no mood to pull punches, and have already begun to outline an approach to the region that is quite contrary to the vision laid out by President Obama. In a Washington Post op-ed piece several days ago, an influential Saudi analyst heralded Riyadh’s decision to embark on an “assertive” new foreign policy independent of Washington on the grounds that “there is simply too much at stake for the kingdom to rely on a security policy written in Washington, which has backfired more often than not and spread instability.” The oped cited the Iranian threat, an increasingly obsessive fixation for an aging and fearful Saudi leadership and a cynical appeal to American (and Israeli) security concerns.

“Iran threatens Saudi Arabia” - Response: Iran isn’t a threat and Saudi jets and missiles won’t matter anyway

Prof. Anthony Dimaggio 2010. (prof. of politics, Illinois State U.) The Permanent War Economy: What’s Really Behind the U.S.-Saudi Military Alliance (brackets and parentheses in original) <http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/09/22/the-permanent-war-economy-what%E2%80%99s-really-behind-the-u-s-saudi-military-alliance/>

The Wall Street Journal reports that “the [Obama] administration plans to tout the package as a major job creator – supporting at least 75,000 jobs – and sees the sale of advanced fighter jets and military helicopters to key Middle Eastern ally Riyadh as part of a broader policy aimed at shoring up Arab allies against Iran” (which has long been framed, contrary to all available intelligence, as a nuclear threat). The notion that the Iranian (non) threat will be countered by additional Saudi fighter jets and anti-ballistic missiles should strike any rational observer as insane, but the administration’s comments on the importance of the deal for the military industrial complex are instructive.

Iran is not an expansionist threat

Dr. Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed 2008. (M.A., Ph.D. from University of Sussex, Associate Professor at the University of Sussex, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development, and has testified as an Expert Witness in Congressional Hearings), July 2008 “The Iran Threat: Why War Won’t Work” Transcend Research Institutehttp://www.transcend.org/tri/downloads/The\_Iran\_Threat.pdf

“In reality, US military perceptions of Iran as a dangerous power-expander attempting to maximise its regional hegemony are inaccurate. As two senior Iran analysts at the Council on Foreign Relations point out in *Foreign Affairs*, the main obstacle to a resolution of the Iran crisis is “the Bush administration’s fundamental belief that Iran cannot be a constructive actor in a stable Middle East and that its unsavory behavior cannot be changed through creative diplomacy. Iran is not, in fact, seeking to create disorder in order to fulfill some scriptural promise, nor is it an expansionist power with unquenchable ambitions.”

“Loss of dollar as reserve currency” - Response: Not unique - it will happen in the next 10 years anyway

Dr. Barry Eichengreen 2011. (PhD; professor of economics and political science at the University of California, Berkeley) Why the Dollar's Reign Is Near an End 1 Mar 2011 WALL STREET JOURNAL Foreign Exchange Report <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703313304576132170181013248.html>

The greenback, in other words, is not just America's currency. It's the world's. But as astonishing as that is, what may be even more astonishing is this: The dollar's reign is coming to an end. I believe that over the next 10 years, we're going to see a profound shift toward a world in which several currencies compete for dominance.

“Loss of dollar as reserve currency” - Turn: Would produce net benefits if the dollar were replaced

Journalist Michael Shuman quoting finance Professor Michael Pettis 2011. (Pettis - finance professor, Peking University, MBA in Finance and MIA in Development Economics from Columbia University) 15 Apr 2011 Is the dominance of the dollar bad for America? TIME magazine, (brackets added) <http://business.time.com/2011/04/15/is-the-dominance-of-the-dollar-bad-for-america/>

His conclusion is that what benefits the U .S. gets from the reserve status of the dollar are outweighed by the costs: [quoting Prof. Pettis:] The large imbalances that this system has permitted now destabilise the world. If forced to give up the dollar, the world might reduce global trade somewhat, and it would probably spell the end of the Asian growth model. But it would also lower long-term costs for the US, and reduce dangerous global imbalances. The US should therefore take the lead in shifting to multi-currency reserves, in which the dollar is simply first among equals. [end Pettis quote]

2A EVIDENCE: KOREA

INHERENCY

US keeping 28,000 troops in S. Korea

US Senate Committee on Armed Services 2011. Report on NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, published 22 June 2011 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&sid=cp112TtjuH&r_n=sr026.112&dbname=cp112&&sel=TOC_827886&>

The committee notes that on August 14, 2004, the President authorized a realignment program to reduce and relocate U.S. forces in South Korea from 37,000 to 25,000 by September 2008. In 2008, The President reached a mutual agreement with the Government of South Korea to halt the reduction at 28,000.

S. Korea could defend itself but won’t as long as the US continues to subsidize them

Doug Bandow 2011. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) Why Are U.S. Troops Still in Korea? 3 May 2011 <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-us-troops-still-korea>

Only in terms of military power does North Korea enjoy an edge, and then only in terms of quantity. The North's weapons are antiquated; its soldiers are malnourished and ill-trained. The DPRK could devastate the South's capital of Seoul with artillery fire and missile attacks, but could not conquer South Korea. And the ROK lags behind the North in quantity only as a matter of choice. South Korea could spend the equivalent of the DPRK's entire annual GDP on defense if the former desired to do so. But Seoul has no reason to do so when the U.S. government insists on conscripting American taxpayers to subsidize the South Koreans. Indeed, the ROK would be foolish to become self-sufficient and lose the aid of the world's superpower. A couple weeks ago Seoul issued a cheerful press release extolling its agreement with the U.S. not to weaken the ROK's defense "when North Korea keeps on making military provocations." Such a deal!

The only Americans in reach of North Korea’s weapons are the US troops stationed in S.Korea

Doug Bandow 2010. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) 29 Nov 2010 “Pull U.S. Troops out of Korea” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/pull-us-troops-out-korea>

Nothing is likely to change in the near future. Washington should step back and leave the issue to the North's neighbors. The only Americans within easy reach of Pyongyang's weapons are the thousands of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. Given the South's manifold advantages over North Korea, an American military garrison is unnecessary. The troops should come home. Then Washington should adopt a policy of benign neglect towards the North. Let Seoul, Tokyo, and Beijing bear the risk of implosion, war, or proliferation.

China has more influence with N. Korea than anyone else, but they’re not using it

Jayshree Bajoria 2010. (Master's in international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia Univ, and a diploma in journalism from Xavier Institute of Communications, Mumbai ) The China-North Korea Relationship 7 Oct 2010 <http://www.cfr.org/china/china-north-korea-relationship/p11097>

North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009 further complicated its relationship with China, which has played a central role in the Six Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea. CFR's Scott Snyder and See-won Byun of the Asia Foundation argue the nuclear tests highlight the tensions (PDF) between China's "emerging role as a global actor with increasing international responsibilities and prestige and a commitment to North Korea as an ally with whom China shares longstanding historical and ideological ties." Beijing continues to have more leverage over Pyongyang than any other nation, say analysts. The economic leverage in particular, some point out, has only grown as a result of North Korea's declining relations with South Korea and the international community. But most experts agree that Beijing is unlikely to exercise its leverage given its concerns regarding regional stability and the uncertainty surrounding regime succession in North Korea.

Status Quo policy toward N. Korea is “strategic patience”

Mark E. Manyin 2012. (specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service) 11 Jan 2012 “Kim Jong-il’s Death: Implications for North Korea’s Stability and U.S. Policy” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42126.pdf>

Since the middle of 2009, the Obama Administration and South Korea’s Lee Myung-bak government in effect have adopted a joint approach toward North Korea, often called “strategic patience,” that has utilized both engagement and pressure, with an emphasis on the latter. In essence, the approach has had four main components:

* keeping the door open to Six-Party Talks over North Korea’s nuclear program but refusing to re-start them without a North Korean assurance that it would take“irreversible steps” to denuclearize;
* insisting that Six-Party Talks and/or U.S.-North Korean talks must be preceded by North-South Korean talks on denuclearization and improvements in North-South Korean relations;
* gradually attempting to alter China’s strategic assessment of North Korea; and
* responding to Pyongyang’s provocations by tightening sanctions against North Korean entities, conducting a series of military exercises, and expanding cooperation with Japan.

Strategic patience could be described as a passive-aggressive approach that effectively is a policy of containing North Korea’s proliferation activities, rather than rolling back its nuclear program. Indeed, underlying the approach is an expectation that North Korea will almost certainly not relinquish its nuclear capabilities. One drawback is that it has allowed Pyongyang to control the day-to-day situation. While Washington and Seoul wait to react to Pyongyang’s moves, the criticism runs, North Korea has continued to develop its uranium enrichment program, solidified support from China, and has embarked on a propaganda offensive designed to shape the eventual negotiating agenda to its benefit.

Negotiating agreements with N.Korea is useless: They always break them

Dr. Fred C. Iklé 2010. (PhD from Univ. of Chicago; former director of U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; later Under Secretary of Defense for Policy) Task Force member, writing his own comments at the end of the Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force report: “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” June 2010 <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf>

We must not seek agreements with North Korea because it does not keep agreements. At least seven agreements with the United States have been broken: the armistice agreement, the North-South Communiqué of 1972, two North-South agreements of 1992, the Agreed Framework of 1994, the Communiqué of the North-South Summit of 2000, and the Nonproliferation Treaty, human right agreements, and others. It is hard to find an agreement that North Korea has kept.

SOLVENCY/ADVOCACY

No justification for US military in S. Korea

Doug Bandow 2011. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) Why Are U.S. Troops Still in Korea? 3 May 2011<http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-us-troops-still-korea>

Why is the U.S. creating military units, stationing them overseas, and sending them back and forth for training to benefit the security of *another nation*, an advanced and wealthy country capable of defending itself? Why are American personnel preparing for battle to defend South Korea? If American resources were infinite, then it might make sense to shower bases and garrisons all over the globe. If South Korea was still war-ravaged and impoverished and the Cold War was still raging, it might make sense for the U.S. to maintain a security guarantee. But neither of those conditions bears any relation to reality today.

US military in Korea is destabilising: Without the US, a war would be unlikely

Dr. Tim Beal 2011. (Masters Degree in modern Chinese studies at the Univ.; PhD in Chinese trade; was Ferranti Research Fellow at the Centre for Japanese Studies at Stirling University; foundation director of the Centre for Asia/Pacific Law and Businessat Victoria Univ of Wellington, New Zealand) Peace Forum, Vol. 27 Issue 2 No 36 December 2011, pp.13-26, Published by the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee Univ., Seoul, S.Korea<http://www.timbeal.net.nz/Crisis_in_Korea/Critical_perspectives8.pdf>

It might be mentioned in passing that it is not generally realised just how destabilising the present US military involvement in Korea is. Basically, without the United States a war between the two Koreas is highly unlikely. The South is far more powerful than the North, so a deliberate DPRK attack is not plausible.

Money saved: US should save money by eliminating military support for S.Korea

Doug Bandow 2011. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) Why Are U.S. Troops Still in Korea? 3 May 2011 <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-us-troops-still-korea>

Moreover, the warfare state is no less expensive and no more affordable than the welfare state. If America is to regain its financial footing, it must cut back — everywhere. Including America's expansive military dole for other nations. A good place to start slashing would be welfare for South Korea.

US needs more assertive China policy to solve N.Korea proliferation

Prof. Thomas J. Christensen 2011. (professor of politics and international affairs and co-director of the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton Univ; former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs) FOREIGN AFFAIRS, March/April 2011, Vol 90, No 2. “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy” <http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx>

Even if U.S.-Chinese ties improve and China reverses the negative trends in its regional diplomacy, Washington may still be unsatisfied if the shift does not include enhanced Chinese participation in international efforts to tackle global problems, especially proliferation in North Korea and Iran. For the United States and its allies, securing this kind of Chinese cooperation may be the highest hurdle to clear. Obama has an impressive group of advisers on Asia, but the domestic political and psychological factors in China will create reasons for pessimism, at least until China's succession is complete in 2012. Unfortunately, without such a change in China's policies, solving problems from proliferation to climate change will be much more difficult for the United States and the rest of the international community. In this one important sense, the United States needs a more assertive China.

US disengagement would motivate China to take action against North Korea

Doug Bandow 2010. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) Why Are We Worrying about North Korea? <http://www.campaignforliberty.org/node/11998>

It's hard to believe, but the situation in North Korea could get worse. Imagine a weak collective leadership after Kim's death dissolving into warring factions as competing officials looked to their favorite Kim relative or army general. Imagine burgeoning civil strife, growing public hardship, and mass refugee flows. And violence flowing across the Yalu River to the north and demilitarized zone to the south. Washington's best policy would be to step back from this geopolitical miasma. Any map demonstrates which countries have the most at stake in a stable Korean peninsula: South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. It is time for them to take the lead. American officials should be particularly blunt with Beijing. If the DPRK creates a growing atomic arsenal, Washington has no interest in being in the middle. So the U.S. would do nothing to discourage South Korea or Japan from going nuclear in response. Hearing Tokyo and nuclear weapons in the same sentence would cause Chinese policymakers to break out in a cold sweat and encourage them to take action against the North.

Strong stand by China is key to dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program

Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force 2010. (Charles L. Pritchard and John H. Tilelli Jr., Chairmen; Scott A. Snyder, Project Director; CFR is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher. Pritchard - former aide to Pres. Bush in negotiations with N. Korea; former US Representative to Korean Peninsula Energy Development Org. Tilelli - retired US Army 4-star general, former commander of US forces in Korea) “U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula” <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22935/Korean_PeninsulaTFR64-1.pdf>

This Task Force report comprehensively reviews the situation on the peninsula as well as the options for U.S. policy. It provides a valuable ranking of U.S. interests, and calls for a firm commitment from the Obama administration to seek denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, backed by a combination of sanctions, incentives, and sustained political pressure, in addition to increased efforts to contain proliferation. It notes that China’s participation in this effort is vital. Indeed, the report makes clear that any hope of North Korea’s dismantling its nuclear program rests on China’s willingness to take a strong stance. For denuclearization to proceed, China must acknowledge that the long-term hazard of a nuclear Korea is more perilous to it and the region than the short-term risk of instability.

US can withdraw from S.Korea defense treaty with 1 year’s notice

US-S.Korea Mutual Defense Treaty 1953. <http://www.usfk.mil/usfk/sofa.1953.mutual.defense.treaty.76>

Article 6 This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

South Korea has no impact on US national security

Doug Bandow 2011. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) Why Are U.S. Troops Still in Korea? 3 May 2011 <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-are-us-troops-still-korea>

These activities have nothing to do with defense of America. Again, consider the Korean peninsula. During the Cold War the two Koreas were part of a "great game" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The peninsula mattered not because it was intrinsically important to America — just consult any atlas — but because the battle between the two Koreas was tied to the larger global struggle. Today conquest of the South by Pyongyang would be a humanitarian tragedy and create an economic loss, but would have little geopolitical impact on America. And now, in contrast to 1950, the ROK is well able to defend itself.

N.Korea threat exaggerated: S.Korea’s forces are better and SK has twice the population and 40x the economy of the North

Doug Bandow 2010. (J.D. (law degree) from Stanford Univ; senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties; worked as special assistant to President Reagan ) 1 Nov 2010 “U.S. Should Get Out of Korean Peninsula” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-should-get-out-korean-peninsula>

The North poses a greater threat to South Korea, but even here the purported danger is exaggerated. The Republic of Korea is far ahead on most measures of national power. The South's forces are better trained and its equipment is more capable; Seoul has a much larger army reserve and military industrial base. The ROK has twice the population and upwards of 40 times the gross domestic product the North. Moreover, neither China nor Russia, the North's traditional allies, would support the DPRK in another war.

Paying attention to N.Korea fuels their totalitarian behavior

Dr. Fred Kaplan 2012. ( PhD political science, MIT; former foreign policy advisor to congressman Les Aspin) Let’s Ignore North Korea , SLATE 19 Apr 2012, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2012/04/north_korea_missile_launch_poses_no_serious_threat_to_the_united_states_.single.html>

But more to the point, don’t get bent out of shape. That would only play into their game. The North Korean leaders savor our attention. They grow a little in their own delusional stature every time we shudder over the grave danger they allegedly pose. They shine a little brighter in the domestic propaganda that touts them, and justifies their totalitarian rule, as the much-feared protectors of the Great Korean Nation. Scott Snyder, in his seminal book *Negotiating on the Edge*, describes North Korea’s diplomatic style as “a prolonged cycle of crisis, intimidation and brinksmanship.” The trick to countering it is to break the cycle, and one way to do that is not to get sucked into it.

ROK (S. Korea) has more personnel that can be devoted to military service

ROK’s weaknesses are political - they have to decide to make sacrifices for security

Anthony Cordesman 2011. (holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal; former national security assistant to Senator John McCain and civilian assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense; former director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense ) “The Korean Military Balance” Center for Strategic & International Studies July 2011 <http://csis.org/files/publication/110712_Cordesman_KoreaMilBalance_WEB.pdf>

The World Bank and UN make somewhat different estimates, but all agree that the ROK has a vastly larger economy, with far better income distribution and personal wealth and has far more personnel that can be devoted to military service. The ROK’s disadvantages are that its population has much higher expectation; it must pay far more for manpower, must price military investment in market rather than command terms, and finds it harder to command popular sacrifices in the name of enhanced security.

North Korea’s conventional forces are focused on deterrence and defense

James R. Clapper 2011. (Director of National Intelligence) 16 Feb 2011 “Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,” <http://intelligence.senate.gov/110216/dni.pdf>

Because of deficiencies in their conventional military forces, the North's leaders are focused on deterrence and defense. The Intelligence Community assesses Pyongyang views its nuclear capabilities as intended for deterrence, international prestige, and coercive diplomacy. We judge that North Korea would consider using nuclear weapons only under certain narrow circumstances.

2A EVIDENCE: WAR POWERS REFORM

TOPICALITY

The War Powers Resolution is a recurring issue for the commitment of US armed forces

Library of Congress, last updated 2011. last updated 4 Apr 2011 “War Powers,” <http://loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php>

U.S. Presidents have consistently taken the position that the War Powers Resolution is an unconstitutional infringement upon the power of the executive branch. As a result, the Resolution has been the subject of controversy since its enactment, and is a recurring issue due to the ongoing worldwide commitment of U.S. armed forces. Presidents have submitted a total of over 120 reports to Congress pursuant to the Resolution.

INHERENCY

The War Powers Resolution, sometimes referred to as the War Powers Act, WPR or WPA: Title 50 United States Code Chapter 33 Sections 1541-1548. The Library of Congress explains some of the key provisions in their article last updated in 2011, saying QUOTE:

Library of Congress, last updated 2011. last updated 4 Apr 2011 “War Powers,” <http://loc.gov/law/help/war-powers.php>

“The second part requires the President to consult with Congress before introducing U.S. armed forces into hostilities or situations where hostilities are imminent, and to continue such consultations as long as U.S. armed forces remain in such situations (50 USC Sec. 1542).The third part sets forth reporting requirements that the President must comply with any time he introduces U.S. armed forces into existing or imminent hostilities (50 USC Sec. 1543); section 1543(a)(1) is particularly significant because it can trigger a 60 day time limit on the use of U.S. forces under section 1544(b). The fourth part of the law concerns Congressional actions and procedures. Of particular interest is Section 1544(b), which requires that U.S. forces be withdrawn from hostilities within 60 days of the time a report is submitted or is required to be submitted under Section 1543(a)(1), unless Congress acts to approve continued military action, or is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.” UNQUOTE

Now is the critical time, if we don’t act we may lose the ability to rebalance war powers in the future

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, there is no better time for Congress to recognize that it is at a constitutional crossroads. The next few years will provide an opportunity for collective reflection on the conduct of these wars: instead of engaging in recriminations over past mistakes, it is far more profitable to take institutional measures that will prevent their recurrence. A window of opportunity is opening. If Congress does not take advantage of this moment to reclaim the power of the purse, its chances of rebalancing the separation of powers may well diminish over time.

War Powers Resolution is flawed

Center for Constitutional Rights 2009. (non-profit legal and educational organization, includes attorneys who litigate for civil rights issues. The material in this quote was written by: Annette Warren Dickerson, Qa’id Jacobs, C. Lynne Kates, Jules Lobel, Sara Miles, Nicholas Modino, Jen Nessel, Alison Roh Park, Michael Ratner, Vincent Warren and Peter Weiss) “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution” <http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf>

The War Powers Resolution, as written, was flawed in several key respects. The first flaw was that the Resolution imposed no operative, substantive limitations on the executive’s power to initiate warfare, but rather created a time limit of 60 days on the president’s use of troops in hostile situations without explicit congressional authorization. This approach was a mistake, because as a practical matter it recognized that the President could engage in unilateral war-making for up to 60 days, or 90 days with an extension. But the Constitution requires that Congress provide authorization prior to initiating non-defensive war, not within a period of months after warfare is initiated. As history has demonstrated time and again, it is difficult to terminate warfare once hostilities have begun. The key time for Congress to weigh in is before hostilities are commenced, not 60 or 90 days afterward. Secondly, the War Powers Resolution correctly recognized that even congressional silence, inaction or even implicit approval does not allow the president to engage in warfare – but it failed to provide an adequate enforcement mechanism if the president did so. Under the resolution, wars launched by the executive were supposed to be automatically terminated after 60 or 90 days if not affirmatively authorized by Congress – but this provision proved unenforceable. Presidents simply ignored it, Congress had an insufficient interest in enforcing it and the courts responded by effectually saying: if Congress did nothing, why should we?

WPR can’t solve for unauthorized Presidential expansion of an existing war

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

Nonetheless, the War Powers Resolution, passed in the wake of Vietnam, continues to suppose that wars come in only two sizes. It distinguishes between very short-term interventions and the rest. The resolution authorizes the president to make brief interventions unilaterally—giving him sixty days to use military force without legislative approval. But the president has to go to Congress for explicit authorization during this period if he wants to sustain his offensive for a longer period. The idea behind this compromise was simple: the president should have the power to fend off momentary threats, but he must work with Congress to carry out any significant military conflict. This allowed the country to maintain its deep commitment to interbranch cooperation while permitting it to respond to short-term emergencies. But the compromise failed to acknowledge that modern war is limited war. And the challenge of limited war is not merely to induce the president to seek Congress’s approval at the start. The real problem is in enforcing the limits once the war is already underway.

President can start a war with already-appropriated funds, then hit Congress with “emergency” requests

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

We have come a long way from the Founding Era, when the president was obliged to gain fine-grained funding from Congress before he could engage in significant military action. Nowadays, Congress is playing catchup. The president can generally start a war with already appropriated funds, and then start bludgeoning Congress with an endless series of “emergency” appropriations.

Elsewhere in the same article, Ackerman and Hathaway explain the conclusion:

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

Our aim, in short, has been to place the ongoing normalization of “emergency” budgeting into larger constitutional perspective. While it only required the majority vote of a single house to deny the president the money he needed to start a war during the Founding period, it now takes two-thirds of both houses to cut off a war even after it has begun.

Full context: Why Congress can’t easily cut off war funding under Status Quo - not as the Constitution originally designed it

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

Perhaps some future act of resistance will involve the outright rejection of an emergency funding request. But congressional resistance will likely take a more cautious form. Under this scenario, Congress would reluctantly pass the president’s emergency request, and then pass another bill cutting off funds at some future date—say a year or so—to allow the troops to get out of harm’s way. While this maneuver would effectively insulate Congress from charges that it is “endangering the troops in the field,” it comes at a heavy institutional price: the funding cut-off would require two-thirds support in both houses to overcome a presidential veto. Our aim, in short, has been to place the ongoing normalization of “emergency” budgeting into larger constitutional perspective. While it only required the majority vote of a single house to deny the president the money he needed to start a war during the Founding period, it now takes two-thirds of both houses to cut off a war even after it has begun.

Presidents commit armed forces into hostilities without authorization from Congress

Richard F. Grimmett 2010. (Specialist in International Security, Congressional Research Service) 22 Apr 2010 “The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41199.pdf>

In the post-Cold War world, Presidents have continued to commit U.S. Armed Forces into potential hostilities, sometimes without a specific authorization from Congress. Thus the War Powers Resolution and its purposes continue to be a potential subject of controversy. On June 7, 1995, the House defeated, by a vote of 217-201, an amendment to repeal the central features of the War Powers Resolution that have been deemed unconstitutional by every President since the law’s enactment in 1973.

G.W. Bush and Obama both violated Congressional war mandates in Iraq

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

The recent Iraq War exemplifies this challenge. When Congress authorized the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it did not give President Bush the carte blanche he sought. It self-consciously restricted the war’s aims to narrow purposes, expressly authorizing a limited war. Yet the president transformed a well-defined and limited mission into an open-ended conflict with changing aims. The critical moment came during the final months of the Bush Administration. Despite Obama’s victory at the polls, President Bush broke statutory limits on the war without requesting congressional approval. He asserted his authority to transform a limited war into an unlimited one by concluding an executive agreement with the Iraqi government. Despite the protests of congressional leaders, including then-Senators Joseph Biden, Hillary Clinton, and Barack Obama, the Bush Administration simply cut Congress out of the international lawmaking process, leaving the executive agreement as its legal legacy. This represented a breathtaking assertion of presidential authority to redefine war aims without the consent of Congress. Once the Democratic leaders in the Senate took over the executive branch, however, they failed to challenge Bush’s assertion of presidential prerogative. They silently accepted his unilateral actions, allowing them to serve as the foundation of their own Iraq policy.

Obama violated War Powers Act in Libya in 2011, just like other Presidents of both parties

Rep. Chris Gibson 2011. (congressman from New York, former professor of American government) 25 May 2011 “War Powers, United States Operations in Libya, and Related Legislation” Testimony of Rep. Chris Gibson (NY20) House Committee on Foreign Affairs, <http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/gib052511.pdf>

Last Friday marked 60 days since the administration began operations in Libya and we are now not in compliance with the War Powers Act. While it is somewhat encouraging that in recent days the President has taken the steps to obtain Congressional approval, it is unclear why he waited until the 60-day period had passed, and why he sought approval from several international organizations prior to the mission, but failed to consult or seek statutory authorization from Congress. In view of the War Powers Act, I believe the President’s actions are on dubious constitutional grounds but I want to be clear, this is not a new phenomenon. Presidents from both parties have been on dubious grounds with regard to the War Powers Act, perhaps not surprising given that no President since its enactment has acknowledged its constitutionality. It’s time to bring clarity to the situation and to resolve the matter of Presidential War Powers.

Status Quo policy on war powers violates the Constitution

Herbert L. Fenster 2012. (expert in Government Contract Law; extensive experience in the negotiation, interpretation, and litigation of contracts for major weapons systems; holds degrees in architecture/civil engineering, history, and economics from the University of Pennsylvania, and is a graduate of the University of Virginia Law School; served as litigation counsel for the Reagan-Bush Campaign Committee and for the Grace Commission; director of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce National Chamber Litigation Center and a corporate and foundation director and trustee; General Counsel of the National Defense University Foundation) 24 Jan 2012 “The Great War Powers Misconstruction” JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POICY <http://www.jnslp.com/2012/01/24/the-great-war-powers-misconstruction/>

Congress owns all of the powers to create and field a military (no matter how the powers are defined), and the President has the executive authority. The involvement of the United States in multiple military conflicts, ultimately at the behest of the President and not the Congress, is evidence that currently both the executive and legislative branches operate contrary to the mandates of the Constitution. Thus, the notion of war powers must be reconsidered.

Without reform, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 will leave the debate over war powers paralyzed

Center for Constitutional Rights 2009. (non-profit legal and educational organization, includes attorneys who litigate for civil rights issues. The material in this quote was written by: Annette Warren Dickerson, Qa’id Jacobs, C. Lynne Kates, Jules Lobel, Sara Miles, Nicholas Modino, Jen Nessel, Alison Roh Park, Michael Ratner, Vincent Warren and Peter Weiss) “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution” <http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf>

In a great many instances, neither the President nor Congress, nor even the courts have been willing to trigger the War Powers Resolution mechanism. This is in part because the courts will not enforce the Resolution where Congress is either silent or acts ambiguously, even though the law clearly requires the troops to be withdrawn in such circumstances. In 1999, in the case of Yugoslavia, Congress voted not to authorize war, yet failed to pass legislation ordering the troops home and in fact funded the military action. Clearly, without reform of the legislation to address its weaknesses and without a concerted effort by a new executive in concert with Congress, the debate over war powers and responsibilities will remain paralyzed.

Drone attacks violate Constitutional safeguards requiring Congress to authorize war

Dr. Peter W. Singer 2012. (PhD in government, Harvard; Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution; served as coordinator of the Obama 2008 campaign’s defense policy task force) 22 Jan 2012 “Do Drones Undermine Democracy?” <http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0122_drones_singer.aspx>

A deep deliberation on war was something the framers of the Constitution sought to build into our system. Yet on Tuesday, when President Obama talks about his wartime accomplishments during the State of the Union address, Congress will have to admit that its role has been reduced to the same part it plays during the president’s big speech. These days, when it comes to authorizing war, Congress generally sits there silently, except for the occasional clapping. And we do the same at home. Last year, I met with senior Pentagon officials to discuss the many tough issues emerging from our growing use of robots in war. One of them asked, “So, who then is thinking about all this stuff?” America’s founding fathers may not have been able to imagine robotic drones, but they did provide an answer. The Constitution did not leave war, no matter how it is waged, to the executive branch alone.

War Powers Resolution is flawed, disrespected and not enforced

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>

In sum, the WPR combines several elements of a sensible process for making war powers decisions (including reporting, consultation, and a clear statement rule) with a constitutionally under-inclusive definition of the President’s defensive war powers and a constitutionally problematical sixty-day clock. Consequently, presidents have given only lip service to even the beneficial parts of the process and ignored or rejected the rest. Congress, in turn, has sometimes taken the sixty-day clock as an excuse to do nothing, instead of reaching a collective judgment about uses of force. The courts, mindful that Congress often looks the other way when the President has abused the WPR process, have looked away themselves. The WPR is sometimes said to have “pricked the conscience”of the political branches in use-of-force situations by prompting some information flow and dialogue, at least about compliance with WPR procedures, if not about the merits of a use of force. Even if this is true, the benefit is substantially outweighed by the WPR’s underinclusive view of the President’s defensive war powers and the interpretation of the sixty-day clock to give a free pass to the political branches, as well as by the continuing disrespect for the rule of law bred by the general desuetude of this law.

War Powers Resolution not upheld by Congress nor Presidents because of its 60-day time limit

Richard F. Grimmett 2010. (Specialist in International Security, Congressional Research Service) 22 Apr 2010 “The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Six Years” <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41199.pdf>

The automatic withdrawal provision has become perhaps the most controversial provision of the War Powers Resolution. Section 5(b) requires the President to withdraw U.S. forces from hostilities within 60-90 days after a report is submitted or required to be submitted under section 4(a)(1). The triggering of the time limit has been a major factor in the reluctance of Presidents to report, or Congress to insist upon a report, under section 4(a)(1).

Congressional oversight through “power of the purse” has failed: We need a new mechanism to restore the constitutional balance

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

Congress has lost the oversight capacity that made the power of the purse such a potent means of military control at the time of the Founding. Nevertheless, it has not given up trying to use its budgetary powers to keep limited wars from escalating. Despite the obstacles created by a transformed appropriations system, these efforts have been occasionally successful. But these successes have been so erratic and unpredictable that they will have little deterrent effect on future assertions of presidential unilateralism. If Congress hopes to police the boundaries of limited war, it must confront the transformations in the larger appropriations system, and create new Rules for Limited War that recalibrate the constitutional balance.

“Libya was NATO, not US” - Response: US Admiral was running it

Prof. Bruce Ackerman and Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (professors of law and political science at Yale Univ.) 18 May 2011, “Opinions Death of the War Powers Act?” WASHINGTON POST <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/death-of-the-war-powers-act/2011/05/17/AF3Jh35G_story.html>

Why, then, hasn’t the president been pressing Congress to approve the war before the looming deadline? Because it’s easier to paper over the problem with new legal fictions pretending that the time limit doesn’t apply to this instance. By Friday, the administration’s legal team is likely to announce that the clock stopped ticking on April 1 — the date when NATO “took the lead” in the bombing campaign. Since NATO is running the show, the argument will go, the War Powers Act no longer applies, and the president doesn’t have to go back to Congress after all. But American planes and drones continued their bombing long after the April turnover — and the drones are still flying over Libya. Since the cost of the mission is at three-quarters of a billion dollars and climbing, it is sheer fiction to suggest that we are no longer a vital player in NATO’s “Operation Unified Protector.” This is especially so when an active-duty American officer remains at the top of NATO’s chain of command. As supreme allied commander, Adm. James Stavridis “leads all NATO military operations.”

“Consulting” or “Notifying” Congress isn’t enough: We need specific legislation authorizing use of force

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>

Neither consulting nor notifying Congress is a substitute for its collective judgment expressed in authorizing legislation. In any case, all members of the War Powers Initiative agree that it is in the President’s institutional interests and in the national interest for the use of force abroad to be supported by the collective judgment of Congress and the President, because such a judgment reflects a political consensus that makes them jointly responsible for the resulting costs. To persuade a majority of both houses of Congress to make the collective judgment that the use of force is in the national interest, a President must, in effect, persuade the people. If he cannot persuade the people’s representatives, he is unlikely to persuade the people who elected them.

Example of failure of budget process: Iraq and Afghanistan. President can start the initial invasion out of general funds

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

As we have seen, Congress now grants the Defense Department vast sums under very broad categories, giving the president immense discretion to reallocate funds from one activity to another. This permitted President Bush to seize fiscal control at the very outset of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He could finance the initial invasions out of general funds, without seeking any special appropriations for the use of military force.

Current budget process leads to inadequate Congressional consideration of war-related issues

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

In further normalizing the “emergency” approach, the new president did indulge in a bit of public hand-wringing. Recalling his campaign promise, he pledged to submit future funding requests through the regular appropriations system. But these brave words were soon forgotten when money began to run out again in 2010: with political opposition to the Afghan war on the rise, the political advantages of another emergency appropriation were too tempting to ignore. Once again, Obama acquiesced in a deeply problematic innovation by his predecessor, and thereby enhanced its standing as a bipartisan precedent for future presidents. This recent history stacks the deck further against the responsible use of the power of the purse. Worse yet, these “emergency” bills often include lots of other items that have nothing to do with the war. Since they are destined for expedited treatment, they provide a tempting vehicle for funding pork barrel projects of interest to particular members of Congress. This will allow future administrations to pacify potential war critics by supporting their special-interest amendments to the emergency package. The normalization of emergency funding, then, not only misleads the public and eliminates the participation of key committees; it can even deflect the attention of Congress entirely from the question of war and peace to the pork-barrel priorities of individual members. A positive vote for continuing the next war may merely signify the successful conclusion of a feeding frenzy, supported by the executive branch.

“Minor Repair - Congress just cuts off funding for unpopular war” - Response: Budget process blocks Congress from effective use of “power of the purse” to control war spending

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

According to the conventional wisdom, Congress lacks the political will to use the power of the purse to stop presidential war-making in its tracks. While this may have been true in particular cases, Congress has in fact demonstrated political forcefulness on many occasions. The key modern problem is Congress’s lack of institutional capacity to exercise its political will. It has allowed the budgetary process to evolve in ways that make it extraordinarily difficult to act decisively.As our Iraq case study shows, the Bush Administration was in a position to pay for the initial invasion with money appropriated for other purposes. It then funded the war through a series of well-timed requests for “emergency” supplemental appropriations. By deferring these requests to the last minute, President Bush put Congress in an untenable position. If it refused funding to enforce its statutory limitations on the war, it would be accused of abandoning the troops in the field. This was too high a political price to pay to force the president to retreat from Iraq, as the initial congressional authorization required. The strategic use of emergency appropriations allowed the president to engage in “bait-and-switch” tactics that undermined effective democratic control over the use of military force. Following the Iraq precedent, future presidents will be able to “bait” Congress and the American people into approving a limited war, and then “switch” to a much longer war with more ambitious objectives. Serious congressional consideration of these escalating war aims will be short-circuited by the repeated use of the “emergency” appropriations device. This diagnosis suggests the need for an institutional remedy. The Iraq case shows that it is not enough for the initial authorization of force to specify the limited purposes of the war. It must also specify the limited time period for the conflict, requiring the president to return for an explicit reauthorization if he wishes to extend the war beyond the preset period.

Budget is so complicated that Congress has lost control over defense policy

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, (brackets added) Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

By the early 1960s, Congress had essentially lost control over the process: “the totals involved in the defense budget have become so great, the lump-sums and carry-overs so large, the discretion to shift funds from one category to another so extensive, that budgetary controls have actually provided Congress with little leverage over policy.” [quoting Raymond H. Dawson, Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy: Legislative Authorization of Weapons Systems, 56 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 42, 44 (1962)]

“Congress can always stop the President by cutting off funding” - Response: President has the constitutional burden to obtain authorization from Congress before conducting war

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>

The President may constitutionally use force abroad for a range of defensive purposes, including some counter-terrorist operations, depending on their scope and duration and other factors listed above. But the President otherwise cannot constitutionally conduct war, or preventive war, without obtaining prior congressional authorization. Beyond this range of defensive war powers, the burden lies on the President to obtain the authorization. The constitutional rule is that the President can lawfully fight wars for other than a range of defensive purposes only if Congress has authorized it, not that the President may fight it until Congress has stopped it.

“Congress can just stop the funding” - Response: Budget process reverses it. Now Congress must vote to stop a war, and the President can veto

John Yoo’s claim about “Congress can just do nothing” are misleading

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 (brackets and ellipses in original) <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

As Reid Skibell put it, “There is a general academic consensus that Congress can countermand an executive decision to commit troops abroad through spending restrictions. . . . [T]he spending power has become Congress’s primary tool in influencing military . . . decisions.” Even super-strong presidentialists like John Yoo agree: “[A]ll Congress need do is nothing . . .” and the war effort will be starved by lack of funds. But Yoo’s claim is deeply misleading. Congress has to act affirmatively if it wants to stop a war in its tracks. For starters, modern day appropriations give the president enormous discretion in military spending. As a Congressional Research Service memo explained at the dawn of the Iraq war: “In regular defense appropriations bills, money for operation and maintenance . . . is typically appropriated in very broad categories, which has allowed Administrations to deploy forces into regions of potential conflict without advance funding approval from Congress.” Once the president starts a war with already appropriated funds, he can make repeated use of last-minute emergency supplemental appropriations to bludgeon Congress into appropriating additional funds. Congressional opposition will predictably crumble if the only alternative is to deprive the troops of “bullets and body armor.” To act effectively, Congress must pass separate legislation cutting off further funding at some future date. But these cut-offs are subject to a presidential veto, requiring an override by a two-thirds majority in both houses.

Status Quo Congressional “Power of the Purse” is no longer an effective means of controlling war powers

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

The radical transformation of limited into unlimited war was made possible by the erosion of Congress’s most powerful tool for controlling military force—the power of the purse. Congress has failed to adapt this power to meet modern challenges. What was once a highly effective mechanism for forcing the president to operate within congressional limits has eroded over the course of two centuries.

General funding of Defense Dept means President can start a war without specific Congressional authorization

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

As we have seen, Congress now grants the Defense Department vast sums under very broad categories, giving the president immense discretion to reallocate funds from one activity to another. This permitted President Bush to seize fiscal control at the very outset of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He could finance the initial invasions out of general funds, without seeking any special appropriations for the use of military force.

Status Quo Congressional budget process bypasses deliberation about war funding - result is political blackmail and unconstitutional Presidential powers

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

For starters, the “emergency” label enables the president to evade the longer-term, and more disciplined, reviews characteristic of the standard budgetary process. Under congressional rules, “emergency” requests bypass the authorizing committees, like the Senate Armed Services Committee, and go directly to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. As the Iraq Study Group pointed out, these committees are then “pressured by the need to act quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds.” The result is a spending bill that “passes Congress with perfunctory review.” This end-run not only undermines thoughtful and disciplined congressional deliberation; it is an invitation to blatant forms of political blackmail. These emotional appeals were on display when President Bush began his sustained political campaign to transform the Iraqi war into an unlimited conflict. A critical moment came three days after President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki signed the Declaration of Principles that would ultimately allow the president to break free of congressional war limitations. The administration suddenly announced that the immediate injection of funds was necessary to provide soldiers in the field with such basics as “bullets and body armor.” Against this background, members of Congress had little choice but to vote “yes” within three weeks. With funds running out again in June 2008, Congress again approved another “emergency” appropriation — allowing Bush to continue negotiating his unconstitutional agreements with Maliki with confidence that his critics could not cut off military funding until after he had left the White House.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

Congress alone was given the constitutional authority to initiate war

Louis Fisher 2012. (Scholar in Residence at the Constitution Project; worked for four decades at the Library of Congress as Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers) 24 Jan 2012 Basic Principles of the War Power, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY <http://www.jnslp.com/2012/01/24/basic-principles-of-the-war-power/>

The Framers of the U.S. Constitution assigned to Congress many of the powers of external affairs previously vested in the English king. That allocation of authority is central to America’s democratic and constitutional system. When decisions about armed conflict, whether overt or covert, slip from the elected members of Congress, the principles of self-government and popular sovereignty are undermined. Political power shifts to an executive branch with two elected officials and a long history of costly, poorly conceived military commitments. The Framers anticipated and warned against the hazards of Executive wars. In a republican form of government, the sovereign power rests with the citizens and the individuals they elect to public office. Congress alone was given the constitutional authority to initiate war.

“Commander in Chief” power is not unlimited - it’s subject to Congress

Louis Fisher 2012. (Scholar in Residence at the Constitution Project; worked for four decades at the Library of Congress as Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers) 24 Jan 2012 Basic Principles of the War Power, JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY <http://www.jnslp.com/2012/01/24/basic-principles-of-the-war-power/>

The Commander in Chief Clause is sometimes interpreted as an exclusive, plenary power of the President, free of statutory checks. It is not. Instead, it offers several protections for republican, constitutional government. Importantly, it preserves civilian supremacy over the military. The individual leading the armed forces is an elected civilian, not a general or admiral. Attorney General Edward Bates in 1861 concluded that the President is Commander in Chief not because he is “skilled in the art of war and qualified to marshal a host in the field of battle.” He possesses that title for a different reason. Whatever military officer leads U.S. forces against an enemy, “he is subject to the orders of the civil magistrate, and he and his army are always ‘subordinate to the civil power.’” Congress is an essential part of that civil power.

“Declare War clause is just a formality” - Response: Not in context of the Founders; they intended it to be a binding limit against any initiation of military action

Dr. Thomas E. Woods 2011. (PhD history, Columbia Univ.) March 2011 “The Phony Arguments for Presidential War Powers” <http://www.tomwoods.com/warpowers/> (brackets added)

Consider also that as the Constitution was being debated, Federalists sought to reassure skeptical anti-Federalists that the president’s powers were not so expansive after all. For one thing, the Federalists said, the president lacked the power to declare war. In order for their argument to carry any weight, “declare war” must have been taken to mean the power to initiate hostilities – for no anti-Federalist would have been appeased by “Sure, the president can take the country to war on his own initiative, but the power to draft declaratory statements will rest with Congress!” If [Professor John] Yoo’s argument were correct, we should expect to see presidents in the years immediately following ratification of the Constitution taking bold military action without concerning themselves much about the will of Congress, which according to Yoo had only the power to issue declaratory statements. But as we have seen in the examples of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson, the opposite was in fact the case; these early presidents were careful to defer to Congress.

Even for action against terrorism and WMDs, Congress should be asked for authorization

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>(brackets added)

The Declare War Clause gives Congress the choice between authorizing the use of force abroad by declaration of war or by legislation. Public accountability for the decision to use force requires that Congress speak as clearly in legislation as it does in a declaration. Under this constitutionally-derived clear statement rule, which is restated in the WPR [the War Powers Resolution of 1973], authorization for the use of force abroad should not usually be inferred from a general defense appropriation, let alone from other legislation regarding military procurement, conscription or other collateral subjects. However, the nature and source of terrorist attacks and threats posed by WMD [weapons of mass destruction], and the need for secrecy and speed in clandestine operations against them, may justify more general authorization of some counter-terrorist operations that are not already authorized by the President’s defensive war power. Even in such cases, Congress must always state the purposes and scope of its authorization as clearly as the circumstances permit in order to satisfy the constitutional objectives of legislative deliberation and political accountability.

Now is key time for reform: Obama is solidifying the abuses of Bush

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

We are likely to see this scenario repeated in the future. President Bush’s successful bait-and-switch in Iraq has created a deeply troubling precedent that threatens the democratic check by Congress required by the Constitution. Instead of challenging this precedent, the Obama Administration is on the verge of consolidating it through acquiescence. There is a pressing need for institutional reform that allows Congress to restore our endangered balance of powers.

Constitution requires shared responsibility for war powers

Robert McMahon, last updated 2011. (master's degree in international relations from Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy) last updated 20 June 2011 “Balance of War Powers: The U.S. President and Congress,” <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/balance-war-powers-us-president-congress/p13092>

Susan Low Bloch, a constitutional law expert at the Georgetown University Law Center, says the framers of the Constitution deliberately divided the war powers between the two branches to induce them to work together on such a vital issue. "I don't know if they expected conflict, but they wanted coordination and cooperation and shared responsibility," Bloch says.

Unauthorized Presidential expansion of “limited war” is a real threat to the constitutional allocation of power

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

The constitutional limits on the use of force have been violated in two classes of cases. In the first, the president uses military force without congressional approval. A frequently mentioned example is President Clinton’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999 under the auspices of NATO. In the second, the president seeks and receives a limited authorization for the use of force from Congress but then ignores the limits. The first type of constitutional violation is troubling but infrequent—Kosovo notwithstanding. Since the adoption of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, modern presidents have repeatedly asserted the constitutional authority to commit troops without seeking congressional approval, but have nonetheless sought and received the congressional authorization that the War Powers Resolution requires (putting aside cases authorized by U.N. Security Council resolution). The second type of violation is almost never discussed, but it poses a serious and very real threat to the constitutional allocation of power.

“FOUNDING FATHERS” ARGUMENTS - They didn’t support Presidential war powers without Congressional approval

“Congress controls major wars, but lesser uses of force are reserved to the president” - Response: Supreme Court in 1800 said Congress had power to regulate even limited war and not the President

Dr. Thomas E. Woods 2011. (PhD history, Columbia Univ.) March 2011 “The Phony Arguments for Presidential War Powers”<http://www.tomwoods.com/warpowers/>

“Congress may have some power over major wars, but lesser uses of force are reserved to the president alone.” The evidence from the early republic contradicts this claim. Supreme Court justice Samuel Chase summed up the reigning doctrine in 1800: “Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or congress may wage a limited war; limited in place, in objects and in time.”

“Congress controls major wars, but lesser uses of force are reserved to the president” - Response: Supreme Court in 1804 said Congress regulates even limited war

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The 1804 case of *Little v. Barreme* involved a ship commander who, during the Quasi War with France in the late 1790s, had seized a ship that he thought was illegally trading with France. The commander was following a directive from President John Adams in seizing this ship, which had been coming from France. But Congress had authorized President Adams only to seize ships going *to* France; in short, the president’s directive ventured beyond what congress had called for in this limited war. In a unanimous decision, the Court declared that the commander was liable for damages even though he had acted in accordance with a presidential directive. No such presidential directive could override the authority of Congress, said the Court.

The President can only act alone to repel sudden attacks. Alexander Hamilton said the President directs the war after Congress authorizes it

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“The president has the power to initiate hostilities without consulting Congress.”

Ever since the Korean War, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution – which refers to the president as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States” – has been interpreted this way. But what the framers actually meant by that clause was that once war has been declared, it was the President’s responsibility as commander-in-chief to direct the war. Alexander Hamilton spoke in such terms when he said that the president, although lacking the power to declare war, would have “the direction of war when authorized or begun.” The president acting alone was authorized only to repel sudden attacks (hence the decision to withhold from him only the power to “declare” war, not to “make” war, which was thought to be a necessary emergency power in case of foreign attack).

Constitutional Convention delegates said war and peace should be managed by the legislature

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At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates expressly disclaimed any intention to model the American executive exactly after the British monarchy. James Wilson, for example, remarked that the powers of the British king did not constitute “a proper guide in defining the executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace.” Edmund Randolph likewise contended that the delegates had “no motive to be governed by the British Government as our prototype.”

Founding Father James Wilson said a single man would not have the power to involve us in war

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James Wilson assured the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, “This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives: from this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our interest can draw us into war.”

George Washington only used the military for defensive measures, and waited for Congress to approve anything further

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In conformity with this understanding, George Washington’s operations on his own authority against the Indians were confined to defensive measures, conscious as he was that the approval of Congress would be necessary for anything further. “The Constitution vests the power of declaring war with Congress,” he said, “therefore no offensive expedition of importance can be undertaken until after they have deliberated upon the subject, and authorized such a measure.”

Pres. John Adams waited for Congressional approval for military action against France

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Supporters of a broad executive war power have sometimes appealed to the Quasi War with France, in the closing years of the eighteenth century, as an example of unilateral warmaking on the part of the president. Francis Wormuth, an authority on war powers and the Constitution, describes that contention as “altogether false.” John Adams “took absolutely no independent action. Congress passed a series of acts that amounted, so the Supreme Court said, to a declaration of imperfect war; and Adams complied with these statutes.”

Jefferson’s war with the Barbary pirates was authorized by Congress

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Jefferson consistently deferred to Congress in his dealings with the Barbary pirates. “Recent studies by the Justice Department and statements made during congressional debate,” Louis Fisher writes, “imply that Jefferson took military measures against the Barbary powers without seeking the approval or authority of Congress. In fact, in at least ten statutes, Congress explicitly authorized military action by Presidents Jefferson and Madison. Congress passed legislation in 1802 to authorize the President to equip armed vessels to protect commerce and seamen in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and adjoining seas.

“Hundreds of historical examples justify Presidential military intervention without Congress” - Response: Those examples aren’t parallel with what modern Presidents are doing

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In 1966, in defense of the Vietnam War, the State Department adopted a similar line: “Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 125 instances in which the President has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain positions abroad without obtaining prior congressional authorization, starting with the ‘undeclared war’ with France (1798-1800).” We have already seen that the war with France in no way lends support to those who favor broad presidential war powers. As for the rest, the great presidential scholar Edward S. Corwin pointed out that this lengthy list of alleged precedents consisted mainly of “fights with pirates, landings of small naval contingents on barbarous or semi-barbarous coasts, the dispatch of small bodies of troops to chase bandits or cattle rustlers across the Mexican border, and the like.” To support their position, therefore, the neoconservatives and their left-liberal clones *are counting chases of cattle rustlers as examples of presidential warmaking*, and as precedents for sending millions of Americans into war with foreign governments on the other side of the globe.

“UN Charter authorizes the President to act” - Response: UN Charter says action must be approved by Constitutional process, and that means Congress

Dr. Thomas E. Woods 2011. (PhD history, Columbia Univ.) March 2011 “The Phony Arguments for Presidential War Powers” <http://www.tomwoods.com/warpowers/>

“If the United Nations authorizes military action, the president does not need to consult Congress.” The UN Charter itself notes that the Security Council’s commitment of member nations’ troops must be authorized by these nations’ “respective constitutional processes.” The Congressional Research Service’s Louis Fisher explains further: “Assured by Truman that he understood and respected the war prerogatives of Congress, the Senate ratified the UN Charter. Article 43 provided that all UN members shall make available to the Security Council, in accordance with special agreements, armed forces and other assistance. Each nation would ratify those agreements ‘in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.’ It then became the obligation of Congress to pass legislation to define the constitutional processes of the United States. Section 6 of the UN Participation Act of 1945 states with singular clarity that the special agreements ‘shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution.’ The procedure was specific and clear. Both branches knew what the Constitution required. The President would first have to obtain the approval of Congress.”

SOLVENCY / ADVOCACY / ADVANTAGES

The Plan is constitutional and enforceable

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

The Constitution gives either chamber the authority to change its rules governing future authorizations for the use of force. Under our proposed “Rules for Limited War,” all future authorizations will be valid for only two years unless the House or Senate sets a different time-limit—or declares that the war should continue, without limit, until victory is achieved. But unless Congress makes this decision explicit in its initial authorizing resolution, the two-year term will serve as a default rule. The new rules will be enforced through a prohibition on all war appropriations after the congressional deadline, except for money needed to wind down the mission over the course of one year.

Advocacy: House & Senate need rules to block war appropriations until President gets Congressional approval

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

To back up these time limits, the House and Senate will require another set of rules. These enforcement provisions prohibit all further war appropriations, except for a one-year fund for winding down the mission. The ban would include all appropriations that extend the engagement beyond the withdrawal period—whether in a regular or “emergency” appropriations bill. If the president wants to continue the war, he can do so only by obtaining a new authorization—in which Congress can consider the merits of further fighting without the emotional blackmail involved in an endless series of “emergency” funding measures.

Clear time limit is the only way to stop presidential “bait-and-switch” tactics

[B & S = President gets Congress to vote for a limited military engagement and then expands it without authorization]

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

There is every reason to expect the president’s lawyers to adopt similarly creative interpretive approaches to future qualitative limitations. The more legal fog they generate, the easier it will be to engage in bait-and-switch, with the president relying on their legal analysis to deny that he is escalating the war far beyond the express terms of the initial war authorization. This is the reason why the new rules rely on a quantitative approach to limited war. Our proposed two-year default rule authorizes the president to make war for 730 days. Even the most creative lawyers will have a hard time wriggling their way out of the default time limit, or any other time period that Congress selects to replace it. Although qualitative restrictions on war aims can play a useful supplementary role, only quantitative restrictions have the hard-edged clarity essential for effectively constraining presidential bait-and-switch—a central design objective for the system as a whole.

Congress must be able to limit the President’s use of military force

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

All these cases add up to a clear principle: the president must respect congressional limits on the use of military force. Congress’s power is not unbounded. It cannot, for example, interfere with the commander in chief’s ability to control military strategy. But it can, as Justice Chase said in Bas v. Tingy, authorize “a limited war; limited in place, in objects, and in time.”These restrictions do not interfere with the president’s authority to execute the war within these limits. If Congress authorizes war in Iraq, the president may not use the authorization to wage war in Iran. If Congress authorizes war to carry out a Security Council resolution, the president may not continue the war after the resolution has expired. And if Congress authorizes war for a period of two years, the president cannot wage war for a decade. Time and again, the Court has reaffirmed Congress’s power to limit the president’s use of military force. This principle is now well-settled. The challenge, as the next Part shows, is for Congress to develop the institutional capacity to back up this principle with effective action when the president tries to violate it.

Ackerman & Hathaway plan provides flexibility and forces open debate on war authorization

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

The default rule provides the needed flexibility without abandoning the more fundamental point: most wars are fought for limited objectives that require reappraisal from time to time. Given this fact, the new rules force Congress to frame the terms of its initial war commitment self-consciously after an open and focused public debate. This initial termination point can, of course, be extended if Congress passes a new reauthorization before the period has expired—and as before, this new bill will be subject to a two-year default unless it specifies some other term explicitly.

Funds should be prohibited for unauthorized use of military force

Courts should oversee war powers challenges

Congress should impeach the President for violations

Center for Constitutional Rights 2009. (non-profit legal and educational organization, includes attorneys who litigate for civil rights issues. The material in this quote was written by: Annette Warren Dickerson, Qa’id Jacobs, C. Lynne Kates, Jules Lobel, Sara Miles, Nicholas Modino, Jen Nessel, Alison Roh Park, Michael Ratner, Vincent Warren and Peter Weiss) “Restore. Protect. Expand. Amend the War Powers Resolution” <http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_White_WarPowers.pdf>

To ensure that this principle is enforced, new legislation should prohibit the use of appropriated funds for any executive use of force that is unauthorized under the statute. Furthermore, the reformed War Powers Resolution must allow room for judicial oversight in the case of conflicts. A president who initiates hostilities in disregard of the statute would undoubtedly use appropriated funds to do so, forcing Congress to make the difficult decision of whether to authorize funds for troops engaged in combat. The statute should therefore state that a presidential violation of the act would create an impasse with Congress, and that separation of powers principles require the Court to decide the merits of any challenge brought against an alleged violation. And, a presidential violation of this principle should be explicitly made an impeachable offense.

Plan creates incentives for President to negotiate with Congress over war funding

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

The endgame will loom large as early as Period One. Since the president has reason to believe that a bait-and-switch will be very costly later on, he will have strong incentives to be more realistic about the war’s potential costs at Period One—as we have seen, greater candor at this stage may allow him to persuade Congress to extend the term of initial authorization beyond the two-year default rule and thereby buy more political insurance at the outset of the venture. Similarly, the high costs of later defiance will encourage him to cooperate with Congress during Period Two, soliciting its advice in negotiations with countries in the battle zone and seeking its approval for any important agreements he reaches with the affected governments. In short, the costs of defiance play a central role in generating the deliberation-forcing and power-enhancing dynamics that provide the great constitutional advantages of the reform.

Plan has significant impact on Congressional-Presidential relations

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

Our proposal is designed to be both politically feasible and instrumentally effective in controlling the democratic pathologies of a presidential bait-and-switch. It builds on precedents developed by Congress to control the use of the appropriations power. Even if only a single chamber adopts the new rules, this action will catalyze a recalibration of our real-world system of checks and balances.The rules will have a significant impact on congressional–presidential relations long before matters reach the moment of final confrontation—when the president, after failing to convince Congress to authorize a further extension of the war effort, confronts a one-year “wind up” appropriation for the orderly withdrawal of troops from the battle zone.

Plan enhances Congress’ power over war by making the President negotiate with them

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

At the same time, our proposal will provide a much-needed boost to Congress in its ongoing dealings with the president. The proposal is therefore power-enhancing. To illustrate, consider a brief hypothetical variation on our Iraq case study. Begin by recalling some basic facts: as popular support for the war waned during 2008, President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki finally agreed to extend the war for three more years. During their lengthy negotiations, President Bush completely cut Congress out of the loop, even refusing to provide leading members with copies of the negotiating draft documents. Worse yet, he utterly ignored the demands of then-Senators Obama and Clinton to submit the agreement to Congress for its approval. Under the new rules, no president could afford to treat Congress with such contempt. After all, he will be obliged to gain reauthorization within the foreseeable future, and it would be foolish to antagonize the congressional leadership by locking them out of key negotiations. It makes much more strategic sense to co-opt key senators and representatives by keeping them abreast of the negotiations, and then to submit the president’s agreement for congressional approval.

Constitution says Congress can put limitations on use of force, and those limits are binding on the President

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

The Constitution and two centuries of practice have established a clear principle: Congress may impose limitations on the use of force and these limits are binding on the president. We begin with the text. Congress not only has the power to “declare War” and to “raise and support Armies.” It also has the power to grant “Letters of Marque and Reprisal.” Although this latter power has fallen into disuse (as have formal declarations of war), it does suggest the pervasive character of the congressional role at the time of the Founding. In the eighteenth century, letters of marquee and reprisal enabled Congress to authorize small-scale military actions by privateers—actions which could provoke retaliations that might lead to larger-scale war. There can be no mistaking, then, the Constitution’s broad textual commitment toCongress’s key role in the war-making system.

Multiple examples of Congress authorizing “limited wars”

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 (ellipses and brackets in original) <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf>

Other examples of limited war include the First Barbary War, the Spanish-American War, and the First Gulf War. In the First Barbary War, Congress provided authorization “to equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged requisite by the President . . . for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas.” An Act for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 129, 130 (1802). Congress also provided the authority “to subdue, seize and make prize of all vessels, goods and effects, belonging to the Bey of Tripoli, or to his subjects . . . .” Id. The congressional declaration of war in the Spanish-American War “directed and empowered [the president] to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States” for the specific purpose of ensuring that Spain “relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.”

JUSTIFICATIONS

If Presidents can start wars without Congress: Lives and money wasted on reckless military adventures

War Powers Initiative Committee of The Constitution Project, Co-Chaired by former Representative Mickey Edwards and former Representative David Skaggs, 2005. (Mickey Edwards - Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton Univ.; former Member of Congress (R-OK); David Skaggs - former Member of Congress (D-CO): Member of the Appropriations Committee and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Peter Raven-Hansen - professor of law, George Washington Univ.; Louis Fisher - Senior Specialist in Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; Thomas Franck - Professor of Law Emeritus at N.Y. Univ School of Law; Michael J. Glennon - Prof. of International Law, Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy at Tufts Univ.; Dr. Morton Halperin, former high-level official in the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department; Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Sec. of State for Democracy, Human Rights & Labor; Dr. Susan E. Rice, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs; James R. Sasser - Former senator from Tenn.; Jane Stromseth - Prof. of law at Georgetown Univ.; Patricia M. Wald - former Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit; Don Wallace Jr. - Prof of law, Georgetown Univ.; R. James Woolsey - former director of the CIA; Michael K. Young - former Dean of the George Washington Univ. Law School), FORCE ABROAD: WAR POWERS in a System of CHECKS AND BALANCES, <http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/28.pdf>

The framers shared the view that an absolute monarch would be prone to squandering his subjects’ lives and money on reckless military adventures. “Absolute monarchs,” John Jay wrote in The Federalist Papers, “will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.” The best precaution against unilateral war-making by the executive was to require a collective decision to go to war. “It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large,” James Wilson later explained to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. Moreover, vesting this power in the whole Congress meant that the popularly-elected House, the body most directly responsive to the voters, had to act and so helped to assure the widest possible political consensus for war. The Senate — originally chosen by state legislatures — could not alone provide this assurance. Since the people could not be asked directly whether the nation should go to war, requiring the assent of the House as well as the Senate was the next best thing. If presidents bent on war could not persuade the Congress, they presumably could not persuade the people either and would therefore lack the consensus required to assume the costs and risks of war.

Plan produces better decision-making about war

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But the new rules will not only encourage the president to go to Congress for the initial authorization. Once he gets there, he will engage Congress and the nation in a more candid conversation over the likely dimensions of theanticipated military commitment. As our Iraq case study suggests, the present setup makes it all-too-easy for the president to conduct a bait-and-switch operation. In contrast, the new rules encourage a different dialogue. It will no longer be in the president’s interest to minimize risks. He will avoid too dark an account, since this might lead Congress to vote down the authorization. But he will also avoid an overly rosy view—for this will lead Congress to authorize a short time period and increase the risk that he will be forced to return for a reauthorization of the limited war at an unpropitious moment. If he wants to buy more political insurance, he must ask Congress and the country to prepare themselves for a three- or four- year engagement and explain why this lengthy commitment is worth its likely cost in blood and treasure. The prospect of a more realistic dialogue with Congress will also have positive effects on executive deliberations over whether to go to war in the first place. Top policymakers will be more open to expert assessments of risks if they believe that they will have to return to Congress when its initial authorization proves too short to finish the job. And if bottom-up reports are very pessimistic, this might prompt the president to ask himself whether the limited war is worth fighting in the first place. This pressure toward more candid exchange—within the executive branch, and between the president and Congress and the American people— is one of the most promising features of the new constitutional regime. Call it “deliberation-forcing.”

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

“Time limit enables our enemies” - Responses: Not unique, we already have the election cycle every 2 years - the plan gives no additional advantage to our enemies

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In contrast to the new rules, the U.S. election schedule does provide a target date for enemy strategists—if they can demoralize voters just before the November polling date, this may well have a serious impact. And yet the rigid electoral calendar has not seriously impaired past war efforts—provided that the American people remained convinced of their necessity. All things considered, then, the new rules will not provide enemies with a significant strategic advantage beyond those already afforded by our fixed election calendar.

Funding cutoff date does not enable our enemies: President can and will ask Congress to reauthorize an ongoing war in advance of the cutoff date

Prof. Bruce Ackerman & Prof. Oona Hathaway 2011. (Ackerman - Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School; Hathaway - Professor of International Law, Yale Law School) LIMITED WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: IRAQ AND THE CRISIS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGALITY, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW Vol 109, Feb 2011 <http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/109/4/ackermanhathaway.pdf> (typographical error “many” for “may” was in the original; brackets added)

Even if this point is conceded, our not-so-hypothetical critic may come up with another, more nuanced, complaint: she many [may] insist that Congress’s selection of a particular expiration date—say, January 1, 2016—will serve as a reference point for enemy strategists, encouraging them to plan a spectacular series of attacks aimed to demoralize public opinion on New Year’s Day. Why hand this strategic opportunity to the enemy on a silver platter? Once again, this critique mistakes the nature of our proposal: the president is perfectly free to submit his request for reauthorization long before the expiration date, and thereby destabilize the enemy’s military plans. The new rules establish a deadline, not a target. And there is every reason to expect the president to act well before the deadline. He is perfectly aware that a last-minute request can be undermined by an unanticipated enemy offensive. This gives him a strong incentive to choose an earlier moment when the war is going relatively well, since this will make it much easier to gain a substantial war-extension from Congress.

“Emergencies justify Presidential war power” - Response: Even in “grave emergency,” the President should respect Congressional limits on war power

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Little v. Barreme’s insistence on Congress’s power to limit the scope of war was echoed in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion has since become the classic statement of presidential power. Even in a time of “grave emergency,” he explained, the president’s power is circumscribed by express and implied limits imposed by Congress.